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ENTRAPMENT AND TERRORISM
DRU STEVENSON *
Abstract: Antiterrorism is a national priority and undercover sting opera-
dons are a main antiterrorism tool. As our legal system's primary device
for regulating undercover stings, the scope and vigor of the entrapment
defense will impact the effectiveness of antiterrorism stings. The federal
courts follOw the subjective test of entrapment, focusing on whether the •
defendant was predisposed to commit the crime, or if rather the govern-
ment induced the defendant to breach a legal norm. This Article argues
that given the difficulty of preventing terrorist acts and the civil liberties
implications of intrusive surveillance—the alternative to stings—there
should be a rebuttable presumption that anyone who provides material
support to terrorism was predisposed to do so. This Article argues that
terrorism is such a heinous crime that it is unlikely the government could
induce someone to support such criminals unless the person was one of
the few predisposed to do so.
INTRODUCTION
An increase in antiterrorism activities by the government will pre-
sumably lead to a subsequent increase in cases involving the entrap-
ment defense.' Terror cells or conspiracies are necessarily clandestine.
* Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. The author would like to
thank research assistant Jay Clendenin for his helpful contributions to this article, and
fellow professors Geoff Corn, Adam Gershowitz, and Tim Zinnecker for their useful com-
ments, suggestions, and encouragement. Special thanks go to Army LTC Kelly Ward and
the members of the Game Theory class at the National War College, who provided an
opportunity to present the ideas in this article in March 2007; their insights about the per-
spectives of those involved in counterterrorism strategy were especially helpful.
I See, e.g., United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 178-80 (3d Cir. 2007); United States
v. Nettles, 476 F.3d 508, 517 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hale, 448 F.3d 971, 989 (7th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 142 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Polk,
118 F.3d 286, 289-91 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Aref, No. 04-CR-402, 2007
603508, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2007); United States v. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d 408, 413-14
(E.D.N.Y. 2007); Elgabrowny v. United States, No. S5 93 CR. 181(MBM), 2003 WL
22416167, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.. 22, 2003); United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 82,
107-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 CR. 1023, 2001 WL 30061,
at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2001) (describing surveillance and capture of Al Qaeda associate);
United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also John Caher,
Terrorism Trial of Muslims Raises Issues of Entrapment, 236 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 14, 2006, at 1, 1-2;
Scott Hiaasen, Did Feds Foil—or Foster—Terror Plot?, MIAMI HERALD, June 25, 2006, at A4;
Brendan J. Lyons, Intent of Missile Plot Not Lost in Tanslation: FBI Case Juror Says Panel Dis-
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Detection by law enforcement, therefore, must depend heavily on ei-
ther invasive, widespread surveillance,2 or the use of undercover agents
to infiltrate the cells. 3 Of course, both of these methods could be in use
at the same time. Surveillance and stings are not mutually exclusive in
any inherent sense and may even complement each other; neverthe-
less, they are distinct alternatives for law enforcement. 4 Where agency
missed Concerns that Defendants Were Duped, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Oct. 13, 2006, at Al; Wil-
liam K. Rashbaum, Lawyer Confronts Informer in Subway Bomb Plot Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
2006, at B2; Michelle Shepherd, Muslim Went Undercover to Save Lives, HAMILTON SPECTA-
TOR (Ont., Can.), July 14, 2006, at Al2. There has also been much academic discussion of
this point. See Paul Marcus, Presenting Back from the (Almost) Dead, the Entrapment Defense, 47
FLA. L. RENT. 205, 244 n.227 (1995) (discussing sting operation against Egyptian Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahmen and subsequent criminal proceedings and defenses); Binny Miller,
Give Them Bads Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICR. L. Riv. 485,
560-61 (1994); Ian Walden & Anne Flanagan, Honeypots: A Sticky Legal Landscape?, 29 RUT-
GERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 317, 318 (2003); see also Defending Entrapment as an Anti-Terror
Technique (N.P.R. radio broadcast Mar. 11, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 4617379 (discuss-
ing the prosecutorial belief that stings are probably the best way to thwart terrorist attacks
before they occur, and that entrapment defenses are a major concern). For a definitive
explanation of the entrapment defense, see generally PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT
DEFENSE (LexisNexis 3d ed. 2002) (1989).
2 See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1306, 1308 (2004) ("In 2003, for the first time, the number of surveillance orders
issued under FISA exceeded the number of law enforcement wiretaps issued nation-
wide.").
See Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious
Groups, 89 lows L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2004); Solveig Singleton, Privacy and Twenty-First Cen-
tury Law Enforcement: Accountability for New Techniques, 30 Onto N.U. L. REV. 417, 446-47
(2004). There are many examples of sting operations in connection with antiterrorism
efforts. See Albany Muslims Convicted After Terror Sting, 236 N.Y.LJ., Oct. 11, 2006, at 1; Des-
mond Butler, Sting Halts Sale of Uranium for Nuke CINCINNATI POST, Jan. 25, 2007, at A14;
Julia Preston, fudge Issues Secret Ruling in Case of Two at Mosque, N.Y. TIM ES, Mar. 11, 2006, at
MO ("A federal judge issued a highly unusual classified ruling yesterday, denying a motion
for dismissal of a case against two leaders of an Albany mosque who are accused of laun-
dering money in a federal terrorism sting operation. Because the ruling was classified, the
defense lawyers were barred from reading why the judge decided that way."); Anti-War
Protests in the Nation's Capital; New War Plan Derided—Part 2 (CNN television broadcast Jan.
27, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 1722925 ("A uranium sting, officials in the former So-
viet Republic of Georgia announced just this week that they have arrested a Russian man
who is trying to sell weapons grade uranium to an undercover agent."); see also RICHARD
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 230-31 (7th ed. 2007); Nancy S. Marder, Introduction
to Secrecy in Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 305, 315 n.52 (2006) (noting that many re-
cords in terrorism trials have been kept secret).
4 That is, most sting operations probably occur with surreptitious surveillance going
on in the background, both as a means of documenting the crime and monitoring the
safety of undercover agents. Conversely, undercover agents may gather incriminating
statements and information for purposes of testifying at trial, which is a form of surveil-
lance; it becomes a sting when the agents actually provide an opportunity for a crime and
schedule its commission. Judge Richard Posner, however, sees a significant conflict be-
tween intelligence gathering and law enforcement, of which stings are an integral part,
2008]	 Entrapment ea' Terrorism	 127
resources are limited, a shift toward one methodology typically means a
shift away from the other, because each requires the investment or con-
sumption of resources.5
There are also social costs of each method, apart from the direct
budgetary costs of labor and overhead, which agencies may not inter-
nalize; in other words, any method of law enforcement can create ex-
ternalities.6 When the government uses more wide-ranging or intrusive
surveillance, as it might in the War on Terror, infringements on the
civil liberties of all law-abiding citizens can arise, to a greater or lesser
degree.? In contrast, the use of more sting operations has less effect on
civil liberties overall, even if it presents some of its own ethical or con-
stitutional issues. 8 In any case, relying on more undercover operations
in the War on Terror seems cheaper, politically, for government agen-
cies, and such operations will presumably increase whenever terrorism
becomes a priority target for law enforcement,
and argues that an agency attempting to do both simultaneously will be ineffective at both.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD: THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN THE
THROES OF REFORM 110-17, 135 (2006).
5 Several authors have addressed the idea of sting operations being an efficient alloca-
tion of resources, and that efficiency concerns are part of the appropriate test for entrap-
ment. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Clarifying Entrapment, 891 GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407,
415 (1999) ('The most fruitful criterion of government inducements is whether the
inducements exceeded real world market rates ...."); J. Gregory Deis, Note, Economics,
Causation, and the Entrapment Dense, 2001 U. ILL. L. Ray. 1207, 1209-10, 1226 (agreeing
with Judge Posner's observation that entrapment is "merely the name we give to a particu-
larly unproductive use of law enforcement resources").
e See PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 265 (2d ed. 1995) ("[D]efendants con-
tend that the nature of the governmental conduct is too overreaching, too egregious. They
argue that the government is manufacturing crime ...."); Richard Posner, An Economic
Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. Ray. 1193, 1220 (1985) ("Police inducements that
merely affect the timing and not the level of criminal activity are socially productive; those
that increase the crime level are not"). Even if the police activity in a given case was waste-
ful or inefficient; it does not necessarily follow that judges should remedy the situation by
acquitting the defendant. Acquitting the defendant certainly does not recoup any of the
resources already wasted (they are sunk costs); acquittals can impose additional costs on
society by releasing a criminal. This makes the approach that the above commentators
espouse problematic. If it were certain that such acquittals would deter all future ineffi-
cient sting operations, this approach would make sense, but deterring malicious or sloppy
police through acquittals is an unpredictable, unreliable mechanism.
7 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 245.
On the other hand, Judge Posner seems to suggest that a prosecutorial bent in the
Federal Bureau of Investigation poses more of a concern from a civil libertarian stand-
point, and sting operations are decidedly prosecutorial in their orientation. See POSNER,
supra note 4, at 116-17.
9 See, e.g., Jordan Carleo-Evangelist, Fateful Day Arrives for Muslims Caught in Sting, AL-
BANY TIMES UNION, Mar. 8, 2007, at Al; Michael Hill, Mosque Leaders Get Prison in Sting,
BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 9, 2007, at A10 (describing sting operation that resulted in the arrests
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The entrapment defense is our legal system's primary device for
regulating undercover sting operations by government agents." Pre-
dictably, these law enforcement efforts give rise to allegations of over-
reaching, especially from criminal defendants trapped in sting opera-
tions."
Historically, almost all entrapment cases have involved the so-
called "victimless crimes," violations of laws that prohibit otherwise
consensual transactions between parties.' 2 These include trafficking
of two mosque leaders in Albany, New York for laundering money connected to a terrorist
operation); Eric Lichtblau, Trying to Thwart Possible Terrorists Quickly, F.B.I. Agents Are Often
Playing Them, N.Y. Thies, May 30, 2005, at A10; Mosque Leaders Get 15 Years in Money Scam,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL (W. Va.), Mar. 9, 2007, at 3A.
10 See Bruce Hay, Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment, 70 Mo. L. Ray. 387,
387 (2005); Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of Entrapment, 96 J. Cum. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 107, 108 (2005); Jacqueline E. Ross, Valuing Inside Knowledge: Police Infiltra-
tion as a Problem for the Law of Evidence, 79 CH I.-KENT L. REV. 1111, 1123-27 (2004) (stating
that "the entrapment defense regulates this problem only incompletely"); Dru Stevenson,
Entrapment by Numbers, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 1, 69 (2005).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 424 (1973).
12 See id. ("[D]efendant was convicted on all three counts of having unlawfully manu-
factured and processed methamphetamine ('speed') and of having unlawfully sold and
delivered that drug."). Of course, these crimes arguably have "victims" in the sense of lives
wasted through vice, devastated families, and other effects. In general, however, they per-
tain to voluntary or consensual transactions whose harm is mostly in the aggregate instead
of in particular instances; usually no party to a drug deal calls the police to complain about
the crime. These crimes are conceptually different than crimes against the person (e.g.,
rape, murder, battery, and mayhem), which involve an interpersonal assault, and crimes
against property (e.g., larceny, embezzlement, robbery, and burglary), which leave the
victim unjustly deprived. Such traditional crimes are less conducive to enforcement by
sting operations, and less conducive still to the defense of entrapment. Most cases where
entrapment would be asserted as a defense to one of these traditional crimes (against the
person or property) would involve problems with proving an element of the crime or the
defense of consent, which were tidier defenses at common law. For more discussion of the
history and evolution of entrapment, especially as it correlates to the development of these
more transactional-type crimes, see MARCUS, supra note 1, at 1-50; Michael DeFeo, En-
trapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory, and Application, 1 U.S.F. L.
Ray. 243, 250-251 (1967). William Stuntz provides an insightful discussion of the preva-
lence of vice-related crimes in American law and some of the unintended consequences.
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mimi. L. REV. 505, 572-76
(2001). Stuntz notes the ironies inherent in such legislated morality, but also notes that
such crimes do indeed create costly externalities that concentrate in the neediest sectors of
society:
Gambling, sex for hire, and intoxicants are all things that a large portion of
the public wants, and these goods and services are sufficiently cheap, at least
in some forms, that people of all social classes can afford them. At the same
time, these things generate both intense disapproval among another large
slice of the population, and substantial social costs that tend to concentrate in
poor communities. The result is complicated: anti-vice crusades tend to have
strong public support, but only so long as the crusades are targeted at a fairly
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drugs, unregistered firearms, child pornography, and illegal immi-
grants; soliciting sex with prostitutes and children; and schemes for
laundering or counterfeiting money. 13 The consensual nature of these
offenses makes reporting of them exceedingly rare and their detec-
don difficult, leading law enforcement agencies to depend heavily on
undercover agents, paid informants, and sting operations, all of which
give rise to claims of entrapment." The nature of these offenses de-
termines the nature of the defenses associated with them later- on,
when the prosecution brings the case to trial.
This Article focuses on entrapment in the terrorism context, and
this is the first academic article to consider this specific issue in depth. 13
We can anticipate a surge in terror-related entrapinent cases in the years
following a similar surge in undercover antiterrorism operadons. 16 We
expect, therefore, that a greater percentage of entrapment cases will in-
volve the conspiracies to provide financial support to terrorists," in addi-
small subset of the population. Our tradition of giving police and prosecutors
basically unregulated enforcement discretion makes that targeting easy.
Which in turn permits legislatures to define criminal liability in ways that
might otherwise be politically impossible.
Id. at 573.
15 The federal statutory framework for money laundering crimes includes a sting pro-
vision to facilitate the use of undercover operations in detecting violators. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(3) (2000); Scott Golde 8c Winston Calvert, A Practitioner's Guide to the Federal
Money Laundering Statutes, 62 J. Mo. B. 312, 317 (2006).
14 See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 8; infra notes 254-271 and accompanying text.
15 Most articles about entrapment discuss the competing legal tests used to approach
the problem, typically arguing in favor of one rule as opposed to the other. See MARCUS,
supra note 1, at 104 (noting that "the vast majority of legal scholars regard the objective
test favorably"); Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 170 (1976);
Deis, supra note 5, at 1218 (Deis, himself, does not favor the objective test but acknowl-
edges that he is in the minority in the academy). When Park wrote in 1975, all articles
from the previous twenty-five years were criticizing the objective test except one (an article
that proposed abolishing the entrapment defense completely). See Park, supra, at 167 n.13
(citing Defeo, supra note 12). Park himself takes the position of defending the approach
used in the federal courts, and he was one of the first two commentators to do so, See id. at
170. His article became one of the seminal works in the area for over two decades. He also
observes that there had been over one hundred student notes from the same period that
almost uniformly advocated for the objective test. Id. at 167 n.13. Justice Stewart noted the
clear tilt of the academy to his side (in favor of the objective test) when he dissented in
United States v. Russell. See 411 U.S. at 445 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also MODEL PENAL.
CODE § 2.13 cmt. 1, n.3 (1985) (listing influential early articles on the subject).
16 See supra note 1.
17 See, e.g., United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 554 (6th Cir. 2006) (defendant charged
with providing material support); Aref, 2007 WL 603508, at *2-4 (sting operation and
criminal prosecution for providing funds to Islamic terrorists); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC,
471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (involving tort action against Jordanian bank
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lion to bomb plots, 18 sales of nuclear technology or raw materials, 1° and
other characteristic terrorist activities. In addition, we would expect to
see greater international interest in the entrapment defense, as indeed
we can already observe hi Europe and elsewhere. 20 England and the
European Union, for example, have recently begun to recognize the en-
trapment defense for the first time, albeit in limited circumstances. 21 Un-
alleged to have knowingly provided banking and other services that facilitated the actions
of terrorist organizations); United States v. Salah, 462 F. Supp. 2d 915, 915 (N.D. Ill, 2006).
Is See, e.g., Nettles, 476 F.3d at 510 (personal vendetta bomb plot to mimic Oklahoma
City bombing); United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 2007) (Al-Qaeda at-
tempt to bomb the Los Angeles Millennium celebrations); United States v. McMorrow, 471
F.3d 921, 923 (8th Cir. 2006) (bomb threats on Fargo, North Dakota); United States v.
Olmeda, 461 F.3d 271, 277 (2d Cir. 2006) (possession of eighteen pipe bombs and other
munitions); United States v. Mohamed, 459 F.3d 979, 981 (9th Cir. 2006) (threatened Is-
lamic terror bomb attack on Los Angeles); United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1158-60
(11th Cir. 2006) (history of bombings in southern Florida); Aref, 2007 WL 603508, at *9
n.10 (Islamic terror bomb plots); Hurst v. Socialist People's Libyan Arabfamahiriya, 474 F.
Supp. 2d 19, 22 (D.D.C. 2007) (litigation over Lockerbie plan crash); United States v. Lin,
No. CR-01-20071-RMW, 2007 WL 101647, at *1(N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2007) (defendant told
woman that her family was going to die and that her brother was next); Estate of Heiser v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229, 248 (D.D.C. 2006) (bombing of American
installations in Saudi Arabia); United States v. Coronado, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1210 (S.D.
Cal. 2006) (involving violation of statute prohibiting distribution of information relating to
explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction); Blais v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 2d 40, 45 (D.D.C. 2006) (bombing of American installations in Saudi
Arabia); People v. Quinonez, No. H027654, 2006 WL 2567718, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 7,
2006) (bombs placed at elementary schools and childcare center in California to distract
authorities during bank heist); People v. Osantowski, 736 N.W.2d 289, 295 (Mich. Ct. App.
2007) (terror threats and bomb production); State v, Sands, No. 2006-L-171, 2007 WL
37792, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2007) (attempted bombing of municipal authorities in
Ohio); State v. Luers, 153 P.M 688, 691 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (bombing of oil refin-
ery/storage facilities). Note that this lengthy string cite of bomb-related cases covers a
period of only a few months prior to the writing of this Article, in March 2007.
IS See, e.g., Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 412 F. Supp. 2d 99, 107 (D.D.C. 2006) (discuss-
ing purchase of uranium by terrorists); Butler, supra note 3.
" See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 10, at 110 nn.20, 22. McAdams asserts that the grow-
ing interest is due to pressure from the United States for our allies to participate in more
undercover operations to detect terrorists and drug traffickers. See id. at 110. See generally
Jacqueline E. Ross, Impediments to Transnational Cooperation in Undercover Policing: A Com-
parative Study of the United States and Italy, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 569 (2004).
21 England resolutely refused to recognize the entrapment defense for many years. See
generally R. v. Sang, (1979) 69 Crim. App. 282 (H.L.) (appeal taken from CA) (U.K.),
available at 1979 WL 68315. Recently, however, in R. v. Loosely, (2001) 1 Crim. App. 29
(H.L.) (appeal taken from C.A.) (U.K.), available at 2001 WL 1171942, the House of Lords
changed course and adopted an "abuse of process" rule akin to the objective rule version
of the entrapment defense; but instead of providing an acquittal (finding of no guilt), the
courts issue an indefinite 'stay of proceedings" —meaning no penal sanction will ensue,
but neither do the pending criminal charges disappear entirely. A detailed discussion of
the transition from Sang to Loosely in England is available elsewhere. See Dan Squires, The
Problem with Entrapment, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 351-52 (2006); see also Simon
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ail very recently, the entrapment defense was available only in the United
States—it was not a feature of English common law, 22
 and no other in-
dustrialized nations (e.g., Western Europe, Canada," Australia 24) tradi-
tionally recognized the entrapment defense." Entrapment's absence
from these other legal traditions is due partly to other devices in their
legal systems for regulating aberrant police activity, such as outright
criminal liability for government agents who overreach. 26 A second pos-
sible factor is a cultural difference between America and Europe regard-
ing privacy expectations, as Europeans seem to have greater tolerance for
Bronitt. Sang Is Dead, Loosely Speaking, 2002 Suw. J. LEGAL STUD. 374, 374 (explaining
that courts in Singapore have followed the Sang rule—no entrapment defense at all—and
not yet responded to the Loosely decision).
As regards the European Union, see generally Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, 28 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 101 (1999), available at 1998 WL 1043930. This was a watershed case that heavily
influenced the House of Lords in the Loosely decision. See id. The Teixeira opinion, found in
Westlaw by clicking one of the internal links beneath the caption, is an excellent resource
for previous European decisions on sting operations, as well as various international trea-
ties that specifically allow fo'r the use of undercover agents. See id. The European Court of
Human Rights not only acquitted Mr. Teixeira de Castro, but also compelled the Portu-
guese government to repay his lost wages during his time of imprisonment, various litiga-
tion costs, and other expenses. See id.; see also Bronitt, supra, at 376-78.
22 See generally Sang, 69 Crim. App. 282.
25 In R. v. Mack, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903 (Can.), the Supreme Court of Canada defined its
rule on entrapment in light of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a constitu-
tional act passed in 1982. The Canadian high court does not recognize entrapment as a
defense to a crime, in the sense that the defendant can obtain a complete acquittal; none-
theless, it empowered the judiciary to use its discretion in rejecting the spectacle of an
accused being convicted of an offence which is the work of the state." Id. 1 77. When a
court fords, after the defendant is convicted, that the "authorities provide[d] an opportunity to
persons to commit an offence without reasonable suspicion or acting mala fides," the
judge can issue a "stay of proceedings," which puts the case on hold indefinitely without
sentencing the defendant at all. Id. ¶1 10, 122.
24 See Ridgeway v. Regina (1995) 184 C.L.R. 19, 43 (Austl.) (adopting exclusionary rule
for evidence obtained through sting operation). For an excellent discussion of entrapment
law in Australia, and the legislative backlash following Ridgeway it Regina, see Paul Marcus
& Vicki Waye, Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal Justice Systems Uncommonly
at Odds, 12 Tut.. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 27, 73-78 (2004).
25 See Jacqueline E. Ross, 7'radeoffs in Undercover Investigations: A Comparative Perspective
69 U. Cut. L. REV. 1501, 1521 (2002) (explaining that in Europe the general rule is for the
defendant to be found guilty but for the police to be charged as accessories to the crime in
situations that would be analogous to entrapment in the U.S.). Ross discusses the fact that
entrapment is a defense to criminal liability nowhere outside the United States, adding:
Most Western European legal systems instead treat entrapment as a mode of complicity
that fails to excuse the target but implicates the investigator in the crime.... European
legal systems treat such conduct as criminal unless a law expressly exempts the investigator
from liability for specified acts." Id. at 1521-22 (citation omitted).
21 Id. at 521-22.
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invasive government surveillance, 27 and less tolerance for government
trickery or "stings."28 More surveillance makes undercover stings less
necessary.
In the United States, the entrapment defense currently has two
main versions or tests that have caused splits between courts and be-
tween states. The "subjective test," used by the majority of states and
all federal courts, focuses on the defendant's predisposition to com-
mit the crime, with the goal of protecting otherwise innocent citizens
from becoming the targets of undue badgering by undercover agents,
who solicit them to commit crimes. 28 The rival approach, normally
called the "objective test," focuses solely on the outrageousness of the
government's conduct, regardless of the defendant's guilt or eager-
ness to commit crimes, with the purported goal of deterring bad be-
havior by police." The relative virtues of each test are a subject this
author has addressed elsewhere, 31 and is the focus.of most academic
commentary on this defense. 82
As mentioned above, the federal courts all use the subjective test,
by choice of the U.S. Supreme Court in a line of consistent cases. 33
22 See generalkjames Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Venus Lib-
erty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1159 (2004) ("In France and Germany, according to a recent
study, telephones are tapped at ten to thirty times the rate they are tapped in the United
States—and in the Netherlands and Italy, at 130 to 150 times the rate.").
25 This is evident in the European Court of Human Right's discussion in Teixeira. See
supra note 21.
22 See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 53 ('The overwhelming concern is with the 'otherwise
innocent' person, not with the nature of the government activity"); Anthony M. Dillof,
Unraveling Unlawful Entrapment, 94 J. CRIM. L. Sc CRIMINOLOGY 827, 831-35 (2004). See
generally Park, supra note 15, at 165 (providing an exhaustive survey of cases up to the date
of the article's publication). Several cases also discuss the focus of the subjective test. See
Laichani, 480 F.3d at 178-79 ("' [T] he element of non-predisposition to commit the offense
is the primary focus of an entrapment defense.'" (quoting United States v. Fedroff, 874
F.2d 178, 182 (3d Cir.1989))); United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 944 (3d Cir. 1986).
" See, e.g., Dillof, supra note 29, at 835-37; Deis, supra note 5, at 1216-18: Several cases
explain that the purpose of the entrapment defense is to deter impermissible police con-
duct. See Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002); People v. Barraza, 591
P.2d 947, 956 n.5 (Cal. 1979); People v. Holloway, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 551 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996). The drafters of the Model Penal Code advanced the same view: "It is therefore the
attempt to deter wrongful conduct on the part of the government that provides the justifi-
cation for the defense of entrapment, not the innocence of the defendant." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.13 cmt. 1 (1985).
31 See generally Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and the Problem of Deterring Police Misconduct,
37 CONN. L. Rev. 67 (2004).
52 See, e.g., MARCUS, supra note 1, at 104 ("P .] he vast majority of legal scholars regard
the objective test favorably.").
ss Seefacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 554 (1992) (reversing the defendant's
conviction because the government failed to establish that defendant was independently
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Most terrorism cases will be in federal court, given the federal statu-
tory framework in this area and the agencies that devote the most re-
sources to targeting terrorists. 34 We can assume that the Supreme
Court's subjective test will govern the adjudication of entrapment de-
fenses by most terror suspects. The alternative test is not very relevant
to the discussion that follows, as it is not likely to be relevant in terror-
ism cases generally."
The thesis of this Article is that the unique nature of terrorist crime
requires a tweaking of the entrapment rules, at least for these cases."
Although the proposed adaptation will appear at first to be unfashiona-
bly progovernment, facilitating the use of more undercover operations
predisposed to commit the crime for which he was arrested); Mathews v. United States, 485
U.S. 58, 63, 66 (1988) (rejecting government's claim that entrapment defense should be
unavailable because defendant did not concede all elements of the charged crime); Hamp-
ton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976) (holding that the defense of entrapment
was unavailable to the defendant because he was predisposed to commit the crime); Rus-
sell, 411 U.S. at 436 (holding that the defendant's concession that there was evidence to
support the jury's finding that he was predisposed to commit the crime was fatal to his
claim of entrapment); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958) (holding that
entrapment was established as a matter of law because petitioner was induced to commit
the crime); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932) (holding defense of en-
trapment available for man who gave government agent alcohol during Prohibition). The
first Supreme Court case was Sorrells v. United States, where a federal agent posing as a tour-
ist/fellow war veteran enticed his host, a hospitable farmer, to sell him some liquor during
the Prohibition years. 287 U.S. at 439-40. The lower courts had denied the availability of
the entrapment defense; the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, stating that the defense should
be available, at least in a pretrial hearing. Id. at 438-39, 452. Justice Roberts wrote a con-
currence arguing that no trial should occur at all where the police instigated the offense,
and that the majority focused too much on the defendant's predisposition. Id. at 453-59.
31 Besides the statutory framework that furnishes the basis for the charges, federal
agents usually work in partnership with state and local law enforcement agencies in com-
bating terrorism, resulting in even more federalization of these crimes and the relevant
defenses. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has created Joint Terrorism Task Forces
(federal-state-municipal) in over eighty cities. See PosNER, supra note 4, at 116.
55 On the other hand, an insightful colleague, Geoffrey Corn, suggested that the "ob-
jective test" might be better suited to antiterrorism prosecutions, because juries are more
likely to find almost any police conduct reasonable in combating terrorism, and because
predisposition could be more difficult to show in the sample group of defendants. Pre-
sumably, those with enough pro-terrorist acts to evidence a predisposition would be
charged directly in regard to those acts, rather than becoming the subject of a belabored
sting. This is an interesting suggestion, but the change would have to come from Congress
because the Supreme Court has dug in its heels on the subjective test.
" Richard McAdams has recently argued, rather persuasively, that the entrapment de-
fense should vary for each crime (or at least type of crime), including terrorism. See gener-
ally McAdams, supra note 10, at 114-15. This Article focuses only on terrorism and modify-
ing the entrapment defense for this special type of crime, inasmuch as other crimes giving
rise to the entrapment defense are conceptually similar to one another, while terrorist
crimes are uniquely distinct.
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in fighting terrorism will make intrusive, panoptic surveillance less nec-
essary and less attractive to government agencies. Shifting our antiter-
rorism efforts to methodologies that require less widespread surveil-
lance can be an indirect but useful tool in the struggle to preserve civil
liberties at a time when public safety is a paramount concern.37 The
proposed mechanism is to relax the predisposition component of the
rule to make the defense less available to certain dangerous defendants.
The necessary modification can come from either the legislature or the
judiciary, as is the case with any tweaking of affirmative defenses. 38
57 Judge Posner elsewhere makes a rather compelling argument that surveillance and
intelligence gathering are relatively ineffective methods of preventing surprise attacks, like
the September 11, 2001 terrorist bombings. See RICHARD POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE
ATTACKS 99-126 (2005). If the payoffs are low from the information gathering approach
to antiterrorism enforcement, then it might be worthwhile to shift resources elsewhere.
58 Traditionally, the "affirmative defenses" include duress, necessity, self-defense, insan-
ity, impossibility, and entrapment, and most are now a matter of statute in each state. For
purposes of this Article, it is worth noting that impossibility is perhaps the defense most
likely to overlap with entrapment, given that there is a conceptual problem with whether
the "crime" committed could have been a real "crime" if the property involved belonged
to the government all along, or if the only other parties to a criminal conspiracy were gov-
ernment agents. See Audrey Rogers, New Technology, Old Defenses: Internet Sting Operations and
Attempt Liability, 38 U. RICH. L. Rev. 477, 502-08 (2004). The point is that some defen-
dants, especially in Internet cases, could raise an impossibility defense as an alternative to
the entrapment defense. For a thoughtful student note analyzing the relationship between
predisposition, inability, and impossibility, see John F. Preis, Note, Witch Doctors and Battle-
ship Stalkers: The Edges of Exculpation in Entrapment Cases, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1869, 1873-74
(1999). Preis argues generally that the entrapment defense should be available where the
defendant would have been unable to Commit the crime due to impossibility, albeit in a
small number of cases. Id.; see also R.A. Duff, Commentary, Estoppel and Other Bars to Trial, I
OHIO ST.], CRIM, L. 245, 253 (2003). In many cases, the "impossibility" defense for sting
operations is eliminated by the relevant statute, such as the "sting" provision of the federal
money laundering statute. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a) (3) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
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Unlike all other affirmative defenses in criminal law, 39 the en-
trapment defense can influence the planning and policy decisions of
law enforcement agencies." I have argued elsewhere that acquittals
based on the entrapment defense are unlikely to deter police miscon-
duct,'" in part because enforcement agencies have almost perfect ex
ante knowledge about the law (unlike many criminals) and can plan
their sting operations around the rules." For this reason, unlike all
other affirmative defenses, one would expect to see successful en-
trapment defenses decrease over time, at least pertaining to specific
offenses." Law enforcement agencies can plan around the rules to
3° Entrapment is also distinguishable from most of the other affirmative defenses in
that it is an '`excuse" rather than a justification." See, e.g., Adav Noti, Note, The Uplifted
Knife: Morality, Justification, and the Choice-of-Evils Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1859, 1861
(2003) (Insanity and entrapment are examples of legal excuses ...."). There is some
debate about this classification, although it is not exactly a controversial issue. See, e.g., 2
PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 209(b) (1984) ("It has been argued that
there are two alternative theories of entrapment: entrapment as an excuse, similar in some
respects to duress, which provides a defense because the defendant's actions were not fully
his own, and. entrapment as a nonexculpatory defense designed to deter police miscon-
duct, even at the expense of allowing a culpable defendant to go free.") This seems to
correlate roughly to the subjective and objective divide. Robinson concludes, however,
after some discussion, that entrapment under either scheme should really be classified
separate from other '`excuses:"
Thus, the entrapment defense, even in its excuse-like formulation, does not
appear to be based solely on culpability principles, as excuses are, but proba-
bly reflects a combination of concerns including an estoppel notion that it is
unfair to permit the entity that has entrapped to then punish. Ultimately,
then, both approaches to entrapment must be viewed as nonexculpatory de-
fenses, although one may result in a greater deviation from culpability princi-
ples than the other. The excuse-like formulations of the entrapment defense
may be seen as an attempt to minimize the societal costs associated with non-
exculpatory defenses by minimizing the number of culpable persons who es-
cape conviction under the defense.
Id. at 516.
4° See POSNER, supra note 4, at 136.
41 In my first article on the subject, I argued that acquittals of defendants are unlikely
to deter specific acts of police overreaching, for a number of individualized subjective
reasons. Stevenson, supra note 31, at 73. Individual acquittals in isolated instances of agent
misconduct are also unlikely to affect overall policy decisions of bureau chiefs or agency
administrators, contrary to the assumption underlying the minority "objective test" for
entrapment. Id. at 75-80. Even so, the entrapment defense is the primary legal mechanism
for regulating undercover operations, and we must assume that policymakers are sensitive
to the parameters of the rules when they plan such operations.
42 See generally Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Entrapment. 41 AM. CRIM. L. Rev. 1389,
1428-31 (2004) (arguing that the current entrapment defense under-deters bad police
behavior and over-deters good police behavior).
43 See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 27-30.
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preempt successful entrapment claims; or, if the rules are too prode-
fendant, undercover operations will fall into disuse." In either case,
once the rules or parameters become clear through adjudication,
there will be fewer opportunities for a successful entrapment defense,
and the defense itself will wane into disuse. Bureau chiefs and agency
directors are aware of limitations imposed by this affirmative defense
and will make policy decisions about enforcement methods accord-
ingly; the allocation of law enforcement resources must be sensitive
and responsive to the rules about this particular defense.* The en-
trapment defense therefore affords a unique opportunity to influence
law enforcement policy for the relevant crimes, including terrorism.
Entrapment is the most relevant affirmative defense to terror-related
prosecution.
In federal courts, adjudication of the entrapment defense turns on
whether the defendant was "predisposed" to commit the crime.* The
undercover agent(s) induced the defendant to commit the specific act;
the question is whether the government induced an otherwise inno-
cent, law-abiding citizen to breach some legal norm. 47 Typically, the
sting operation includes having the defendant caught in the act, so
44 See id.
45 See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 3, at 1272-74. Lininger provides a thought-provoking
example:
Because officers are so highly dependent on the involvement of prosecutors
in proactive investigations, it should come as no surprise that constraints on
prosecutors often have the transitive effect of constraining the police officers
involved in a particular investigation. The best example of this phenomenon •
is the recent experience of Oregon, where the state supreme court construed
an ethical rule to prevent prosecutors from supervising undercover investiga-
tions. In the case In re Gatti, the court interpreted DR 1-102(A) (4) of the
Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits a lawyer from
"engag[ingl in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenta-
tion." The court determined that this language prevented prosecutors from
supervising investigations in which law enforcement officers posed as partici-
pants in criminal activity, such as drug users seeking to buy drugs from a tar-
get under investigation. The Oregon State Bar eventually revised DR-102 to
make clear that prosecutors could supervise such investigations, and the Ore-
gon Supreme Court approved this change. But in the meantime, for the two-
year period in which 'the Gatti rule" remained in effect, proactive criminal
investigations ground to a halt in Oregon. F.B.I. Agent Nancy Savage, the
Special Agent in Charge of the F.B.I. office in Eugene, Oregon, commented
on a national television broadcast that the Gatti rule had "shut down major
undercover operations" in Oregon.
Id. at 1273-74 (citations omitted).
" MARCUS, supra note 1, at 61-63.
47 See, e.g., Hampton, 425 U.S. at 486.
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there is no question about the defendant's role in the crime itself. 48 En-
trapment is an affirmative defense, as opposed to an attack on the ele-
ments of the charges themselves—the defendant asserts that but for"
the government's inducement, she would never have committed such
an offense. 49
The predisposition element of the entrapment defense can trig-
ger the introduction of evidence about the defendant's character and
prior related crimes,50 evidence that might otherwise be excludable as
irrelevant and overly prejudicia1. 51 This feature probably deters many
defendants from claiming entrapment, for strategic reasons; 52 a sur-
prisingly large proportion of defendants attempt to raise the defense
only on appeal, after there is nothing left to lose. 55 The predisposition
inquiry also considers factors like the alacrity with which the defen-
dant embraced the undercover agent's offer or inducement," the
time or number of attempts required to obtain the defendant's par-
"See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 439-40.
45 See id. at 439-41. -
55 See, e.g., Sherroan v. Kentucky, 142 S.W.3d 7,21-22 (Ky. 2004) ("However, if the exis-
tence of the character trait determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, then it is an
essential element and provable by specific instances of conduct ... [as in] criminal cases
where the defense is entrapment, because of the need to prove the defendant's predisposi-
tion to commit the charged offense,"); see also MARCUS, supra note 1, at 147-54 (discussing
the admission of defendant's prior bad acts at trial).
51 See Lakhani, 480 F.3d at 179 (noting that raising the entrapment defense allows the
prosecution to offer as proof the character or reputation of the defendant, including any
prior criminal record). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that in Lak-
hani's case, the evidence of prior acts, taken alone, would not have been sufficient to show
predisposition, See id. at 180 n.11.
52 The same issue arises in military tribunals and military commissions. See, e.g., MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. II, 11-110. (2005 ed.), available at http://www.
au.af.mit/au/awc/awcgate/law/mcm.pdf ("When the defense of entrapment is raised, mi-
dence of uncharged misconduct by the accused of a nature similar to that charged is admis-
sible to show predisposition." (citing Mn.. R. EVID. 404(b))).
53 See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 32-36 (providing approximately fifty recent exam-
ples). It appears that one-third to one-half of all reported entrapment cases have the de-
fense arising only in the context of post-trial, post-sentencing appeals, mostly as (unsuc-
cessful) "ineffective assistance of counsel" claims alleging that the defense attorney should
have raised the defense earlier. See id. at 32-33.
54 See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 143 ("Whether or not the defendant responded to gov-
ernment inducement with reluctance is an important factor in determining state of
mind."); see also id. at 159-61. This was the main issue in the Third Circuit's discussion of
Lakhani's entrapment claims—the court cataloged the instances where the defendant
showed eagerness and enthusiasm to sell rocket launchers to the undercover informant.
Lakhani, 480 F.3d at 180 ("No piece of evidence indicates a reluctance on Lakhani's part to
complete the illegal arms deal; indeed, everything demonstrates the opposite.").
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ticipation,55 and the defendant's subsequent resolve or hesitation in
pursuing the criminal activity.56 The cases also take note of who initi-
ated the first contact, and if it was the government, then what reasons
the government had to initiate contact with this target. 57 These six
factors have not comprised a definitive list in the judicial analysis of
predisposition, but the Supreme Court could adopt such a delineated
list, which would capture much of the jurisprudence to date and re-
duce confusion in the lower courts. 58 An additional factor (not hith-
erto considered in many cases) would be the seriousness or societal
approbation of the crime itself, that is, whether most citizens would
find this crime so offensive that it outweighs almost any inducement.
If the criminal act would strike most people as heinous, it makes pre-
disposition more likely for the rare person who actually succumbs.
Crimes with less moral or societal stigma would presumably require
less inducement, and therefore make individual predisposition less
apparent. This consideration is particularly relevant to the discussion
that follows.
The Supreme Court's "but-for" rhetoric 59 in analyzing predisposi-
tion may give the appearance of a bright-line rule, but the reality is that
the concept is rather elastic.60 Sometimes the Court finds no predispo-
sition even where the defendant has a history of similar .crimes and
needed little persuasion from the undercover agent.° In other cases,
the Court has found predisposition even where the agent made re-
peated proposals and provided free materials, ingredients, or equip-
ment for the criminal enterprise. 62
The vagueness of the term confers enough discretion on the
Court to adjust its application for special circumstances such as terror-
" See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 139 (discussing the role of timing in numerous en-
trapment cases); see also id. at 159-61 (discussing relevance of defendant's acts , subsequent
to his first contact with government agents).
" See id. at 146.
57 See id. at 137, 163.
5s See id. at 136-38. On the other hand, in these pages Marcus discusses United States v.
Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 1984), which did enunciate a five-factor test, but these
have not become the standard for other courts.
59 See, e.g., Russell, 411 U.S. at 440 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[T] he entrapment defense
is available under this approach only to those who would not have committed the crime
but for the Government's inducements. Thus, the subjective approach focuses on the con-
duct and propensities of the particular defendant in each individual case . . . .").
See United States v. Hunt, 749 F.2d 1078, 1085 (4th Cir. 1984) ("Predisposition is
necessarily a nebulous concept ...."); MARCUS, supra note 1, at 128-29.
61 See, e.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. at 371-74.
62 Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488-89.
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ism.63 No mechanical change is needed in the rule itself to allow a re-
laxed predisposition standard for this particular crime. Of course, a
modification could come as a statutory enactment, creating a rebut-
table presumption that predisposition exists, defining the term statu-
torily to include almost all foreseeable defendants, or simply making
the entrapment defense unavailable for certain crimes (like terrorist
activities). Appellate courts could create similar rules by precedent if
the right case came up on appeal. Whether coming from the legisla-
ture or from the judiciary, if the entrapment defense were unavailable
for terror suspects, or, more likely, if law enforcement agencies knew
that predisposition would be easier to prove for these cases due to a
relaxed standard, it would bolster the government's undercover op-
erations.
The more interesting question is whether the rule should change
for these special crimes; whether special circumstances exist that would
justify such a departure from the norm. To this end, I offer several con-
siderations.
First, the stakes are plainly higher for deterring or incapacitating
perpetrators of terrorism as opposed to the traditional "victimless"
crimes." Although the drug trade and sex trade may impose high social
costs in the aggregate (an admittedly controversial point), it is relatively
easy for nonparties who want to eschew such things to insulate them-
. selves from the direct harms that come from these activities. This is, of
course, one of the main conventional arguments against prohibiting
such activities in the first place. Terrorists, in contrast, kill and maim in-
nocent civilians, destroy private property, and disrupt daily life and
commerce.65 As the goal of terrorism is to draw attention to a cause, 66 to
66 See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 136-39 (discussing the 'totality of the circumstances"
approach used by most courts).
"See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 10, at 113,169 ("Particularly for crimes of bribery and
terrorism, where the stakes are high and conventional methods appear least effective, it
seems that the benefits of this investigative tool justify some use of it."); see also infra notes
273-291 and accompanying text. But see Hay, supra note 10, at 422 (acknowledging the
same point but explaining that there are other factors that should influence public policies
in this regard).
66 Karl J. Leger, , The Security Professional, Tt., rurism, Bio-Ternorism, and the Next Level, in
HANDBOOK OF Loss PREVENTION AND CRIME PREVENTION 487,489 (Lawrence J. Fennelly
ed., 4th ed. 2004).
66 See, e.g., PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA 9 (1998) ("From the terror-
ists' perspective, the major force of terrorism comes not from its physical impact but from
its psychological impact.").
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intimidate and instill fear, 67 and (perhaps) to provoke an ill-fated over-
reaction in response," the value of a stunt is in its sensationalism." Ex-
cess carnage and shock value are the commodities of terrorism." This
point is nothing new; it is obvious from events of the last decade 'that
terrorism is a special category of crime, something particularly horrific,
albeit statistically infrequent compared to similarly lethal natural disas-
ters, aggregate violent crime rates, and aggregate mortal accidents. 71
Even if terrorists were incredibly rare, the deterrence calculus is the
same." The potential harm from a single act of terrorism, successfully
executed, is great enough that there should be a consensus about deter-
ring it as much as possible or incapacitating would-be perpetrators. In-
creasing the likelihood of conviction provides both greater deterrence
and more incapacitation, and limiting the most relevant affirmative de-
fense to such cases would increase the likelihood of convictions. The
67 See id. ("By generating a combination of fear and fascination, terrorists have been
able to capture important parts of the agendas of great nations.").
66 See id. at 73-74 (discussing "reasons why retaliation that appears promising on its
face might fail or even backfire").
See Leger, sup/ note 65, at 489.
7° See id.
71 See, e.g., Charles J. Diecidue, Executive Protection, the Security Professional, Terrorism, Bio-
Terrorism, and the Next Level, in HANDBOOK OF Loss PREVENTION AND CRIME PREVENTION,
supra note 65, at 59 (discussing the increased rate in terror-related kidnappings of corpo-
rate executives, but noting that kidnappings motivated by ransom expectations are increas-•
ing faster than those motivated by political agendas).
72 See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger, How to fight Terrorism: Alternatives to De-
terrence, (Zurich Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 137, 2002),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=359824 (discussing the deterrence calculus for ter-
rorists and arguing that raising opportunity costs is more efficient than raising the threat-
ened sanctions).
Judge Posner discusses the theory of deterrence and the "calculus" that describes de-
terrence in terms of the equation D=pL, where D represents the deterrent value, p repre-
sents the likelihood of detection and punishment, and L represents the sanction or liabil-
ity itself. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 218-27. Most of the modern approaches to
deterrence focus on the rational mind and calculating decision-making mechanisms, in-
stead of primal emotions like fear (or even morality). Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punish-
ment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Poi.. ECON. 169, 170 (1968); see also DAVID FRIEDMAN,
PRICE THEORY 459-65 (1986); CESARE BECCARIA-BONESANA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND
PumsnsrEwts 48 (Academic Reprints 1953) (1764) (perhaps the oldest work in the area);
Maurice Cusson Sc Pierre Pinsonneault, The Decision to Give Up Crime, in THE REASONING
CRIMINAL 72-81 (Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke eds., 1986); Hashem Dezhbakhsh
et at., Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratarium Panel
Data, 5 AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 344, 344 (2003) (assessing the effects of the death penalty by
analyzing fluctuations in crime rates immediately after a death sentence is carried out—
the authors conclude there is a strong deterrent effect); Floyd Feeney, Robbers as Decision-
makers, in THE REASONING CRIMINAL, supra, at 53-71; George J. Stigler, The Optimum En-
forcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970).
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stakes are very high, prevention is paramount, and the entrapment de-
fense in its current form (mostly a product of narcotics enforcement)
undermines incapacitation and, therefore, prevention. An adaptation is
necessary. This tradeoff between the stakes and the loss of leniency is
not a complete justification for relaxing the definition of predisposition,
but it is one factor.
Second, the stakes are higher with terrorism, as opposed to other
victimless crimes, not only because of the greater harm to innocent vic-
tims, but because terrorists are more likely to elude detection and ap-
prehension than everyday drug peddlers or prostitutes." The profes-
sionalized secrecy of terrorist conspiracies makes infiltration by
undercover agents more necessary, and its only alternative—govern-
ment surveillance—exponentially more intrusive and ubiquitous. 74
This is a distinct sense in which the stakes are higher." The ability to
play hide-and-seek on several continents, and the financial resources to
stay networked with coconspirators through satellite phones and other
gadgets, make capturing a terrorist leader more difficult than catching
a regular gang leader; the lower probability of capture means less de-
terrence for a more injurious crime." Capturing malevolent escape
artists solely through increased surveillance would require such a dra-
matic increase in surveillance that it would infringe on our civil liber-
ties; this sacrifice is itself a cost that we should seek to avoid."
Third, and in a similar vein, antiterrorism efforts differ from anti-
trafficking efforts with respect to the missing compulsiveness compo-
nent." The willing parties to the victimless crimes are often addicted
to the vice in question—whether drugs, child porn, or other vices."
73 See, e.g., Louts R. IvItzELL, JR., TARGET U.S.A.: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE NEW TER-
RORIST WAR 67-79 (1998) (chronicling many examples of sophisticated avoidance of de-
tection); see also POSNER, supra note 3, at 230 (explaining that conspiracies are more effi-
cient at "avoiding being caught"); infra notes 292-300 and accompanying text.
74 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK 84 (2006) ("Terrorists are news-
paper readers and Internet surfers like the rest of us, and they can learn a lot about the
government's surveillance efforts that might allow them to escape detection.").
75 Ste POSN ER, supra note 4, at 116-17.
76 See id. at 245.
77 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Liberties and the War on Terrorism, 45 WAsusuittv LI 1,
14-19 (2005).
" See infra notes 301-307 and accompanying text.
79 William J. Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55 F.R.D. 229,256 (1972). Judge Wil-
liamJ. Campbell has opined that:
Today the conspiracy statute is frequently used in narcotic cases in which
many defendants are addicts. Very often, such defendants act as messengers
for government agents procuring narcotics for them. A conspiracy indictment
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This compulsiveness or desperation of addicts introduces many inter-
nal risks or weak links into the relevant supply chain. In other words,
the parties to the victimless crimes are self-selected to make mistakes,
betray themselves unwittingly, or fail in some objective. This feature of
these crimes lowers the stakes, that is, the value or necessity of perfect
law enforcement; the perpetrators will blunder in many cases, making
detection easy or the crime less likely to succeed. Terrorists may be
zealots,86 but they are not carrying out their mission amidst the onset
of withdrawal symptoms. Their chosen undertaking is certainly more
challenging than a simple drug transaction, but we cannot count on
them to make the same types of mistakes as the perpetrators of the
other crimes that normally give rise to the entrapment defense' In
this sense, the criminals are a different category of prey for law en-
forcement (terrorists being less prone to silly errors), and the legal
rules should reflect this reality. 82
Fourth,88 the type of predisposition that presents a real danger is
different for this crime. Unlike the traditional victimless offenders,
the danger at issue here is not just those already contemplating the
crime, but also those who are particularly susceptible to recruitment
by terrorist groups, regardless of whether they wanted the opportunity
to join such a conspiracy before the chance came. 84 Many people
might assist with a trafficking scheme if offered a fantastic sum of
is then used as a means to admit hearsay to overcome the inevitable defense
of entrapment through showing the jury that someone said that the defen-
dant knew where to get narcotics. The conspiracy statute thus again becomes
a means to convict only the lowest stratum in the criminal ladder while the
big supplier remains unprosecuted although the statistics of the investigating
bureau reflect great numerical success.
Id. at 256.
93 See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 66, at xiv.
el See, e.g., JOHN B. WOLF, FEAR OF FEAR: A SURVEY OF TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND
CONTROLS IN OPEN SOCIETIES 28 (1981) (noting that terrorist recruits are technically
competent in their areas of specialization).
82 These first three justifications could also apply to the entrapment defense as it re-
lated to firearms violations, but the remaining four are more dependent on the antiterror-
ism context. Modifying the entrapment defense for firearms violations is outside the scope
of this Article, but would be a legitimate question for future inquiry or commentary.
85 See infra notes 308-343 and accompanying text.
94 See JOHANNES ANDF-NAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 122-25 (1974). In this semi-
nal work in the area of deterrence theory, Andenaes surveys the leading approaches to de-
terrence of crimes, and appears to suggest that the most effective method of deterrence is
actually the removal or incapacitation of special lawless individuals who are "bad examples"
and tend to lead others into crimes. Id. Sting operations are particularly useful for incapaci-
tating those who would be potential recruiters for terrorist organizations, or even the recruits
who would serve as a sufficient catalyst to give the conspiracy momentum.
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money, or if frightened or badgered enough by an undercover agent—
at least in an isolated instance. These are the intended beneficiaries of
the current entrapment defense. Far fewer would agree to drive a
truck bomb up to the city's federal building, or hijack a plane, for any
sum of money or other inducement. Perhaps only people with a cer-
tain psychological makeup, 85 or certain entrenched attitudes, could
be potential recruits (or recruiters) for a terror cell. 86 Let us assume
that undercover agents will pose as recruiters—or even the venerated
leaders—of local terror groups. They hatch a plan that involves killing
untold numbers of civilians, assign tasks to each member, solicit vows
of loyalty, and the like. The day before the supposed attack ends with
a roundup and arrests, and the prosecutor has a cornucopia of admis-
sible evidence proving each defendant's involvement and activities in
furtherance of the conspiracy. At the trials, suppose the defendants
predictably plead entrapment and claim the inducements offered by
the recruiter or phony leader were irresistible, that they would have
been otherwise indisposed to join. No level of inducement justifies
yielding to such a temptation. If the recruiter or leader were genuine
(not a government agent), no inducement, small or great, would pro-
vide a defense for the suspect. There is no defense of private entrap-
ment.87 No inducement by the government could exceed the poten-
85 There is a least one example of where a defendant attempted the opposite of what is
being suggested here—unsuccessfully requesting a more favorable entrapment defense
standard given his fragile psychological makeup and susceptibility to control by under-
cover agent. See United States v. Ford, No. 05-cr-00537-REB, 2007 WL 628069, at *1 (D.
Colo. Feb. 26, 2007) ( -Defendant claimed that because of his vulnerable psychological and
emotional makeup, he was, inter alia, particularly susceptible to the entreaties of [the un-
dercover agent buying firearms], who defendant saw as a father figure that defendant
wanted to please and did not want to disappoint").
B5 It is outside the scope of this Article, of course, to suggest any model for terrorist
profiling; there seems to be no consensus on this in the social sciences literature. The
point instead is the underlying assumption that a finite set of individuals furnish the pool ,
or base for potential recruits, from the terrorists' perspective, and that this fact could le-
gitimately inform "predisposition" analysis in entrapment cases. For a comprehensive sur-
vey of the psychological and social literature on terrorist profiling up to 1999, see generally
REX A. HUDSON, THE SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM: WHO BECOMES A -rim-
RORIST AND WHY? (Marilyn Majeska ed., 1999), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/
frd.html. Liaquat All Khan presents a broadside attack on the entire body of literature that
argues that modern Islamic terrorists are merely frustrated and misunderstood Muslim. See
Liaquat Ali Khan, The Essentialist Terrorist, 45 WASHBURN 14 47, 88 (2005).
87
 See generally Gideon Yaffe, "The Government Beguiled Me": The Entrapment Defense and
the Problem of Private Entrapment, 1 J. Eritics & Soc. PHIL. 2 (2005).
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tial inducements from genuine terrorists" enough to justify a differ-
ent outcome in the case. 89 If the recruits were susceptible to the un-
dercover agent, they would also be "recruit material" for real terror-
ists;" it is fortunate for the rest of its that the undercover agent
recruited them first, With this particular crime, we should assume that
a normal person would be immune to inducements.° We can infer
predisposition merely by the fact that the person agreed to engage in
such a horrible act, and that other evidence of predisposition is un-
necessary. 92
The fifth justification for limiting the entrapment defense in
these cases—or relaxing the predisposition test—is the positive exter-
nality that undercover operations offer in antiterrorism efforts." If
terrorist leaders realize that a significant percentage of their recruited
minions are informants or undercover agents, or if potential recruits
realize that their recruiter (or even the venerated leader himself)
could be a government agent, there will be a chilling effect on the
entire enterprise.94 Transaction costs increase significantly as mistrust
abounds. Each party diverts resources to screening and testing their
coconspirators more than they would otherwise.95 There is less "pro-
gress" in the conspiracy because of this added cost, this drain on time,
energy, and other resources. It becomes more difficult to trust recruits
with necessary details and assignments, and more difficult to recruit
anyone in the first place, as the field becomes more cluttered with
undercover government agents. For the ideologues and radicals, the
presence of unknown traitors is discouraging and deflating. In a con-
89 See, e.g.,JANE BOULDEN & THOMAS G. WEISS, TERRORISM AND THE U.N.: BEFORE AND
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 209-05 (2004) (discussing the large financial resources available
for inducing recruits in "rear organizations).
99 For an interesting example of terrorist inducements to recruits, see Holly S. Haw-
kins, Note, A Sliding Scale Approach for Evaluating the Terrorist Threat over the Internet, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 633, 646 (2005).
99 See WOLF, supra note 81, at 27-29. For further discussion of terrorist recruitment
methods, see generally HUDSON, supra note 86.
91 But see Kevin A. Smith, Note, Psychology, Factfinding, and Entrapment, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 759, 772-74 (2005) (discussing "Milgram" principles of universality in predisposi-
tion—and perhaps suggesting that the average person is susceptible to inducements in this
area).
92 For more discussion of prevention of recruitment, see Stephen Seymour, Note, The
Silence of Prayer: An Examination of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Moratorium on the Hiring of
Muslim Chaplains, 37 CoLum. HUM. Rm. L. REV. 523, 530-32 n.553 (2006).
93 See Coiquitt, supra note 42, at 1421-22; see also infra notes 344-356 and accompany-
ing text.
94 See Hay, supra note 10, at 412-13.
95 See id.
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spiracy that thrives on motivation and zeal instead of pecuniary gain,
infiltrators undermine the most valuable resource of the conspiracy.
Given the higher stakes with terrorism than with other crimes tar-
geted by undercover agents, this "lemons effect" on the conspiracy
has substantially greater social benefit than usual." This merits more
judicial deference for the mechanism that obtains this benefit.
An additional positive externality of undercover work in the anti-
terrorism arena is the disproportionately high value of giving prosecu-
tors more bargaining power to elicit useful disclosures about the ter-
ror network and other plots." The diminished availability of the most
relevant affirmative defense would give prosecutors an additional
edge in inducing the suspect to inform on others who are still at
large." Obviously, prevention of terror crimes is more important than
prevention of a future drug sale or other victimless crime, because the
latter are just as suited for law enforcement after the fact, apart from
the problems of detection and nonreporting. Prevention is not as es-
sential with the other crimes that gave rise to the entrapment defense
and shaped its parameters. With terrorism, prevention is crucial, and
rules regulating sting operations (the entrapment rules) should re-
flect this difference.
A final (or seventh) justification for modifying the entrapment de-
fense is that it operates as an ex post regulatory device (reacting to the
details of a particular sting after it occurs), and an ex post regulatory
mechanism has a decreasing marginal return as ex ante restraints in-
crease." Put plainly, the dangerousness of infiltrating a terrorist con-
spiracy already serves as a check or deterrent against government over-
reaching; there is less need for the judiciary to add additional checks)"
Judicial intervention to regulate undercover operations is less valuable
where there are already significant natural restrictions on the enter-
prise. Some of these operations are not only dangerous, but involve
costly international travel, training undercover agents in foreign lan-
George A. Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488,488-90 (1970).
97 See PosNe.u, supra note 4, at 112; see also infra notes 357-364 and accompanying text.
66 See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 66, at 27 (discussing the greater success of Scotland
Yard in gaining useful antiterrorist information than Britain's secret service, because "most
informants have been found among those who have been arrested and threatened with
punishment for other crimes").
See infra notes 365-374 and accompanying text.
100 See WOLF, supra note 81, at 93 ("Police undercover work, designed to obtain infor-
mation on terrorist groups, is extremely dangerous to the police officer, as there is a con-
stant risk that he will face torture and death if discovered.").
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guages, 10
 and significant risks of failure. The entrapment defense's
strong relationship to ex ante planning by law enforcement agencies
can tip the scales too much in the wrong direction. There are enough
restraints or screening effects inherent in undercover antiterrorism
work to obviate some of the need for additional judicial intervention.
Judicial hesitancy in finding a lack of predisposition, therefore, could
be more appropriate in this context.
The remainder of this Article develops these points further, and
discusses their applicability to entrapment's lesser known siblings,
namely sentencing entrapment, entrapment by estoppel, and deriva-
tive entrapment (sometimes called vicarious entrapment). Part 1 pro-
vides some historical and conceptual background on the entrapment
defense; readers who are already familiar with the development of the
entrapment rules may prefer to skip to the subsequent sections, but
readers new to the area may find this survey particularly heipfa102
Part II explores the unique statutory framework operating in antiter-
rorism charges. 03 The heart of the Article, Part ill, explains and de-
fends the foregoing justifications for a modification of the rule)° 4 Part
W addresses sentencing entrapment, entrapment by estoppel, and
derivative entrapment in the terrorism context. 103 Besides the seven
main points summarized above, each of these corollary defenses pre-
sents at least one additional reason for an adaptation or relaxation of
the usual rule.
Having provided a roadmap for the ensuing discussion, this is an
appropriate point to insert a few admissions and disclaimers. The ar-
guments presented here have a law and economics" bent, focusing on
tradeoffs and incentives; the overall premise is utilitarian. This Article
does not address the ethical or moral problems with undercover gov-
ernment operations, many, of which are obvious: the problem of gov-
ernment deception, the problem of the government creating crimes
that would not otherwise have occurred, the conceptual asymmetry of
recognizing government entrapment while ignoring the problem of
private entrapment, the role of moral luck in the outcomes, among
others. Other commentators cover these moral issues comprehensively,
100 See POSNER, SUP/31 note 4, at 111 (discussing the difficulty the FBI has experienced
in recruiting agents with the necessary language skills for deciphering intercepted com-
munications).
102 See infra notes 111-253 and accompanying text.
103 See infra notes 254-271 and accompanying text.
04 See infra notes 272-374 and accompanying text.
1 " See infra notes 375-446 and accompanying text.
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and such deontological arguments must stand on their own, rather
than be pitted against teleological (utilitarian) concerns as if they were
offsetting disutilities. 106 The fact that something is wrong does not off-
set its social value; it makes the social value irrelevant or out of
bounds.'°7 This Article explores the best version of the rule, from a
pragmatic standpoint, and is not a moral endorsement of the things
undercover agents may do. Similarly, this Article skirts the obvious
105 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Po-
lice, 76 Oa. L. REV. 775, 806-07 (1997). Slobogin points out that police deception can vic-
timize the innocent, invade citizens' privacy, and should be subject to ex ante judicial su-
pervision/permission, much like warrants for searches or arrests:
These potential harms are much greater, however, when the undercover op-
eration takes on an active mode by going after a specific target or targets
thought to be criminal rather than seeking to lure criminals out of the gen-
eral population. The propriety of infiltrating a particular organization or es-
tablishing an intimate relationship with a particular individual cannot be the
subject of an abstract public debate.... Thus, where active undercover opera-
tions are contemplated, judicial authorization should be obtained. The police
should not be able to use such techniques unless the public, in the form of
the judge, decides that good reason to do so exists and that more straightfor-
ward methods are not likely to work.
Further, the distinction between passive and active undercover operations
jibes with the privacy notions that theoretically underlie Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. If the police merely set out a "honey pot,' they are likely to
discover only criminal aspects of a person's life. If, on the other hand, they
use covert operations to surveil a person's everyday actions and learn his or
her thoughts, they are practicing a significant invasion of privacy which, like
electronic surveillance, should be regulated judicially, both in cause and ne-
cessity terms.
Id. at 806-07. Slobogin contends that such ex ante safeguards would make the unwieldy en-
trapment defense almost unnecessary. Id. It should be noted that the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation does conduct undercover operations under ex ante guidelines, see generally Tux
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS UNDERCOVER
OPERATIONS (May 30, 2002), [hereinafter Asticaovr, GUIDELINES] available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/olp/fbiundercover.pdf,  and much of the federal law enforcements activities
contemplated in this article would come under its purview or presumably under similar in-
ternal rules. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that the guide-
lines still apply to agencies now reporting to Homeland Security after the post-September 11
reorganization. Pieniazek v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 792, 793 (7th Cir. 2006). Admittedly,
nonegregious violations of the guidelines by federal agents have no legal consequence for
the defendant. See United States v. Abusnayyaleh, Criminal No. 05-425 (JRT/JJG), 2006 WL
3690739, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 13, 2006).
On the subject of moral problems with undercover agents, and the widespread and
problematic use of sexual relationships to manipulate the targets of sting operations, see
generally Andrea B. Daloia, Sexual Misconduct and the Government: Time to Take a Stand, 48
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 793 (2000).
107
	 justice or righteousness inherent in a government policy is a 'separate discus-
sion from the-usefulness of various versions of the legal rules.
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moral and ethical quandaries that often arise in antiterrorism efforts,
such as ethnic or religious profiling, 108 protection of international
scoundrels because of their "usefulness" as informants, prolonged de-
tention of terror suspects without due process, or the use of torture to
extract information about upcoming attacks. These are very appropri-
ate subjects for academic inquiry but are outside the scope of this Arti-
cle, even though they may be relevant in the same adjudications in
which this Article is relevant.
The entrapment defense is distinct from other criminal defenses
and procedural safeguards in the extent to which it can influence ex
ante planning by bureau chiefs and policymakers. I assume throughout
this Article that allocation of antiterrorism resources is a zero sum
game such that investing resources in one method diverts them from
others. 1 ® Therefore, making one method "cheaper" for police by alter-
ing the legal rules will provide an incentive to concentrate resources on
that method; 11° this is a corollary assumption. Finally, this author as-
sumes a predilection for preserving the privacy and minimizing unnec-
essary government surveillance, and that thwarting deadly terrorist at-
tacks is desirable.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
A. Brief History
The entrapment defense was not a feature of English common
law, and it gained recognition in this country only in the twentieth
cen tury.ill Other commentators have chronicled the leading cases in
108 See generally Khan, supra note 86, at 47-48. 50 (arguing throughout that antiterrorist
policy literature has demonized Muslims unjustifiably, and offering numerous examples of
resultant harms to law-abiding Muslims).
"9 See, e.g., State v. Mullens, 650 S.E.2d 169, 215 (W. Va. 2008) (Maynard, J., dissent-
ing) ("Cash-strapped and overworked law-enforcement agencies have no incentive to arbi-
trarily send wired informants into the homes of law-abiding citizens when there are real
crimes to investigate.").
no By implication, then, the entrapment defense is unique among defenses in its abil-
ity to make one particular method (sting operations) more "expensive" for police when
the defense is robust, and "cheaper" for police when it is unavailing for culprits.
nt See United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 177-78 (3d Cir. 2007); MARCUS, supra
note 1, at 2-6. For a discussion of recent material from the House of Lords, see generally
Andrew Ashworth, Re-Drawing the Boundaries of Entrapment, 2002 CRIM. L REV. 161 (U.K.).
This article focuses on the modern use of the defense as a method of deterring police
misconduct, so the historical origins are terribly relevant.
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this area in amazing detail," 2 so it would be redundant to do so here.
My purpose instead is to provide a brief summary.
The rise of the entrapment defense corresponded to the advent of
Comstock laws, Prohibition, the Mann Act, narcotics regulation, and
restrictive immigration laws." 3 These so-called "victimless crimes," 114
involve transactions in contraband or illicit services, where both parties
are willing participants, like buyers and sellers. Ubiquitous regulation
of such matters is a distinguishing feature of modern criminal law. 115
The commercialized nature of many of the proscribed acts (like distri-
bution and possession) not only requires buyers and sellers, but also
invites distributional and production organizations, as in any market,
because economies of scale and efficiencies from specialization benefit
the participants. 116 The result is increasingly large groups working in
concert in the criminal enterprise.
The networks that spring up for the purpose of working around
these rather moralistic laws have an additional consequence. Law en-
forcement agents posing as any one of the individuals in the enterprise
can help catch everyone involved. Thus, the criminalization of such
activities lends itself to sting operations due to the collective nature of
the prohibited acts. In addition, the lack of victims to report crimes also
112 See generally Park, supra note 15, at 171-216 (offering a breathtaking survey of cases
up to the mid-1970s). Park's labyrinthine footnotes span his entire article, but alas the
cases are all from before 1973, and the field has developed since then. A newer history,
done with a Foucault-based anthropological viewpoint was provided more recently by Re-
becca Roiphe. See Rebecca Roiphe, The Serpent Beguiled Me: A History of the Entrapment De-
fense, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 257, 260-92 (2003). Most of her article is a history, of the
defense, as well as the social context preceding its advent.
113 See Sorrel's v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring) (ac-
knowledging link between entrapment claims and new federal regulation of consensual
transactions).
114 See supra note 12.
116 On the other hand, the country was, in a sense, birthed in the context of conflict
over the regulation of imports and crimes of possession, as seen in the colonial-era spats
with England and the Whiskey Rebellion in Kentucky. See Roiphe, supra note 112, at 260-
70. Roiphe's history begins immediately after the Civil War. See id. These regulations were
less moralistic and more economic; of course, most regulations are a mixture of moral
judgments and economic regulation.
116 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 230 ("But conspiracies are also more dangerous in be-
ing able to commit crimes more efficiently ... by being able to take advantage of the divi-
sion of labor—posting one man as a sentinel, another to drive the getaway car, another to
fence the goods stolen, and so on. Their costs thus are lower (a conspiracy simulates the
market approach to the commission of crime) and they are also more likely to be effective
both in completing the crime and in avoiding being caught ...."). Examples as disparate
as cocaine and anthrax would be applicable. Bodyguards are useful for illegal transactions,
but so are production specialists, suppliers of raw materials, distributors, marketers, and
other agents.
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is a contributing factor, discussed more below. 117 Of course, a perfect
and universal system of surveillance might be an alternative to sting
operations for these crimes, but society would have to sacrifice a tre-
mendous amount of individual privacy for that to happen, even if pan-
optic surveillance were technologically feasible. The government does
not have the means, with present technology, to be omniscient about
the behavior of the citizenry.
As sting operations became more prevalent, so did defendants
claiming that the authorities tricked them into a crime. 119 In a sense
this was also a matter of necessity; entrapment truly is a defense of last
resort., likely to come up in cases where the defense is most desperate.
Sting operations can provide an airtight case for the prosecutor. The
first reported federal case to uphold the entrapment defense was in
1915. 119 The first Supreme Court case addressing the defense was in
1932, in SarreIls v. United States, 120 where a federal agent posing as a tour-
ist/fellow war veteran enticed his host, a hospitable farmer, to sell him
some liquor during the Prohibition years. The lower courts had denied
the availability of the entrapment defense; the Supreme Court re-
versed, stating that the defense should be available, at least in a pre-trial
hearing. 121 Justice Roberts wrote a concurrence arguing that no trial
should occur at all where the police instigated the offense, and that the
majority focused too much on the defendant's predisposition. 122
The Supreme Court went on to issue four more key decisions on
the defense,'" which comprise the entirety of the Court's jurispru-
dence on the matter. These cases, and the "subjective test" they es-
poused (over strident dissents), became binding on all federal courts,
and persuasively influential for state courts and legislatures. Approxi-
mately half the states have now incorporated the defense into their
117 See infra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
118 See Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412, 412-13 (9th Cir. 1915) (first federal case
recognizing entrapment defense).
119 Id. In Woo Wai v. United States an immigration enforcement officer (in the nascent
days of immigration restrictions) had lured the defendant into a scheme for smuggling
Chinese illegal aliens into the country. Id. The recruitment process had taken eighteen
months; the court focused on the lack of evidence that the criminal intention had origi-
nated in the defendant's mind. Id. at 415.
120 287 U.S. at 438.
121 See id. at 442, 452.
1" Id. at 454-55 (Roberts, J., concurring).
'1' See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 554 (1992); Mathews v. United States,
485 U.S. 58, 59-60 (1988); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 485 (1976); United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 424-25 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 370
{1957).
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criminal statutes, in various permutations; the others have the defense
as a matter of judicial precedent. 124
The Court in Sorrells discussed two possible approaches to the
defense, called the "subjective" and "objective" tests, and adopted the
subjective test. 125 The concurring Justices wanted the objective test
instead.' These two tests still define the field. The subjective test as-
sumes that entrapment is not a constitutional matter, although the
Court has not permanently foreclosed the idea that entrapment could
be tied to a generic procedural due process claim at some point. 127
Due process, however, is the entire concern of the objective test; some
courts actually call it the "due process test." 1 48 The fact that entrap-
ment is not a constitutional issue, according to the majority of the
Court, means that states are free to ignore the Court in this area and
adopt alternative approaches. 129 The Model Penal Code (the "MP.C")
followed the dissenters on the Court and opted for the objective test,'"
124 All states have the entrapment defense, but only half have codified it. For a list, see
John E. Nilsson, Note, Of Outlaws and Offloads: A Case for Derivative Entrapment, 37 B.C. L.
REV. 743, 747 n.26 (1996).
525 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448 (emphasizing that Congress would not have enacted a stat-
ute seeking to punish someone without criminal intent, thereby focusing on the defen-
dant's disposition); id. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring) (focusing on ,entrapment as a way
for the judiciary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process).
126 Id. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring); see also Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
/27 A few courts have tried this, but the idea has not caught on; nor has the Supreme
Court ever adopted it See, e.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 375 (3d Cir. 1978);
Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1971) (stating that the Government
may not involve itself so directly and continuously over such a long period of time in the
creation and maintenance of criminal operations"); see also Kenneth M. Lord, Entrapment
and Due Process: Moving Toward a Dual System of Defenses, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 463, 467-68
{1998) (arguing that courts should use both an entrapment defense and a related due
process defense, depending on the case); Eric L. Muller, Constitutional Conscience, 83 B.U.
1. REV. 1017, 1020 (2003) (lamenting the passing of the outrageous government conduct
defense from the government system and proposing its revival); John David Buretta, Note,
Reconfiguring the Entrapment and Outrageous Government Conduct Doctrines, 84 GEO. L.J. 1945,
1950 (1996) (urging that entrapment be merged into an outrageous government conduct
test under constitutional due process analysis); Molly Kathleen Nichols, Comment, En-
trapment and Due Process: How Far is Too Fart 58 Tut. L. REV. 1207, 1207 (1984) (advocating
a due process dimension to entrapment defense).
It is important to note that granting a due process entrapment defense would not
necessarily trigger the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. The courts would have to make
that explicit.
Twigg, 588 F.2d at 385.
' 29 See Sorrel's, 287 U.S. at 446.
130 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1980). The MPC's position on entrapment is par-
ticularly interesting when taken together with its approach to conspiracies, especially in
light of the fact that entrapment and conspiracy crimes are interrelated. The MPC allows a
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which probably influenced the minority of states that follow the
MPC's approach on this point."' Five jurisdictionsm have tried to
combine the approaches into a hybrid, which is harder on defendants
because it makes them pass through both sets of hurdles)" The ma-
jority of the Supreme Court, however, has never wavered from the
subjective test, and the more recent cases 134 indicate that the dissent-
ers have either given up or are no longer on the Court. 335
conspiracy conviction even where the only other conspirator besides the defendant was a
government agent. See id. § 5.03(1). This is usually called the "unilateral approach" to con-
spiracy, which differs from the traditional (majority) rule known as the "bilateral ap-
proach," which requires at least two real criminal (nongovernment agent) members of a
conspiracy before any member may be convicted of the charge. For a detailed discussion
of this plurality requirement, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw § 6.5(g) (3d ed. 2000).
The MPC, therefore, makes it easier for the government to obtain convictions by using
sting operations—all one needs is a single victim (defendant) and one government
agent—but then imposes a rule for the entrapment defense that is less favorable to law
enforcement, as it focuses on the actions of the agents and not the defendant's predisposi-
tion. It is not clear if the drafters intended this to be an equalizing feature of the MPC, or
if the odd combination was a coincidence.
131 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 1, at 173-74 ("More than a dozen states have found the
subjective test wanting and have, therefore, adopted the objective test."); see also ALASKA
S-rAT. § 11.81.450 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-209 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-709
(2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-237 (LexisNexis 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3210 •
(1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1997);
18 PA. CONS, STAT. ANN. § 313 (West 1998); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.06 (Vernon 2003);
UTAH CODE ANN, § 76-2-303 (2003); State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa 1974);
People v. Turner, 210 N.W.2d 336, 342-43 (Mich. 1973); State v. Wilkins, 473 A.2d 295,
298-99 (Vt. 1983).
132 Florida, Indiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New Mexico have variations on the
objective test that appear to be hybrids. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.201 (West 2005); IND.
CODE. ANN. § 35-41-3-9 (LexisNexis 2004); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12 (West 2005); State v.
Little, 435 A.2d 517, 519 (N.H. 1981); Baca v. State, 742 P.2d 1043, 1045-46 (N.M. 1987); see
also Marcus, supra note 1, at 180-84 ("A misreading of the objective test can cause inclusion
of the predisposition element.").
155 few commentators have proposed hybrid approaches, but the idea has not gained
widespread acceptance. See, e.g., Lord, supra note 127, at 467-68 (arguing for both a hybrid
entrapment defense to be available as well as a separate due process type defense); Jeffrey
N. Klar, Note, The Need for a Dual Approach to Entrapment, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 199, 203 (1981).
134 See, e.g., Mathews, 485 U.S. at 66-67 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("I have previously
joined or written four opinions dissenting from this Court's holdings that the defendant's
predisposition is relevant to the entrapment defense Therefore I bow to stare elecisis,
and today join the judgment and reasoning of the Court.").
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supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's position on en-
trapment takes on special pragmatic importance for three reasons: 1) the increasing fed-
eralization of criminal law in the United States means that federal rules have an ever-
greater relevance for law enforcenient; 2) the federal criminal code comprehensively cov-
ers many of the so-called "victimless crimes" that lend themselves to enforcement via sting
operations, and hence would naturally give rise to more entrapment claims; and 3) en-
trapment remains a common law defense in the federal courts, meaning that the Court's
jurisprudence on the issue completely carries the day. See supra notes 33-35.
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B. The Internationalization of the Entrapment Defense
Traditionally, entrapment as an affirmative defense was unique to
American law; 136 other industrialized countries did not recognize the
defense,'" but instead regulated sting operations by charging law en-
forcement agents for participation in the crimes they helped instigate. 138
This appears to be changing. 139
In the United States, the increased federalization of criminal
lawm in the last quarter of the twentieth century naturally led to a
commensurate federalization of criminal defenses, so that entrap-
ment cases increased temporarily. 141 It appears that we are now in a
new phase of globalization or internationalization of criminal law," 2
136 See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
137 See Ross, supra note 25, at 1521 (explaining that in Europe the general rule is for
the defendant to be found guilty but for the police to be charged as accessories to the
crime in situations that would be analogous to entrapment in the United States).
133 See id. at 1521-22 ("Most Western European legal systems instead treat entrapment
as a mode of complicity that fails to excuse the target but implicates the investigator in the
crime .... European legal systems treat such conduct as criminal unless a law expressly
exempts the investigator from liability for specified acts." (citation omitted)).
139 See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 10, at 110 & n.21 (asserting that the growing interest
is due to pressure from the United States for our allies to participate in more undercover
operations to detect drug traffickers).
140 See, e.g., United States V. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 631 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v
Sabri, 326 F.3d 937, 956 (8th Cir. 2003) (Bye, J., dissenting); United States v. Jacquez-
Beltran, 326 F.3d 661, 665 (5th Cir. 2003) (DeMoss, j., specially concurring).
There has been much academic acknowledgment of the federalization of criminal law.
See generally John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP.
L. REV. 673 (1999); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American
Criminal Late, 46 HASTINGS U. 1135 (1995); Thomas .). Maroney, Fifty Years of Federalization
of Criminal Law: Sounding the Alarm or "Crying Wolf?' 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1317 (2000);
Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Control-
ling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rtv. 893, 897 (2000); Dick Thornburgh et al., The Growing
Federalization of Criminal Law, 31 N.M. L. REv. 135 (2001); Christine DeMaso, Note, Advisory
Sentencing and the Federalization of Crime: Should Federal Sentencing judges Consider the Disparity
Between State and Federal Sentences Under Booker?, 106 Cotusi. L. REV. 2095, 2104-06 (2006).
141 See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 19. For an exhaustive list of reported entrapment
cases in recent years, see id. at nn.38, 40-56, 81-83. For a tabulation of the increases and
subsequent decreases in the number of cases in which the defense arises, see id. at 37-38.
142 See, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 719-15 (1998) (citing several aca-
demic sources); In re Impounded, 178 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing the emerg-
ing internationalization of criminal antitrust enforcement); United States v. Balsys, 119
F.3d 122, 130-31 (2d Cir. 1997). See generally Bruce D. Landrum, Globalization ofjustice: The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ARMY LAW., Sept. 2002; at 1; Maximo Langer,
From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Ameri-
canization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARv. INT'L U. 1 (2004) (discussing the influ-
ence of American plea bargaining in the international arena); Edgardo Rosman, The Glob.
alization of Criminal Violence, 10 CORNELL J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 1 (2000) (providing a useful
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so we would expect to see a similar internationalization of traditional
defenses."3 This seems to be the case with entrapment, as courts in
more industrialized countries have addressed it in recent years. The
approaches to entrapment vary, and include some alternatives for
regulating sting operations besides the two rival rules found in Amer-
ica, that is, the objective and subjective tests.
Canada's Supreme Court recognized entrapment-like claims in
Queen v Mack in 1988. 1 " The court based this move in part on the Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a constitutional act passed in
1982. 145 Unlike the United States, Canada does not recognize entrap-
ment as an "affirmative defense" to a crime, in the sense that the de-
fendant can obtain a complete acquittal; 146 rather, courts issue a "stay of
proceedings," after the conviction of the defendant, which puts the case on
hold indefinitely without sentencing the defendant at 310 47 The Cana-
dian courts use a rule akin to the "objective test" in the United States;
for example, in Regina v. Sullivan, the Canadian Supreme Court ex-
plained, "The policy considerations here are analogous to those which
apply when proceedings against an accused are stayed because of en-
nomenclature and identification of which crimes tend to be the most prone to interna-
tional effects, and consequently, enforcement).
143 See, e.g., Balsys, 524 U.S. at 714-15 (discussing the problems of government over-
reaching in the international context).
144 See R. v. Mack, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903, ¶1 10, 122 (Can.). For an academic overview
(somewhat dated) of entrapment law in Canada, see generally David Lanham, Entrapment,
Qualified Defences and Codification, 4 Oxvonni. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1984).
143 See Mack, 2 S.C.R. ¶1 10, 122. For an earlier and oft-cited case that had moved in
this direction, see R. v. Dewitt, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 128,'1'1 2, 55 (Can.). Note that Canada ap-
pears to recognize the defense of 'entrapment by estoppel." Levis (Ville) c. Tetreault,
[2006] 1 S.C.R. 420, 11 20-28 (Can.), available on Westlaw at 2006 CarswellQue 2911; R. v.
Jorgensen, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 55, 11 22-24 (Can.), available on Westlaw at 1995 CarswellOnt
985; see also infra notes 415-436 and accompanying text (describing entrapment by estop-
pel). Canada does not appear to recognize "vicarious" or "derivative" entrapment. See R. v.
Carosella, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 80, 1 135 (Can.), available on Westlaw at 1997 CarswellOnt 85; see
also infra notes 437-446 and accompanying text (describing derivative entrapment).
' 46 See, e.g., R. v. Pearson, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 620, at 1 6 (Can.), available on %Vestlaw at 1998
CarswellQue 1079 ("Entrapment is a unique area of the criminal law. In our view, it has
been somewhat inappropriately referred to as an affirmative defence.").
147 See id. 11 7-12 ("[Entrapment] is, in fact, completely separate from the issue of
guilt or innocence .... A claim of entrapment is in reality a motion for a stay of proceed-
ings based on the accused's allegation of an abuse of process.... Entrapment concerns the
conduct of the police and the Crown. The question to be answered is not whether the
accused is guilty, but whether his guilt was uncovered in a manner that shocks the con-
science and offends the principle of decency and fair play.... Once the accused is found
guilty of the offence, the accused alone bears the burden of establishing that the conduct
of the Crown and/or the police amounted to an abuse of process deserving of a stay of
proceedings . . . .").
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trapment. They are concerned with the integrity and fairness of the
administration of justice rather than with the culpability of the ac-
cused."'"
Canadian entrapment cases often include references to American
entrapment law, 149 as extradition proceedings by the United States
government become more common; typically, the Canadian courts
defer to the foreign court's rules and reject the entrapment claims in
these cases. 15° The international characteristics of terrorism make it
more likely that Canada will encounter more entrapment claims in
this area; so far there have only been a few. 15' As in the United States,
the entrapment defense is not always successful. 152
England refused to recognize the entrapment defense for many
years; it was not a defense in English common law.i 53 In 2002, how-
ever, in Regina v. Loosely,'" the House of Lords changed course and
adopted an "abuse of process" rule similar to the objective version of
the entrapment defense (explicitly rejecting a "predisposition" rule,
interestingly). 155 Unlike the United States, however, England now uses
the same procedural relief mechanism as Canada—a "stay of proceed-
ings"—rather than a finding of no guilt or dismissal of the charges
t48 [1991] 1 S.C.R. 489, 1 25 (Can.) (quoting R. v. P., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 3,1 22 (Can.)).
See generally R. v. Brown, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 660 (Can.) (holding that police manipulation of
accused's known alcohol addiction constituted active inducement to commit crime; ac-
cused was entrapped and further proceedings would constitute abuse of process, so judi-
cial stay of proceedings entered).
149 An additional illustration of Canada's awareness of American entrapment law is ap-
parent in the legal academic literature. See, e.g., M. L. Friedland, Contmlling Entrapment, 32
U. ToRowro L.J. 1, 12-14 (1982).
159 See generally, e.g., United States v. Kwok, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 532 (Can.); United States v.
Dynar, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 462, at l 116 (Can.).
151
	
R. c. Khela, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 201, 1 56 (Can.) (attempt to bomb American air-
plane, entrapment claims raised); United States v. Reumayr, [2003) CA029202, CA029839,
2003 CarswellBC 1570, 1 13 (B.C. Ct. App.) (extradition request by U.S. for defendant
accused of trying to bomb Alaska pipeline; entrapment claims raised, court deferred to
U.S. courts); R. v. Young, [2000] 2/00, 2000 CarswellOnt 4970, 11 3, 16 (Ont. Super. Ct. of
Justice) (bombing of police station, entrapment claims raised).
152 See, e.g., R. v. Shirose, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565, 576-79 (Can.) (holding that in the ab-
sence of proved entrapment, it was unnecessary to consider the legality of "reverse-sting"
operations generally or specifically; rather, entrapment requires application of the "clear-
est cases" doctrine, reserved for the most egregious instances of government misconduct;
"reverse-sting" in this case did not shock the conscience or weigh against the conviction).
355 See, e.g., R. v. Sang, (1979) 69 Grim. App. 282, 286 (H.L.) (appeal taken from CA.)
(U.K.), available at 1979 WL 68315.
154 (2002) 1 Crim. App. 29, 366-67 (H.L.) (appeal taken from C.A.) (U.K.).
133 Id. See generally Squires, supra note 21 (discussing in detail the opinion and the case
history leading up to Loosely).
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(the American rule). 166
 The defendant escapes penal sanctions for the
incident; of course, one may still find it inconvenient to have a convic-
tion on record.
The House of Lords felt influenced (possibly bound, depending
on how one understands European Union law) by a landmark deci-
sion from the European Court of Human Rights (the "ECHR") in
1999, Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal.'" The remedy for entrapment in
the ECHR is more drastic than elsewhere. The tribunal acquitted Mr.
Teixeira du Castro, who was the victim of a drug sting by Portuguese
undercover agents, and ordered the Portuguese government to repay
his lost wages during his time of imprisonment and various litigation
costs.168 This case will probably continue to be influential over the
other countries of Western Europe for several years. 133
Australia has also moved in the direction of recognizing entrap-
ment claims,'" but with a different remedial device. Australian courts
impose an exclusionary rule on evidence or testimony related to po-
lice overreaching 161 (again, something similar to an objective test in
the United States). 162 Following the celebrated 1995 Ridgeway v. Regina
case, however, state legislatures rushed to enact statutes granting im-
munity for undercover agents, preventing prosecution for their in-
volvement in sting-related crimes (the historical remedy for overdone
stings). 163 This seems to have offset the effect of Ridgeway somewhat,
making Australian judicial oversight of sting operations, in the words
of Paul Marcus and Vicki Waye, "extremely thin."'"
Singapore still does not recognize entrapment at all; 1" courts
there apparently continue to follow the 1980 R. v. Sang decision from
England, which England itself has overruled. 166 Given Singapore's on-
going dependence on British jurisprudence and precedents, it seems
156 See Loosely, I Grim. App. at 366-67.
n7 See generally 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. 101 (1999), available at 1998 WL 1043930. The Teixeira
opinion is available in Westlaw by clicking one of the internal links beneath the caption on
the Westlaw case above; it is an excellent resource for previous European decisions on
sting operations.
156 See generally id.
1" See Bronitt, supra note 21, at 376-78.
160 Ridgeway v. Regina (1995) 184 C.L.R. 19,43 (Austl.) {adopting exclusionary rule
for evidence obtained through sting operation).
161 See Marcus & Waye, supra note 24, at 73-78.
162 See id. at 78.
in Id. at 75.
164 Id. at 78.
165 See Bronitt, supra note 21, at 375.
166 See id. at 375,384.
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likely that courts there will follow the Loosely decision eventually. 167
South Africa's Supreme Court also completely rejected the entrapment
defense in State v. Hassen and Another, 168 in 1998.
Even though antiterrorism efforts will probably contribute to'the
further internationalization of criminal law and relevant defenses, a
deep cultural divide between Europe and the United States in atti-
tudes about appropriate behavior for police will remain problematic
for adopting a unified approach. As James Q. Whitman has observed,
Europeans seem to have a higher tolerance for invasive government
surveillance, 169 but are more sensitive about personal control over
one's public identity or portrayal, which seems to weigh against sting
operations. Sting operations, to the extent that they are a "setup," re-
move some of the culprit's control over self-representation, as in the
time, place, and exposure of illegal acts. Surveillance bothers Ameri-
cans, perhaps, because of the chilling effect it has on cherished free-
doms, like free speech and freedom of association, which is conceptu-
ally different from control of one's public portrayal. Richard Posner
has made a similar point about the British: "[T]hey perceive less ten-
sion between M15-style domestic intelligence and civil liberties than
between police measures and civil liberties."m Sting operations are
police operations from this standpoint, focused on obtaining arrests
and convictions.
C. Necessity Is the Mother of Invention
The entrapment defense is always the product of an undercover
sting operation, and sting operations are usually the product of certain
types of criminal activity. There are two characteristics of a crime that
most invite undercover enforcement methods: consent between the
167 See generally id. at 375-84.
168See Recent Developments, Entrapment and the Right to a Fair Trial, 43 J. AFR, L. 112,
112 (1999) (discussing this decision by the Supreme Court of South Africa). The defen-
dants found themselves apprehended as a result of a police trap for purchasing unpol-
ished diamonds without a permit (violating section 20 of the 1986 Diamonds Act). Id.
They appealed on the grounds that the sting and the admission of the evidence from it
violated their constitutional due process rights. Id. The South African Supreme Court held
that there was no substantive entrapment defense under the South African Constitution;
although it recognized the possibility that a case might arise where the trap was so unfair as
to violate the right to a fair trial; this trap was not so egregious. Id.
189 See Whitman, supra note 27, at 1159 ("In France and Germany, according to a re-
cent study, telephones are tapped at ten to thirty times the rate they are tapped in the
United States—and in the Netherlands and Italy, at 130 to 150 times the rate.").
170 POSNER, supra note 4, at 135.
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immediate parties to the crime, and a special need to prevent the crime
from occurring in the first place. The traditional "victinaless crimes,"
such as drug sales, sex sales, and firearms trafficking, are examples of
the consensual transactions that our government has criminalized.
Most common law crimes addressed nonconsensual transfers (thefts)
and extreme versions of otherwise tortious injuries (battery, wrongful
death, and the like). The dramatic rise in criminalization of certain
consensual transactions, a prevalent feature of modern law, necessi-
tated the increased use of both surveillance and sting operations, be-
cause the chances of detection are otherwise terribly low, from a law
enforcement perspective. The absence of an immediate victim who
would be upset enough to report the crime or press charges after the
fact presents special challenges to law enforcement.t"t The criminaliza-
don of activities forces them underground, often into clandestine
criminal networks, which further encumbers enforcement efforts. Infil-
tration of the network by undercover agents becomes expedient.
Preventing crimes can also necessitate the use of infiltrators or
sting operations, especially if the crime is difficult to deter for some
reason. Strict prevention, however, is usually, not a priority; and is usu-
ally not very necessary. If the goal of law enforcement is simply to de-
ter or punish, as is usually the case, then penal actions after the com-
mission can serve both of these goals reasonably well. Traditional
methods of investigating crimes and arresting the suspects are often
appropriate. Admittedly, catching the wrongdoers might be more dif-
In justice Relinquist observed this point with eloquence:
The illicit manufacture of drugs is not a sporadic, isolated criminal incident,
but a continuing, though illegal, business enterprise. In order to obtain con-
victions for illegally manufacturing drugs, the gathering of evidence of past
unlawful conduct frequently proves to be an all but impossible task. Thus in
drug-related offenses law enforcement personnel have turned to one of the
only practicable means of detection: the infiltration of drug rings and a lim-
ited participation in their unlawful practices. Such infiltration is a recognized
and permissible means of investigation ... .
Russell, 411 U.S. at 423. An interesting twist on this paradigm is the modern problem of
computer crime directed at corporations (hacking, theft, point of service denials, vandal-
ism of corporate websites, and so forth), and for which decoys called "honeypots" are now
in use to trap would-be hackers. Corporations, although not willing parties to a hacking
transaction, are often loathe to report that their systems have been breached by unauthor-
ized users. See Walden & Flanagan, supra note 1, at 338. First, corporations do not want the
rest of the hacking community to be aware of security weaknesses in their systems, which
would invite more intrusions. See id. Second, corporations are also concerned about share-
holder value, and public reporting about the crime could have negative repercussions in
this respect. See id.
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ficult for some crimes than for others, as discussed in the preceding
paragraph. Yet aside from the downward-skewed probabilities of de-
tection, either deterrence or retribution is easily obtainable after the
crime occurs. Crime prevention is a separate goal that might require
government activity before the crime, although effective deterrence is
one way to prevent the commission of crimes. If a crime is difficult to
deter, perhaps because the normal motivations for the crimes are im-
pervious to dissuasion, then intervention by the government before-
hand becomes necessary to prevent the crime.'" Similarly, if the po-
tential harm from the crime is extraordinarily widespread and severe,
preventing its occurrence becomes more important than with isolated
instances of the usual "victimless crimes."173 Terrorism meets both of
these_ criteria: the ideological motivations make it difficult to deter by
conventional means (the risk of punishment and social approbation),
and the risk of thousands of deaths at once makes absolute preven-
tion a higher priority than usual. Hence, undercover operations be-
come more expedient as antiterrorism efforts increase.
Another factor contributes to an increase in undercover law en-
forcement, but it is environmental more than inherent in the charac-
teristics of a particular crime. If the exclusionary rules are more likely
to arise at trial, or are easier for defendants to wield as legal weapons
than the entrapment defense, the police may devote more attention to
172 In actuality, the favored antiterrorism statutes for prosecutors are newer enact-
ments forbidding "material support" of terrorism, which are designed to be preventative
rather than punitive, allowing prosecutors to bring charges before the terrorist attack itself
takes place. See infra notes 254-271 and accompanying text; see also Norman Abrams, The
Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived from the (Early) Model Penal Code, 1 J.
NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 5, 7 (2005) ("The government is also using these offenses as a basis
for early intervention, a kind of criminal early-warning and preventative-enforcement de-
vice designed to nip the risk of terrorist activity in the bud.").
175 See Brian P. Comerford, Note, Preventing Terrorism by Prosecuting Material Support, 80
No-raE DAME L. REV. 723, 732-33 (2005) ("Terrorism is different from traditional crime
because it is uniquely destructive and the perpetrators often do not live to be punished.
Any response to terrorism must focus on prevention of future terrorist acts. If terrorism
were a typical crime, the government might consider preventing terrorism through deter-
rent measures, such as tougher penalties and stricter enforcement Terrorists, however,
cannot be deterred; if an offender is willing to die for his actions, no fear of punishment
will discourage him. The only option is to incapacitate terrorists before a plot has been
initiated and before members of the public are harmed. Statutes that merely criminalize
terrorist acts are inadequate because they target completed crimes. Prohibiting attempt
and conspiracy to commit terrorist acts is only marginally better because the public is put
at great risk when prosecutors wait until an act of terrorism is sufficiently close to commis-
sion. The only acceptable response to terrorism is to criminalize support of the terrorist
group. This allows prosecutors to act when an offender trains with, joins, and potentially
lies in wait for instructions from, a foreign terrorist organization.").
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avoiding actions that would trigger the exclusionary rules rather than
those that might constitute entrapment. This can even occur unwit-
tingly, as when police focus more on proper procedure for searches
and seizures, so that they become less vigilant about creating a possible
entrapment defense. On a more conscious level, police could conclude
that an acquittal based on entrapment is less likely than one based on
the exclusionary rules, leading to more willingness to cheat in the area
with the least likely consequences.
There can also be unintended consequences from disparities in
sanctions for police, including disparities in probabilities. Some com-
mentators see the rise of conspiracy as a favorite charge for prosecutors
as a reaction against the dramatic increase in prodefendant exclusion-
ary rules during the Warren Court era. 174 Prosecuting more often for
conspiracy charges, instead of other crimes, may be an attempt to re-
store equilibrium. An unintended consequence of focusing more on
conspiracy, however, is that it creates new opportunities to use govern-
ment informants and sting operations, more so than traditional com-
mon law crimes."5 The incriminating statements made and recorded
by undercover agents in a group conversation, prior to a custodial in-
terrogation, are far less likely to trigger exclusionary rules. The police,
therefore, have extra incentives to conceptualize law enforcement in
terms of conspiracy, and thence to use sting operations, which set the
stage for entrapment."6
Heightened exclusionary rules in criminal procedure, therefore,
can lead to more sting operations to offset the limitations or costs im-
posed by the exclusionary rules." 7 The police will have a tendency to
use an agent, either to infiltrate an existing conspiracy or to create a
174 See Stevenson; supra note 31, at 104,
175 I generally take a favorable view of criminalizing conspiracy, as discussed more in
the following paragraphs. It should be mentioned, however, that some commentators have
argued forcefully that conspiracy is completely unnecessary as a crime (especially given the
modern breadth of laws of attempt and accomplice liability) and that it provides too much
power to law enforcement. See generally Phillip Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy,
61 CAL. L. REV, 1137 (1973). Attempt, however, requires that the defendant have taken a
"substantial step" toward the commission of the crime; conspiracy does not, but rather
requires only that there was an agreement—sometimes somewhat tentative—to pursue a
criminal enterprise. This is much easier for the prosecution to prove. Also, the usual rules
against admitting hearsay evidence can be circumvented when the out-of court testimony
is offered to prove this criminal agreement, which is an element of the crime. See generally
id.
175 See Ross, supra note 25, at 1509 ( -The Fifth Amendment invites the use of under-
cover tactics as a means of obtaining by deceptive stratagems prior to arrest what police
may not elicit by coercion afterwards.").
177 See POSNER, supra note 4, at 114-11
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new one; to recruit those who would have joined a conspiracy other-
wise, or to have more codefendants who will incriminate each other at
trial. 178 In addition, if the exclusionary rules focus mostly on arrest and
search procedures (as they do), then law enforcement is more likely to
want a "controlled" setting for these particular phases of enforcement;
inadvertent violations that trigger the exclusionary rules are more likely
in a spontaneous response to a crime that occurs as a surprise. Police
have an incentive to reduce risk and uncertainty by "creating" the occa-
sion for the crime; this allows police to plan the timing and occasion of
the arrest, and the timing, occasion, and method of obtaining incrimi-
nating evidence. The exclusionary rules create an extra incentive to use
sting operations as the method of choice for law enforcement.
D. Legal Regulation of Sting Operations
There are currently four devices in our legal system that regulate
sting operations. The primary device is the affirmative defense of en-
trapment. There are, however, three other devices with which we cur-
rently regulate sting operations; one is administrative, and the other
two are judicial or legislative. Each is secondary to the entrapment de-
fense in import and effect, and reflects the ex ante, indirect effects of
the entrapment defense.
1. Entrapment as an Affirmative Defense
Modern sting operations are an outgrowth of modern criminali-
zation of consensual transactions, the prosecutorial-statutory frame-
work of conspiracy charges, and the substitution effects of the exclu-
sionary rules in criminal procedure. 178 The entrapment defense is our
175 To the extent that exclusionary rules interfere with the admissibility of confessions,
law enforcement has additional reasons for favoring conspiracy. For example, conspiracies
provide the opportunity to "flip" members into confessing against each other (but such
incriminations are unlikely to trigger the exclusionary rules). For a discussion of how the
criminalization of conspiracies generally provides a societal advantage through the phe-
nomenon of "flipping," see Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307,
1328-32 (2003). Judge Richard Posner notes a similar point as an inherent weakness of
conspiracies, but one that can lead to additional crimes: "While it is also true that a con-
spiracy is more vulnerable to being detected because of the scale of its activities, the scale
may also enable the conspiracy to escape punishment by corrupting law enforcement offi-
cers." POSNER, supra note 3, at 230. My focus is on the value of sting operations to police,
but the insight is the same. •
175 A few commentators have presented empirical arguments that the advent of the ex-
clusionary rules led to significant increases in crime rates nationwide, ranging from three
percent to thirty percent, especially in the wake of Mapp u Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Sze,
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legal system's primary means of regulating government sting opera-
tions. As a regulatory scheme, it depends on an ex post mechanism:
the acquittal of defendants who were wrongly entrapped. There is a
resultant ex ante effect on the planning and execution of the sting
operations (anticipating the pitfalls of the entrapment defense and
working around them), but it is indirect. 180 The direct operation of
the entrapment defense is the ex post acquittal of the sting's target.
Without the indirect, ex ante effect alongside it, of course, any ex post
regulation causes a certain amount of social waste, as the entire un-
dercover operation comes to naught when the court acquits the tar-
get. The resources invested in the sting go to waste; it would have
been better to invest the resources in other forms of law enforcement,
including surveillance and investigation. The indirect or ex ante ef-
fects of the entrapment defense, therefore, are crucial for it to func-
tion as an efficient regulatory device.
2. The Federal Guidelines for FBI Undercover Operations
The internal, administrative regulation of sting operations comes
from the U.S. Attorney General's Guidelines on Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation Undercover Operations, which set rules for sting operations that
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the "FBI') may conduct. 181 The
rules are the subject of modifications every few years, at the discretion
of the Attorney General, and the last modification occurred in 2002,
under John Ashcroft, mostly in response to the 2001 terrorist attacks
in New York and Washington, D.C. and the reactionary "War on Ter-
ror" that ensued thereafter. 132 The Attorney General ("AG") has au-
thority to promulgate and revise the guidelines pursuant to federal
e.g., Raymond Atkins & Paul Rubin, Effects of Criminal Procedure on Crime Rates: Mapping Out
the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rules, 46 J.L. & ECON. 157, 159 (2003). Judge Richard
Posner cites statistics that the 'crime index" compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion grew sevenfold between 1960 and 1996; for reasons he links to exclusionary rules, the
number of federal prosecutions during the same period increased only by a third. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 369 n.61 (2001). Of Course, many theo-
ries explaining the rise in crime rates in the 1960s and 1970s are in circulation. See, e.g.,
GEORGE B. VOLID & THOMAS J. BERNARD, THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 157-58 (3d ed.
1986) (discussing Durkheim's influential social anomie theory); id. at 287-98 (social con-
flict theories).
Ina See POSNER, supra note 4, at 114, 136 (discussing Bureau planning around the
criminal procedure rules in an ex ante manner).
183 See generally ASHCROFT, GUIDELINES, supra note 106.
182 See POSNER, supra note 4, at 137-38 (discussing the guidelines' place in the reorgan-
ized intelligence system after September 11, 2001).
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statute. 183 The AG has full discretion in this area; that is, the fullest
amount of discretion that courts recognize for administrative agencies
generally. These guidelines are important not only because the FBI is
the main law enforcement agency of the federal government (and
thus involved in almost all entrapment cases), but also because a
number of other federal agencies—even those that may not report to
the Attorney General directly—also follow the guidelines. 124 In addi-
tion, some states and major municipal police departments have in-
corporated the Guidelines on. Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover
Operations into their own internal manuals or regulations,m and many
states conduct their sting operations only in collaboration with the
FBI, following the FBI's procedures and protoco1. 186
The regulations seem reasonably cautious, placing modest budget-
ary constraints on sting operations ($50,000 in nondrug cases,
$100,000 in drug cases), and requiring prior approval and ongoing
oversight by the FBI and an administrative organ called the Undercover
Operations Review Committee (the "UORC") . 187 It is a fair criticism,
however, to say that they seem to be lacking teeth, at least from a law-
yer's perspective. The guidelines themselves provide no sanctions for
violations of its requirements, other than discretionary removal of indi-
vidual agents from an operation by the agent's superiors in the FBI or
the Department of Justice (the "DOJ") (presumably there are other
internal disciplinary protocols for wayward employees). 188 In addition,
nearly all of the guidelines' strictures and safeguards are subject to ap-
peals and discretionary exceptions by designated officials. There is a
predictable, sweeping "Reservation" clause at the conclusion. It de-
clares that the guidelines are "not intended to, do not, and may not be
relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable
by law by any party in any matter, civil or criminal ... ."189
' 83 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 533 (2000 & Supp. 111 2003); id. § 510 (2000).
154 See, e.g., Pieniazek v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 792, 794 (7th Cir. 2006) (immigration
agency); United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 686 n.9 (8th Cir. 1985) (Fish & Wildlife Ser-
vice conducting undercover operations to catch Native Americans trafficking in eagle
feathers).
145 See,	 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div. (Handschu V), 475 F. Supp. 2d 331, 333
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); Handschu v. Special Servs. Div. (Handschu IV), 273 F. Supp. 2d 327, 335-
36 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
113° See generally Susan N. Herman, Collapsing Spheres: Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Federal-
ism, and the War on Terror, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 941 (2005) (discussing the widespread
involvement of federal agents in state undercover operations).
187 ASHCROFT, GUIDELINES, supra note 106, at 4, 8-9.
I ea, Id. at 17.
159 Id. at 19.
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There is, therefore, no judicial enforcement of the guidelines'
provisions, and no recourse for victims of such violations; victims must
seek redress elsewhere, perhaps under § 1983 actions, for which the
guidelines have no relevance.'" Consistent with this "Reservation"
clause (but not relying on it), federal courts have held that guideline
violations do not furnish the basis for an entrapment defense, 191 or
supply the necessary basis for tort recovery in § 1983 actions.' 92 The
lack of enforcement mechanisms or sanctions makes the guidelines
essentially advisory, a matter of internal processes, and a secondary
device for regulating sting operations.
The guidelines do, however, illustrate the ex ante effects of the
entrapment defense on law enforcement procedures and the plan-
ning of future sting operations. There is a special section on Entrap-
ment,'" stating emphatically, "Entrapment must be scrupulously
avoided. Entrapment occurs when the Government implants in the
mind of a person who is not otherwise disposed to commit the of-
fense the disposition to commit the offense and then induces the
commission of that offense in order to prosecute."'" This summarizes
the federal rule for entrapment (which is judge-made) reasonably
well, but is otherwise precatory verbiage, without stipulated conse-
190 See Suter v. United States, 441 F.3d 306, 311-12 (4th Cir. 2006) (discussing the rele-
vance of the guidelines in a Federal Tort Claims Action and concluding that the FBI had
broad discretion that negated the claims of the plaintiffs); see Donald Yoo, Immune Re-
sponse: With the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Federal Government Has Waived Its Sovereign Immu-
nity on a Limited Basis, L.A. LAW, Feb. 2007, at 24, 29 ("Moreover, the court concluded that
the offending conduct in the case was based on considerations of public policy as the Un-
dercover Guidelines that govern FBI investigations directed FBI officials to weigh risks and
benefits, including risks to persons or businesses, before deciding whether to undertake a
proposed operation.").
tit See, e.g., United States v. Abumayyaleh, No. 05-425 ( JRT/EG), 2006 WL 3690739, at
*2 (D. Minn. Dec. 13, 2006) ("Defendant appears to be arguing that the contacts with the
undercover officer that occurred prior to the final authorization of the undercover opera-
tion violated Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations. The Court is
not persuaded that the government violated the Guidelines by engaging in these prelimi-
nary contacts, but even if the behavior does violate the Guidelines, the Court concludes
that the behavior was not so outrageous or fundamentally unfair as to bar defendant's
conviction."); United States v. Marbelt, 129 F. Supp. 2d 49, 56 (D. Mass. 2000) ("Nor would
a showing of some deviation from the guidelines by the agent in this case be a ground of
effective defense. A showing that the Customs Service had not followed its internal guide-
lines is not a valid defense to the crime charged.").
192 See generally Yoo, supra note 190 (discussing Suter, 441 F.3d 306). But see Alvarez-
Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 643 (9th Cir. 2003) (suggesting, albeit somewhat
ambiguously, that compliance with the guidelines does not create automatic immunity to
tort actions).
1" Asiocuorr, GUIDELINES, supra note 106, at 16.
194 Id.
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quences for noncompliance. The next subsection admits that the
foregoing is a "legal prohibition" (apparently meaning an "external"
bar), and states that "additional restrictions limit FBI undercover ac-
tivity to ensure, insofar as it is possible, that entrapment issues do not
adversely affect criminal prosecutions:196 The "restrictions" are con-
ditions for approving the sting operation beforehand, and proceed as
follows:
(1) The illegal nature of the activity is reasonably clear to po-
tential subjects; and
(2) The nature of any inducement offered is justifiable in view
of the character of the illegal transaction in which the indi-
vidual is invited to engage; and
(3) There is a reasonable expectation that offering the in-
ducement will reveal illegal activity; and
(4) One of the two following limitations is met:
(i) There is reasonable indication that the subject is en
gaging, has engaged, or is likely to engage in the illegal
activity proposed or in similar illegal conduct; or
(ii) The opportunity for illegal activity has been struc
tured so that there is reason to believe that any persons
drawn to the opportunity, or brought to it, are predis
posed to engage in the contemplated illegal conduct. 196
The Supreme Court's "predisposition" test is evident throughout
the conditions; operations conducted according to these convictions
should make an entrapment defense unavailable for the intended tar-
gets when they come to trial. The first item, that the illegal nature of
the activity be clear to potential subjects, takes on special importance in
the terrorism context, as will be discussed below in relation to the statu-
tory framework under which terror prosecutions usually arise. 197 The
stronger the mens rea or scienter requirement of a particular criminal
statute, the more item (1) matters. The last condition on the list, item
(4) (ii), will be especially relevant to the later discussion about the need
to identify and incapacitate the people most likely to join terrorist
groups before they even have a real opportunity to do so.'" In any case,
this administrative method of regulating sting operations is subordinate
10 ,rd.
196 Id.
197 See infra notes 254-271 and accompanying text.
198 See infra notes 273-291 and accompanying text (discussing the heightened stakes of
terrorist incapacitation).
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to the entrapment defense, at least up to now The entrapment defense
affects, or even controls, the parameters of the guidelines, but the
guidelines do not affect the entrapment defense.'"
It is certainly possible to have administrative regulation of police
operations that includes more concrete enforcement provisions. For
example, even in the context of antiterrorism, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act ("FLSA") 20° created a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court ("FISC") that reviews, albeit in secret proceedings, the foreign
surveillance actions of government agents. 201 There is even an appel-
late panel, the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review, which reviews decisions of the FISC if the government attorneys
appeal, which is rare (the government is the only party in FISC pro-
ceedings, so the process is not adversarial). 202 It would be possible to
have a similar arrangement governing sting operations, as opposed to
surveillance, which could exercise a degree of control that would rival
the entrapment defense; but at present, no such regime exists.203 Such
a system would have to originate with the legislature.
3. Consent Decrees
The third manner in which our legal system regulates sting op-
erations is through class action consent decrees covering an individ-
ual agency or police department. 204 The prototype is the Handschu
18@
	 Marbelt, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 55.
"° 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862 (2000 & Supp. III 2003). It seems that FISA is a particularly
bad fit with modern computerized communications technology, and hamstrings our na-
tional security and antiterrorist efforts unnecessarily. See, e.g., K.A. Taipale, The Ear of Diony-
sus: Rethinking Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 128, 141-56 (2007).
"1 50 U.S.C. § 1803.
"2 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (the FISA Court of Re-
view accepted amici briefs from the ACLU and the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers because the government was the only party to the FISA proceedings).
"3 For a detailed discussion of FISA and its failures in safeguarding civil liberties re-
garding surveillance, see generally David S. Kris, The Rise and Fall of the FISA Wall, 17 STAN.
L. & PoL'v REv. 487 (2006).
"4 See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of
Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE U. 1265, 1288-1302 (discussing the problematic character of
organizational change litigation); Alan Effron, Note, Federalism and Federal Consent Decrees
Against State Governmental Entities, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1796, 1802-11 (1988) (arguing that
the consent decrees violate essential principles of federalism). For more general analysis of
consent decrees, outside the immediate context of undercover infiltrators, see generally
Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U.
h.t.. L. REV. 725 (discussing inherent structural difficulties with consent decrees, but not
addressing consent decrees about policing); Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen Yeazell, The
Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARv. L. REV, 465 (1980) (ob-
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Decree in New York City, 208 and similar consent decrees in Chicago, 208
Detroit, Los Angeles, Memphis, and Seattle. 207
 These cases focus pri-
marily on government surveillance of legitimate political activities
(e.g., reformist activist groups), including the use of undercover infil-
trators and informants." 8 Plaintiffs are typically political activists who
seek declaratory and injunctive relief from a litany of documented
abusive actions by local police against their members or group activi-
ties.209 Undercover government infiltrators in political groups have a
chilling effect on a number of constitutional rights, including free
speech and freedom of association.") The protracted litigation that
ensues culminates in a settlement with a quasi-contractual consent
decree, by which the law enforcement agency promises to restrain it-
serving that the procedures and remedies employed in institutional litigation have ana-
logues in older judicial traditions); Nancy Levit, Mega-Cases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of
Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming Mar. 2008) (discussing the effectiveness of
consent decrees in remedying workplace discrimination).
205 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 787 F.2d
828 (2d Cir. 1986). See generally Handschu V, 475 F. Supp. 2d 331; Handschu IV, 273 F.
Supp. 2d 327. The original Handschu case, prior to the consent decree, is Handschu v.
Special Servs. Div. (Handschu I), 349 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
2° 8 See generally Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago (Alliance II), 237 F.3d 799
(7th Cir. 2001); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago (Alliance I), 742 F.2d 1007
(7th Cir. 1984) (en banc). Alliance II significantly rolled back the restrictions on govern-
ment undercover work that Alliance I had imposed in the post-Watergate era; writing the
opinion in early 2001, Judge Posner now seems (in hindsight) prescient in his concerns
about terrorist attacks posing a greater threat than repression of domestic dissent. Alliance
II, 237 F.3d at 802. For a recent review of the Alliance cases, and a brief survey of the pen-
dulum swing back toward the side of government in the years since these consent-decree
cases, see generally Adrian Vermeule, Commentary, Posner on Security and Liberty.. Alliance
to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1251 (2007). For the latest round
of litigation in this case regarding attorney fees from the previous litigation, see generally
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 356 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2004).
207 For an excellent survey of the litigation in each of these cases and summaries of the
consent decrees, see generally Paul Chevigny, Politics and Law in the Control of Local Surveil-
lance, 69 CORNELL L. Rev. 735 (1984).
208 See, e.g., Handschu I, 349 F. Supp. at 767.
200
	
Chevigny, supra note 207, at 768-75 (describing Los Angeles consent decree,
which included the LAPD's Public Disorder Intelligence Division, entered into in response
to growing concerns over disappearing files and records and putting strict limitations on
undercover operations, requiring an elevated level of suspicion in order investigate an
individual); see also David Berry, Note, The First Amendment and Law Enforcement Infiltration of
Political Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 207, 207 (1982) (arguing that infiltration alone, even
without disruption or harassment, violates First Amendment rights, and that consent de-
crees have been an ineffective tool for addressing this).
21° Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044, 1054 (N.D. Ill.
1985).
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self from political surveillance. 211 If the police later violate the terms
(usually detailed guidelines proscribing police behaviors), the plain-
tiffs can commence contempt proceedings. and obtain effective judi-
cial relief. 212 In this sense, the consent decree mechanism is the mir-
ror image of the FBI guidelines: the decree has ample teeth, but
limited scope geographically. 213 Like the FBI guidelines, however,
there were modifications to the Handschu Decree after the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 attacks to give greater latitude for antiterrorism opera-
tions:214 in fact, in 2003, the Handschu Decree incorporated the FBI
guidelines as revised in 2002. 215
Sting operations are not necessarily included in each consent de-
cree, but the limitations on undercover infiltrators would stultify the
use of undercover agents for stings as well. There is a wealth of aca-
demic literature analyzing whether consent decrees are an effective
means of institutional reform; 216 it is also difficult to know whether to
attribute decreases in government abuses as fruit of the decrees or the
result of societal trends, contemporaneous media attention, and the
On the point of regulating sting operations, however, there are
two prima facie limitations of consent decrees. First, they generally
211 See Jerrold L. Steigman, Note, Reversing Reform: The Handschu Settlement in Post-
September 11 New York City, 11 J.L. POL'Y 745, 748 (2003) (describing consent decrees and
analogizing them to court orders).
212 See Anderson, supra note 204, at 737 (describing the available remedies of institu-
tional-reform consent decrees and their scope).
212 See Berry, supra note 209, at 229-30 (giving a detailed explanation of FBI Guide-
lines—including the relevant factors used in determining when the FBI can initiate an
investigation—and how they govern the manner in which investigations may be carried
out). Although Berry concludes that the guidelines lack effective external monitoring to
ensure enforcement of the guidelines, he does propose remedies. Id. at 231-36.
214 See Steigman, supra note 211, at 770-98. Steigman presents an excellent discussion
on the Handschu settlement in the wake of September 11, 2001. He notes the concurrent
interests in protecting against terrorism and the preservation of constitutional rights, and
cautions against willingly waiving those rights in reaction to tragedies like the attacks in
2001. See id. The notable modification to the settlement is that it no longer contains a
"criminal activity requirement," that is, the NYPD does not have to base an investigation on
suspected criminal activity. Id. at 778. Steigman opines that such a modification effectively
eliminates the protection granted by the settlement and cuts its legs out from underneath
it. Id.
215 See id. at 769; see also Handschu IV, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 335-36.
1 16 See, e.g., Berry, supra note 209, at 232. Berry evaluates the efficacy of consent de-
crees, particularly in light of the difficulty in obtaining standing and the lack of effective
remedies, such as money judgments. Id. at 231. He also says that they are defective in that
they cannot adequately prevent prospective harm. Id. Because constitutional rights are
vitally important, he says that they should be afforded prospective protection, rather than
retroactive remedies. See id. at 234.
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prohibit targeting of legitimate political activity and dissent (meet-
ings, political petitioning, rallies, and so forth). 217 Law enforcement
activities against "material support" of terrorist organizations have al-
ready survived constitutional challenges that attempted to qualify the
targeted activities as "political" in the sense of having constitutional
protection. 218 Sting operations within the statutory framework of anti-
terrorism laws, discussed below, have a reasonable chance of falling
outside the stated purview of the consent decrees. 219 Second, they
have a limited geographical applicability, typically applying to a single
municipality or at most a single state. 220 Of course, it is conceivable
that federal law enforcement agencies could someday find themselves
bound by similar consent decrees, but so far, that has not occurred. It
seems less likely to begin at this point in history than in previous eras.
4. State Restrictions on Wired Stings
The fourth device in our legal system for regulating sting opera-
tions is state-level statutory or constitutional (i.e., judicial) restriction of
"wired" sting operations that occur within the defendant's home; this
limits the ways in which police can execute a sting. Five states have such
restraints based on their state constitutions (that is, as interpreted by
the respective state supreme court): 221 Alaska,222 Massachusetts, 223
Pennsylvania,224 Vermont,225 and West Virginia. 226 West Virginia's Su-
212 See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amendment and Net-
worked Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 69 (2007) (arguing that technology has changed the
nature of public political activity and demonstrations); Nick Suplina, Note, Crowd Control:
The Troubling Mix of First Amendment Law, Political Demonstrations, and Terrorism, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 395, 419-20 (2005) (arguing that surveillance in the name of counterterror-
ism is really targeting legitimate political activity and dissent).
218 United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 569-70 (E.D. Va. 2002).
2119 See infra notes 254-271 and accompanying text.
22° See Steigman, supra note 2H, at 753-54.
221 Basically, these courts have flatly disagreed with the holding of the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1971, in United States v. White, which held that such surreptitious recording by
undercover agents does not violate the U.S. Constitution, and held that their state consti-
tutional search-and-seizure clauses (nearly identical to the federal counterpart) forced the
exact opposite conclusion. 401 U.S. 745, 750-51 (1971).
222 See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 879 (Alaska 1978), opinion on reh'g, 596 P.2d 10 (Alaska
1979) (addressing, on rehearing, the issue of the prospective application of the original opin-
ion).
222 See Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1029-30 (Mass. 1987).
224 See Commonwealth v. Brion, 652 A.2d 287, 287 (Pa. 1994).
225 See State v. Blow, 602 A.2d 552, 556 (Vt. 1991).
222 See generally State v. Mullens, 650 S.E.2d 169 (W. Va. 2007).
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preme Court adopted this position only in February 2007, 227 overruling
its previous holdings and accompanied by a strident dissent. 228
In addition, the Oregon Supreme Court has imposed the same
restraint, but based on statutory language instead of its state constitu-
tion. 229 Wisconsin apparently limits these recorded, in-home stings
without warrants to drug enforcement.")
Almost every state has some kind of electronic surveillance stat-
ute. Forty-two states") have adopted electronic surveillance statutes
227 Id.
22° See id.
22° See State v. Fleetwood, 16 P.3d 503, 507-19 (Or. 2000). Strangely, the statute in ques-
tion seems to follow its federal counterpart closely, which the U.S. Supreme Court read to
mean the exact opposite in Mite. See id.
236 In State it Smith, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled that one-party consent sur-
veillance evidence obtained in a suspect's home was inadmissible under the state's elec-
tronic surveillance statutes. 242 N.W.2d 184, 186-87 (Wis. 1976). In 1989, however, the
Wisconsin legislature amended the statutes to permit one-party consent surveillance for
felony drug investigations. See WIS. STAT. § 968.27-.37 (1998). In addition, Connecticut,
New Hampshire, and New Jersey permit wired in-home stings with prior Attorney General
authorization, but without the need for a judicial warrant (this is similar to the FBI Guide-
lines). CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-187(b) (West 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2
(2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:156A-4 (West 1985 & Supp. 2007).
"I See ALASKA STAT. § 12.37.010-.900 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3001 to -3019
(2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120 (2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.50-.98 (West 1999 &
Supp. 2007); Coto. REv. STAT. § 16-15-101 to -102 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
187 to -189 (West 2001); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2401-2434 (2001); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 23-541 to -546 (LexisNexis 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.01-.15 (West 2006); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-11-60 to -67 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80341 to 49 (LexisNexis 2007);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6701 to -6709 (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/19-1 to -9 (West
2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33.5-1-5 to -5-3 (LexisNexis 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 808B.1-
.19 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2514 to -2529 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:1301-:1316 (2005); ME, REV. STAT. ANN. tiL 15, §§ 709-713 (2003); MD. CODE ANN.,
& JUD. PROC. § 10-401 to 10-4P005 (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 99
(2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.01-.391 (West 2003); MISS: CoDE ANN. § 41-29-501 to -
701 (West 2005); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 542.400-.422. (West 2002 & Supp. 2007); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 86-271 to -293 (LexisNexis 2007); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.410-.530 (Lex-
isNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:1 to -B:7 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-1
to -23 (West 1985 & Supp. 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-1 to -11 (LexisNexis 1994); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW, § 700.05-.70 (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 15A-286 to -299 (West 2005); N.D. CEN. Cone § 29-29.2-01 to -29.3-05 (2006); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2933.51-.66 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 176.1-177.5 (West
2002); OR, REV. STAT. §§ 133.721-.739 & 165.535-.673 (2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5701-5781 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 12-5.1-1 to -5.2-5 (2002); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-30.10 to -145 (2003 & Supp. 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 23A-35A-1 to -
34. (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40.6-301 to -311 (2006); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
18.20-.21 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.01-.06 (Vernon
2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-1 to -16 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-61 to -70.3 (2004);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.27-.37 (West 2007); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-701 to -806 {2007).
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patterned after the Federal Title III electronic surveillance rules. 232
Of these, thirty-two follow Tide III by statutorily permitting one-party
consent to electronic surveillance (including the undercover agent
wearing a recording device). 233 Under the statutes of these jurisdic-
232 In 1968, Congress enacted detailed electronic surveillance laws through Title DI of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, the relevant provision being found at 47
U.S.C. § 605 (2000). According to the U.S. Supreme Court, Tide III 'sets forth comprehen-
sive standards governing the use of ... electronic surveillance by both governmental and
private agents." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 515 (1985). In 1986, Congress amended
and updated Title III with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"). Pub. L. No.
99-508, 100 Stat. 1868 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
ECPA established standards for intercepting telephone numbers through the use of pen
registers and trap and trace devices. Id. ECPA also had a second component, the Stored
Communications Act, which established penal sanctions for unauthorized access of elec-
tronically stored wire or electronic communication. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2708 (2000).
The electronic surveillance provisions of Tide III are in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000
& Supp. III 2003). One relevant exception to the prohibition on unauthorized electronic
surveillance is found in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c). This subsection provides, "It shall not be
unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral,
or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one
of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception." 18
U.S.C. § 2511(2) (c). An additional pertinent exception, under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d),
reads as follows:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under
color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such
person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or
tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of
any State.
Id. § 2511(2) (d). After the Supreme Court's decision in White, it is clear that there is statu-
tory authority for federal officials to place an electronic surveillance device on a consent-
ing informant, without judicial authorization, for the purpose of recording communica-
tions with a third-party suspect. See 401 U.S. at 745. Similarly, there is no constitutional
problem, after White, if police lack judicial authorization before sending a wired informant
into the home of another person. See United States v. Brathwaite, 458 F.3d 376, 377 (5th
Cir. 2006) (informant's use of electronic surveillance in defendant's home did not violate
Fourth Amendment); United States v. Hankins, 195 F. App`x 295, 301-03 (6th Cir. 2006)
(same); United States v. Eschweiler, 745 F.2d 435, 437-38 (7th Cir. 1984) (same).
233 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3012(9) (2000 & Supp. 2006); Ana. CODE ANN. § 5.60-
120(a) & (c) (2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 633.5 (West 1999); Coto. REV. STAT. § 18-9-303 & -
304 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2402(c) (4) (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-542(b) (2)
(LexisNexis 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(2)(c) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-11-66(a) (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 803-42(b) (4) (LexisNexis 2007); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-6702(2) (c) (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 808B.2.2.b (West 2003); LA. REV.
S-rxr. ANN. § 15:1303(C) (3) (2005 & Supp. 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 709(4)
(2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & jun. PROC. § 10-402(c) (2) (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 272, § 99(B) (4) (2000); MINN. STAT ANN. § 626A.02(2) (c) (West 2003); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 41-29-531(d) (2005); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 542.402(2) (2) (West 2002); NEIL REV. STAT.
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dons, the police do not need judicial authorization to conduct elec-
tronic surveillance if one party to the communication consents to the
recording.234 Massachusetts is the only state of these thirty-two whose
Supreme Court has held that its state constitution trumps the legisla-
tion on this issue. 235
Vermont is unique in that it apparently lacks any statutory laws
addressing electronic surveillance devices. In 1991, the Supreme
Court of Vermont, in State v. Blow relied solely on the search and sei-
zure provision of the state's constitution to address the issue of using
an informant equipped with an electronic surveillance device to enter
the home of a suspect, without a warrant. 236
Alaska, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia are among the ten states
that have a statute generally following the federal Title III model, but
ANN. § 86.290(b) (LexisNexis 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-1(E) (3) (LexisNexis 1994);
N.Y. CRLM. PRO. LAW. § 700.05(3) (McKinney 1995 & Supp. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
287(a) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.2-05 (2006); OHIO REV. Cone ANN. § 2933.52(B) (4)
(West 2006); Oxen. STAT. ANN. tiL 13, § 176.4(4) (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-30-30(B)
(2003 & Supp. 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 23A-35A-20 (2004); Tex. PENAL CODE Arm.
§ 16,02(c) (3) (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-4(7) (a) (2003); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-62(B) (2) (2004); Wm. STAT. ANN. § 968.31(2) (b) (West 2007); Wro. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-
702(b) (iv) (2005).
234 Six states with statutes authorizing one-party consent for electronic surveillance de-
vices have had their courts address the issue in the context of an informant recording
communications in the home of a suspect: Florida, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Ohio, Wis-
consin, and Wyoming. See State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. 1981); Blood, 507
N.E.2d at 1029, 1032; Lee v. State, 489 So. 2d 1382, 1383-86 (Miss. 1986) (upholding sur-
veillance under state and federal constitutions); State v. Azzi, No. 558, 1983 WL 6726, at
*1-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1983) (upholding surveillance under Federal Constitution);
Smith, 242 N.W.2d at 185-87 (modified by statute); Alamada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 302,
308-11 (Wyo. 1999) (upholding surveillance under state constitution).
In 1981 in State a Sarmiento, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the White decision
by the U.S. Supreme Court and held that the search and seizure provision of the state con-
stitution prohibited an informant from using an electronic surveillance device in a sus-
pect's home without judicial authorization. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d at 644. In response to the
decision in Sarmiento, Florida's citizens amended the state's constitutional search and sei-
zure provision to require that it be "construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to
the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court," FLA.
CONST. art. 1, § 12. The Supreme Court of Florida subsequently conceded, in 1987 in State
v. Hume, that the recording of conversations between a defendant and an undercover
agent in a defendant's home ... does not violate the fourth amendment of the United
States Constitution and, accordingly, does not violate the newly adopted article I, section
12, of the Florida Constitution." 512 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1987).
"5 See Blood, 507 N.E.2d at 1032-39.
23° 602 A.2d at 555; see also State v. Geraw, 795 A.2d 1219, 1220-21 (Vt. 2002) (holding
that a police officer working undercover cannot enter a defendant's home with an elec-
tronic surveillance device without a search warrant).
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without the exception for one-party consent; 237 the other seven states
in this group have held that their state constitutions pose no problem,
or have not considered the issue yet. 238 Alabama, Kentucky, Michigan,
and Montana have their own eavesdropping statutes, not based on the
federal model, but they permit recorded sting operations within a de-
fendant's home. 239
This state-level restraint on stings is limited, being inapplicable for
stings outside the home (in a car, office, dark alley, or elsewhere). 240 It
does not affect wireless stings, where the arresting officers are either
lying in wait at the scene of the crime, or the undercover operative
takes notes from the conversations and is willing to testify at tria1. 241
These restraints may pose inconveniences and limitations on law en-
forcement—stings must occur either outside the culprit's home or
without surreptitious recording—but in most cases, agents can work
around these hurdles. As a regulation of sting operations, this device
also has a confined geographical scope (only two of the states in ques-
tion, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, have dense populations or sig-
nificant urbanization), and are inapplicable to stings by the federal gov-
ernment
5. Dormant Federal Constitutional Constraints
It is worth noting one possible regulatory device for sting opera-
tions that is missing at present from our legal system, at least on the
federal level: the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution itself does not
regulate sting operations, at least presently, because the Supreme
Court has held that the entrapment defense is not a constitutional
issue.242 Of course, states that have followed the MPC in adopting the
237 ALASKA STAT. § 12.37.010,900 (2006); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701-5781 (West
2000 & Supp. 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1D-14 to -16 (LexisNexis 2005).
23a CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-187 to -189 (West 2001); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/14-1 to -9 (West 2003); INn. CODE ANN. § 35-33.5-1-5 to -5-3 (LexisNexis 1998); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-2514 to -2529 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.410—.530 (LexisNexis
2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-1 to -23 (West 1985 Sc Supp. 2007); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 133.721—.739 & 165.535—.673 (2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.18, §§ 5701-5781; TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-301 to -311 (2006).
239 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-30(1) (LexisNexis 2005); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §526.010
(LexisNexis 1999); Mimi. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539g(a) (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-8-213(1) (c) (i) (2005); Carrier v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980); People V. Collins, 475 N.W.2d 684, 696 n.45 (Mich. 1991); State v. Brown, 755 P.2d
1364, 1368 (Mont. 1988).
240 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2.
241 See id.
242 See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 445-48.
174	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 49:125
"objective test" treat entrapment solely as a due process matter. Some
courts in earlier decades have expressed the view that excessive police
entrapment methods violate the procedural due process rights of the
defendant, echoed by innumerable commentators. 245 Whatever the
merits of this position, the U.S. Supreme Court has avoided it so far.
Treating entrapment as a due process violation essentially restates
the objective test, and the usual criticisms of the objective test would
apply.244 For example, it is fair to say (but not necessarily persuasive)
that the subjective test accomplishes everything a due process approach
would do, except for letting plainly guilty defendants go free; if the po-
lice have to resort to atrocious methods to trap someone, the victim
cleai-ly did not have the predisposition to commit the crime. 245 Advo-
cates of the current subjective test argue that the defendant's predispo-
sition relates more closely to the preservation of the rights of innocent
citizens. 246 In addition, some argue that kinder, gentler sting operations
(resulting from a more prodefendant entrapment defense) are less
likely to fool actual criminals, who are savvy and suspicious, but may
fool the simple hearted and guileless, who are presumed to be more
naive or innocent. 247 Constitutionalizing the entrapment defense effec-
tively puts the police on trial and stalls the proceedings against the de-
242 See, e.g., Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding defen-
dant's due process rights violated where the government was "enmeshed" in the criminal
enterprise, "from beginning to end"); Twigg, 588 F.2d at 378-81.
244 For a recent consideration of a quasi-entrapment "due process" defense alongside
the traditional entrapment defense, see Lakhani, 480 F.3d at 180-83.
246 Of course, this is also an argument used by those who say there is no practical dif-
ference in the results under the two tests. Many object that the test is rather unworkable in
its application, which seems to be another way of saying the same thing. See MARCUS, supra
note 1, at 106 ("The second major criticism of the objective test deals with its practical
application. Because the standard involves the hypothetical 'average person,' or 'reason-
able person,' or 'normally law-abiding person,' it may be difficult to apply. The conceptual
difficulty is that such individuals generally do not commit crimes."); see also Pascu v. State,
577 P.2d 1064, 1066-67 (Alaska 1978) (complaining that the test in unmanageable for the
same reason). Justice Scalia stated in his concurrence in Mathews v. United States that "the
defense of entrapment will rarely be genuinely inconsistent with the defense on its merits,"
which perhaps hints that he views the defense as mostly unnecessary. See 485 U.S. at 67
(Scalia, j., concurring).
246 See LAFAVE, supra note 130, § 5.2(e); MARCUS, supra note 1, at 80.
447 Wayne LaFave puts this objection as follows: "A second major criticism of the objec-
tive approach is that the 'wrong' people end up in jail if a dangerous, chronic offender
may only be offered those inducements which might have tempted the hypothetical, law-
abiding person." LAFAVE, supra note 130, § 5.2(e). Park's version of this is that the objec-
tive test can result in the conviction of nonpredisposed defendants. See Park, supra note 15,
at 217. Another way of thinking about this is that the police may have used an inducement
that would not ensnare the average person.
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fendant, and degenerates into an argUment between the police and the
defendant about what really occurred. 248 Others have expressed doubts
about courts acting as the morality police for law enforcement agen-
cies. 249 Finally, a due process approach, with its focus on police miscon-
duct instead of the innocent disposition of the defendant, allows too
much ambiguity and discretion to the finders of fact; such unfettered
discretion leaves too much room for prejudice, personal vendetta, or
other inappropriate motives to color the decision one way or the other.
For example, the objective test for entrapment, without clear-cut stan-
dards, could allow judges or juries to act out of bias against minority
police officers, especially if the agent is of foreign ethnicity (as some
effective undercover agents would be) and the target of the sting op-
eration is a Caucasian Arnerican. 25°
One could argue, in theory, that entrapment violates the vesting
clause of the Constitution 251 by overstepping the limited police power
that the Constitution invests in the executive branch, i.e., that the Con-
stitution simply does not vest the Executive with the right to create
crimes for purposes of trapping the nongovernmental participants.
Courts could also decide at some point that entrapment encroaches on
the right against self-incrimination,252 if a court concludes that entrap-
ment merges the investigatory and accusatory stages of criminal proce-
dure; the difference between self-incrimination at trial and during an
overdone sting operation is rather formalistic. More tenuous, but still
248 See Park, supra note 15, at 221. Park believes that the swearing match will usually fa-
vor the state, given the burden of proof on the defendant to prove entrapment, but he
does not substantiate this claim. See id. at 221-22.
249 See LAFAVE, supra note 130, § 5.2(e) ("It is questioned whether the 'purity' of the
courts is itself a sufficient justification, and whether the objective approach can be ex-
pected to serve the deterrence objective in a meaningful way.").
220 This issue is really the mirror image of the racial/stereotyping problem with the
subjective test. The subjective test allows more room for prejudice against defendants; the
objective test allows more room for prejudice against minority officers. It would seem that
both of these problems would be more pronounced where there is a racial difference be-
tween police and defendants. Under the objective test (as well as the exclusionary rules), a
judge or jury that believes a certain minority group is more aggressive, less honest, more
lazy, and so on, is more likely to believe the minority officer unduly pressured the (white?)
defendant to commit crimes, lie about the defendant's response, plant or tamper with
evidence, and try to find inappropriate shortcuts in obtaining convictions. In general, one
might expect the majority to be more afraid of aggressive law enforcement from minority
officers than from other members of the majority. The objective test provides an outlet for
such attitudes to manifest themselves. Again, this topic seems to have been ignored in the
academic literature, but it is worthy of more investigation.
291 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
2" See id. amend. V.
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theoretically possible, would be a claim that entrapment violates Fifth
or Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, in that investigatory and accusa-
tory phases of enforcement merge together at the moment of the sting
operation's consummation, and therefore the target should have had
the benefit of counsel for the latter. 255
H. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK BEHIND ANTITERRORISM STING
OPERATIONS: "MATERIAL SUPPORT" PROSECUTIONS VS.
VICTIMLESS CRIME PROSECUTIONS
As mentioned in the Introduction, entrapment is distinct from
other affirmative defenses in criminal law because it can influence the
planning and adoption of methods by law enforcement agencies. 254
Unlike defenses of duress, necessity, insanity, and self defense, all of
which can defeat criminal charges, the entrapment defense allows law
enforcement agencies to plan undercover operations around the
rules to preempt successful entrapment claims; or, if the rules are
simply too prodefendant, to abandon such operations. 255 Bureau
chiefs and agency directors are aware of the ways in which this af-
firmative defense regulates undercover activities, so they can make
policy decisions accordingly. 256 Decisionmakers who allocate law en-
forcement resources must be sensitive and responsive to the rules
about this particular defense. Given the priority of preventing terror-
ist crimes before they occur, as opposed to catching offenders after
the act, entrapment becomes the most relevant affirmative defense to
terror-related prosecution.
The ex ante planning associated with the entrapment defense is
even more pronounced for antiterrorism efforts than other forms of
law enforcement, because of the statutory framework under which ter-
rorism charges arise. Most terrorism-related prosecutions base their
charges in the "providing material support" 257 prohibitions of 18 U.S.C.
2" See id.; id. amend. VL
254 See supra notes 39-45 and sources cited therein.
255 See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 14.
256 See supra notes 181-199 and accompanying text (discussing the FBI Guidelines for
Undercover Operations).
257 See NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTITERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 16,30 (2d ed.
2006) ('The government views these offenses as especially important tools in the effort to
prevent terrorism."): STEPHEN Drcus ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 834 (3d ed. 2006)
("The material support charge is increasingly the government's weapon of choice against
suspected terrorists.").See generally Kristen Eichensehr, Treason's Return, 116 YALE Lj.
POCKET PART 229 (2007), hup://thepocketpartorg/2007/01/16/eichensehr.html (corn-
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§§ 2339A-2339B, which contain a relatively robust scienter require-
ment.258 A successful sting operation must include the gradual disclo-
sure of enough "hints" (that the decoy individual is a terrorist) to en-
sure that the defendant falls within the definition for "knowingly"
supporting terrorism. Unlike antitrafficking stings, which can furnish a
conviction once the simple, ill-conceived transaction occurs, the sting
operatiOns must plan for meeting the more complicated elements of
"material support."259 In addition, common types of statutorily defined
"material support" are the provision of substantial funds or special ex-
pertise, training, and the like. 260 These categories aim at a different so-
cioeconomic demographic than traditional trafficking crimes (more
sophisticated or wealthy), meaning the selection of targets for a sting
will require more planning, as well as a more limited field of possible
targets.
The "material support" statutes-differ from traditional victimless
crimes in that they criminalize otherwise everyday, legal activities based
on potential consequences instead of a substantive aspect of the activity
itself. 261 Donations, loans, and the provision of training,- lodging, and
paring the recent indictment of Adam Gadahn for "material support" in relation to his
highly-publicized pro-terrorist videos to World War 11-era treason cases).
258 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006) ("Whoever provides material
support knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carry-
ing out, a violation ...."); 18 U.S.C. § 233911(a) (1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) ("Whoever
knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization . .");
see also United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1335-39 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (inter-
preting the scienter requirement to mean that 1) the recipient organization was desig-
nated as a foreign terrorist organization, and 2) that the defendant was indeed supplying
"material support!). Note that Norman Abrams has argued that the mens rea requirement
of the material support statutes is too weak, being nothing more than "knowledge-plus-
aid." Abrams, supra note 172, at 21-25, 31. Abrams also observes that the "knowledge"
requirement in § 2339A is more specific than for § 233913. Id. at 11.
259 See Abrams, supra note 172, at 8-9; see also ABRAMS, supra note 257, at 18 (discussing
the definition of "material support").
289 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b) (1). Section 2339A(b) (1) provides the following defini-
tion of "material support":
[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or
monetary instruments or fmancial securities, financial services, lodging, train-
ing, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identifica-
tion, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, ex-
plosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself),
and transportation, except medicine or religious materials ....
Id.
281 See ABRAMS, supra note 257, at 16 ( -These offenses share certain special characteris- ,
tics: they are among the most doctrinally innovative of the new terrorism offenses; they can
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expert advice—without the element of terrorism—are common, legal,
and even necessary components of our modern econorny.262 They fall
under the statute's criminalizing purview only when the actor has rea-
son to believe that the recipient has terrorist connections. 265 By con-
trast, the "victimless crimes" involve the transfer of rather obvious con-
traband, sex under circumstances that most people eschew,
transportation of truckloads of foreigners across a border, and the
like.264 In other words, the scienter element may be the only element
that distinguishes the proposed activity (in the sting operation) from
perfectly respectable behavior. 265 The sting's preplanned deception
must focus on this aspect, therefore, unlike sting operations for the
traditional offenses that attract undercover operations. A scienter re-
quirement and the predisposition component of the entrapment de-
fense have a special connection. 266 Showing that the defendant pro-
ceeded, even after knowing that the material support could aid
terrorists, suggests a predisposition more strongly than acceding to an
impulse crime, like sampling drugs.267 The latter could appear to be
simple surrender to temptation in a moment of weakness. Conversely,
be used to prosecute a wide variety of different kinds of conduct; and they can be invoked
relatively early in the chronology of steps toward completing a terrorist act.").
2" See, e.g., United States v. Jayyousi, No. 04-60001-CR, 2007 WL 781373, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. Mar. 12, 2007) (material support in the form of newsletters advocating terrorism and
explaining various techniques); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (2) (defining "training" as
Instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to 'general knowl-
edge").
263 See, e.g., United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Al-Atian,
308 F. Supp. 2d at 1328.
264 One exception to this distinction would be money laundering, which is more akin
to the "material support" crimes in that it usually utilizes everyday, otherwise legal transac-
tions to obscure the illegal method of income. Even so, money laundering is distinguish-
able from "material support" because the latter is consequentialist in its imputation of
culpability, but the former finds its turpitude in an antecedent act.
266 For examples of the scienter requirement being the critical issue in the prosecu-
tions, see Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 399-404 (9th
Cir. 2003), vacated by 382 F.3d 1154 (2004); AlArian, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1336-39.
266 See United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 178-80 (3d Cir. 2007).
267 The "material support" statute itself leans in this direction already, in some sense
folding part of the mens rea element into the actus revs. See ABRAMS, supra note 257, at 18
("Another way of characterizing the approach taken in these two statutes is that a trade-off
was made between the mens rea required for the offenses and the actus reus or conduct
required to hold the aiding person criminally liable. Thus, the statutes require that the
contribution of the actor be material, and they put content into the concept of material
support by defining it in terms of substantial forms of aid through the specification of
listed categories. By thus 'hardening up' the actus reus, the drafters made more acceptable
a diluted mens rea of knowledge, which is less demanding than the usual complicity re-
quirement of purpose.").
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setting up a sufficient scienter element in a sting is more difficult than
tempting a target with hedonic contraband, leaving more possibility
that the sting will seem like overreaching when entrapment claims arise
at trial.
Academic commentators have harshly criticized the "material sup-
port" statutes. Nevertheless, the statutes have survived constitutional
challenges for violating the First Amendment right to free associa-
tion, 269 for overbreadth, 279 and for violations of due process. 271
III. PRINCIPLES FOR ADAPTING THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE FOR
TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS
The entrapment defense has always been a tailored response to
special methods of law enforcement; these methods, in turn, were a
tailored response to a limited set of crimes having certain characteris-
tics. Thus, the crimes themselves gave rise to the defense by this two-
step process. Yet there are profound ways in which terrorist activities
differ from the crimes that gave rise to the entrapment defense.
These differences will influence the methods that enforcement agen-
cies deploy.272 As a tailored response to this altered state of law en-
forcement, the federal entrapment defense will require some modifi-
cation, especially concerning the predisposition element. This Section
focuses on seven distinguishing features of the new context that
should guide the adjustmeks of the entrapment rules.
A. The Heightened Stakes
Undercover operations traditionally focused on crimes whose
aggregate harm, rather than the minimal or remote harm of an indi-
vidual instance, motivated the enactment of the penal provisions. 273
268 See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 172, at 25; Michele A. Krengel, Case Comment, Consti-
tutionality of a Statute Prohibiting Material Support to Organizations Designated as "Terrorist," 30
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 253,257 (2005); Eichensehr, supra note 257, at 229.
269 Lindh, 212 F. Supp. Mat 569-70.
27° Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 304-05; Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
271 See Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1343-44; Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 299-300. For a
detailed summary of constitutional challenges, see Comerford, supra note 173, at 751-53.
272 See POSNER, supra note 4, at 112 ("And the critical issue is the 'point' at which to in-
stitute prosecution; a criminal investigator will arrive at that point sooner than an intelli-
gence officer would?).
278 Judge Richard Posner describes the seemingly harmless nature of the acts that form
the crux of sting operations in this way:
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One counterfeit bill in circulation might not harm anyone, but
enough counterfeit currency can diminish the value of all the legal
currency in circulation. One dose of narcotics may be relatively harm-
less recreation in an isolated instance, but widespread use begets a
host of social problems related to the disabling effects of addiction.
Sex for money, in a single instance, might produce no immediate in-
jury; prostitution as an industry can exploit immigrants and addicts,
undermine a social structure dependant on nuclear families, and so
forth. These aggregate harms are somewhat amorphous and the sub-
ject of endless debate, and can appear to be merely legislation of mo-
rality. If the aggregate harms are a genuine policy concern, on the
other hand, then there is too much incentive, and not enough indi-
vidual cost, in each isolated case; too many people will engage in that
activity if the law does not deter it. In any case, these modern crimes,
like trafficking, money laundering, counterfeiting, and the sex trade,
stand in stark contrast to the common law crimes, like murder, theft,
or rape. Each instance of the latter type is a personal tragedy to the
individual victim.
Terrorism is obviously different from both of these types of
crimes. 274 Its harm can be widespread, even catastrophic, in a single
instance or attack. It differs from the common law crimes because of
the drastic multiplication of innocent victims from each delict. It differs
from the consensual-transaction crimes, which usually attend the en-
trapment defense, in that the aggregate harm is not the concern as
much as the harm in each instance. The goal of terrorism is to draw
attention to a cause, 275 to intimidate citizens, and to coerce govern-
ments. 276 The immediate goal of a terrorist stunt is sensationalism. 277
Often the police solicit a person to commit a crime, for example by sending
an undercover agent or informant to buy narcotics from a drug dealer, who is
then prosecuted for an illegal sale. It may seem odd that the law should pun-
ish such a harmless act, for obviously the sale of narcotics to an undercover
agent who then destroys the narcotics does no harm to anyone But the
rationale is again prevention.
POSNER, supra note 3, at 231. Even though the harm of a single instance of the victimless
crimes is almost nil, the preventative and deterrent value of random transactions being
stings has a net positive value in reducing the aggregate number of instances.
274 See e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 66, at 80 ("Why, then, do we not rely on the processes
of law enforcement alone to maintain law and order in the case of terrorist bombings ... ?
The answer is because of the degree of harm that may be done before any arrest is
made.").
275 See id. at 9.
216 See id. at 12-18.
277
 Sec Leger, supra note 65, at 489.
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Civilian casualties and community shock value are commodities for ter-
rorists.278 It is almost a cliché now to say that September 11th "changed
everything"279 or that the priorities of law enforcement must change. 288
Yet the shift in emphasis toward prevention, as opposed to punishment,
means that the defenses to crimes deserve reconsideration.
Judge Posner recently explained the difference in the cost-benefit
analysis of preventing these different types of crimes:
The broader point is that prevention is a much more impor-
tant policy goal in the case of global terrorism than in the case
of ordinary crime. The nation can live with 30,000 ordinary
murders a year, but not 30,000 murders by terrorists. Criminal
punishments are designed to limit the crime rate, but not to
reduce it to zero; the costs would be disproportionate to the
benefits. This is much less clear in the case of terrorism. 281
Prevention of a particular crime, as opposed to simple penalization,
depends on a combination of deterrence and incapacitation. Deter-
rence is usually complicated with terrorism, because it means playing
with incentives for those acting mostly out of ideological zeal, precom-
mitted to making extreme personal sacrifices. 282 Punishment of tradi-
tional crimes can serve the ends of retribution and deterrence simulta-
neously, because the actual wrongdoer suffers and potential
wrongdoers become aware of higher costs for pursuing their aims. A
would-be terrorist with a martyr complex, however, might view certain
increased costs (such as potential punishment, enhanced security sys-
tems, and lethal consequences for tiny mistakes) as the stage props of
orchestrated heroism, the type of challenges that make the activity even
more rewarding. In the well-trod dichotomy between specific deter-
rence (deterring a specific individual) and general deterrence (deter-
ring the entire population),283 terrorism requires a middle road of "cus-
tomized general deterrence," 'an increase in the kinds of costs that
"8 See id.
"9 See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 178, at 1316.
280 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The Deepening Crisis of American Constitutionalism, 40 GA.
L. REV. 889, 890 (2006).
POSNER. supra note 3, at 245.
282 For a fascinating discussion of terrorist incentives toward certain types of tactics and
away from others, see generally Peter J. Phillips, Terrorism: A Mean-Variance Analysis (Feb.
12, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=966006.
283 See United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 187 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[A]side from gen-
eral deterrence, the penological goal of specific deterrence provides ample reason for
Lakhani's sentence: he will never again seek to provide material support to terrorists.").
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offset the terrorist's utility, 284 rather than enhancing it by making the
act seem more heroic. Tailoring the legal rules—for either the penal
statute or the available defenses—is necessary to achieve this end.
Some, including Judge Posner, have suggested that the height-
ened stakes with terrorism warrant less procedural protections and
benefit of the doubt for terror suspects, and greater surveillance of
the general population, to catch them more often and avoid acquit-
tals based on technical procedural violations (that is, application of
the exclusionary rules). 288 The heightened need for prevention does
not necessarily require such a superficial cost-benefit tradeoff be-
tween the civil liberties of innocent suspects and the devastating inju-
ries caused by a single attack. The point is not that the heightened
stakes justify tipping the scales of justice in favor of prosecutors at
every turn; that is the blunt-tool approach. Rather, the higher stakes
mean that ex ante prevention is more necessary than with other types
of crimes, and that the legal rules should steer law enforcement more
toward methods that would provide effective prevention, instead of
simply empowering law enforcement across the board. Increasing the
would-be terrorist's costs via increased punishments may not be as
pragmatic for customized deterrence, for example, as increasing the
risk of failure and incapacitation,286 which are not necessarily the
same thing as punishment after the fact. General deterrence may be
more limited in the terrorism context, but this does not mean that all
varieties of deterrence have lower value; it merely means that the de-
terrence must be more artful or better aimed to be effective.
Incapacitation is the second prong of prevention, and increased
incapacitation can make up for a lack in deterrence.287 Of course, inca-
pacitation can itself deter—a would-be offender may conclude that the
likelihood of success is too low to justify an attempt—but we can also
analyze it as a distinct method. Catching and imprisoning the would-be
terrorist before a real plot is underway, even for a relatively short time
(suppose three or four years, enough time for a network of collabora-
tors to erode) may be a more efficient prevention device than trying to
thwart an actual attack and punishing the conspirators for attempt. The
234 See generally Phillips, supra note 282.
212 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 245.
2B6 See HEYMANN, Stipta note 66, at 84-85.
257 See POSNER, supra note 4, at 135 (discussing the difference between the intelligence
agency's reaction and the law enforcer's reaction, the latter being more focused on pre-
vention and incapacitation).
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same is true for undercover infiltrators as saboteurs, 288
 but this tactic
relates less directly to the entrapment defense, and is perhaps less likely
for a law enforcement system that is used to maximizing arrests and
convictions rather than interfering with criminal success rates.
Similarly, a phony terrorist cell set up as a sting operation creates a
substantial opportunity cost for would-be terrorists, 289 diverting them
into a plot that is bound to fail from the outset (because it is planned
by government agents) instead of a real one that might succeed. More
specifically, "material support" under the antiterrorism statutes that is
provided to undercover agents is a diversion of resources away from
real terrorists. 29° This has two effects. It is harder for real terrorists to
garner the material support they need (as it is diverted elsewhere), and
the awareness that a supporter might waste all his resources on gov-
ernment agents can deter would-be supporters from aiding anyone. 291
Less leniency at trial may indeed be more justifiable, but this
frames the question as a tradeoff between the stakes and the loss of
leniency or lenity. Rather than being simply more draconian about
prosecuting terrorism, however, we could be more sophisticated and
tailor the rules to shift law enforcement more toward effective preven-
don.
B. Eluding Detection and the Increase in Surveillance
Continuing with the theory that an affirmative defense like en-
trapment needs to fit certain characteristics of the crime in question, it
is significant that terrorism differs from other crimes in its difficulty of
detection.292 Terrorists are more likely to elude detection and appre-
hension than everyday drug peddlers are; the defendants in antiterror-
ism cases are different from those in the traditional cases where the
entrapment defense arises. 293 The professionalized secrecy of terrorist
288 See HEYMANN, supra note 66, at 112.
289 See Frey & Luechinger, supra note 72, at 18-19. Frey and Luechinger argue that rais-
ing opportunity costs is more effective than threats, but this is somewhat different from the
opportunity costs I mention here. See id.; see also HEYMANN, supra note 66, at 80.
290 See HEYMANN, supra note 66, at 96.
291 For extremely thoughtful and well-informed discussion of the role of material sup-
port and philanthropy in international terrorism, see Monica Serrano. The Political Economy
of Terrorism, in TERRORISM AND THE U.N. 202-06 (Jane Boulden & Thomas G. Weiss eds.,
2004). Monica Serrano argues that "[title deep financial logic of terrorism, then, is to be
found in the symbolic structures of philanthropy." Id.
292 POSNER, supra note 3, at 230 (explaining that conspiracies are more efficient at
"avoiding being caught").
293 See HEYMANN, supra note 66, at 113.
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conspiracies294 presents a (sometimes tragic) choice between two meth-
ods of detection: infiltration by undercover agents, and government
surveillance that is exponentially more intrusive and widespread.
Relying on increased surveillance carries extra costs. There is the
much decried loss of civil liberties for the general population as gov-
ernment eavesdropping becomes more ubiquitous, a point that other
commentators have covered exhaustively. 2" Regardless of whether it is
justifiable to make sacrifices to our civil liberties, it seems obvious that
such sacrifices are worth avoiding if there are less costly alternatives. A
discreet sting operation—a setup to catch a would-be supporter of
terrorism in a preplanned, orchestrated criminal situation—consumes
fewer resources than ongoing surveillance making broad enough
sweeps to detect the right criminals. 296 There are welfare losses to so-
ciety that accompany the erosion of civil liberties, as transaction costs
increase for useful activities increase with the reduced freedoms of
mobility and privacy; the emblematic example is the extra cost and
difficulty of air travel in the post-September 11th world. Long lines at
airport security, a dramatic increase in lost baggage by the airlines,
increased security costs borne by the airlines and passed through to
customers, are but a few examples of the deadweight loss caused by
the surveillance-centered reaction to terrorism.
It is expensive to maintain sufficient staff in law enforcement
agencies to intercept communications and analyze the data; the spe-
cialized qualifications needed for surveillance (bilingualism, technol-
ogy training, background checks, and so forth) pose additional costs.
A dramatic increase in surveillance means a dramatic increase in per-
sonnel costs. 297 Moreover, a surveillance-centered approach means
2" See MIZELL SUpTE/ note 73, at 67-79 (chronicling older examples, from the 1970s and
1980s, of sophisticated avoidance of detection).
495 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 77, at 14-19.
496 See, e.g., Mark D. Villaverde, Note, Structuring the Prosecutor's Duty to Search the Intelli-
gence Community for Brady Alatenal, 88 CORNELL L. Rev. 1471, 1972 (2003) (noting that
40,000 FBI investigations yielded only 115 prosecutions, and 29 convictions—not a very
efficient approach).
297 See POSNER, supra note 37, at 99-125 (describing the inherent difficulties—or im-
possibility—of getting intelligence organizations to work effectively). Judge Posner states:
Specifically, one can expect intelligence officers to protect their jobs by 1)
avoiding definite predictions, 2) erring on the side of not sounding the
alarm, 3) deferring the making of a prediction, while gathering more infor-
mation, 4) hesitating to update predictions on the basis of new information,
5) shying away from making predictions that are inconsistent with what their
colleagues and superiors are predicting, and 6) in the wake of an attack,
overemphasizing intelligence directed at preventing an exact repetition of it.
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indefinite surveillance, always watching and.waiting for the next plot to
hatch, sorting through endless false leads and proposals that the ter-'
rorists abandon. 299 A good sting operation runs its course, traps the
wrongdoer, and concludes. Incapacitating a future terrorist can hap-
pen within a predetermined time with a sting, or after an indefinite
period of monitoring; the latter involves indefinite costs, while the
Fortner conforms to a preset budget. 2
The budgetary concerns, of course, are less troubling than the
loss of liberties to which we are accustomed. 999
 Such losses may be
unnecessary if we recognize a substitution effect in law enforcement.
Orwellian surveillance is really an alternative to stings; this is true at
least where the stakes are high and the wrongdoers are especially elu-
sive. The entrapment defense limits and discourages sting operations
to the degree that the defense is available and effective for defen-
dants. A generous entrapment defense in the terrorism arena pro-
duces a substitution effect that increases the government's use of in-
vasive surveillance.
C. Self-Screening for Compulsiveness and Self-Disclosure
Antiterrorism efforts also differ from antitrafficking efforts with
respect to personal traits of the typical defendant The crimes that
historically implicated the entrapment defense often had a compul-
siveness component. The willing parties to the victimless crimes are
often addicted to the act or contraband in question, 391 which is part of
the aggregate harm that leads to the criminalization of these consen-
sual transactions in the first place. The prevalence of addicts in this
field, with their associated compulsiveness and desperation, intro-
duces many internal risks or weak links into the supply chain of a traf-
ficking conspiracy. Some degree of self-screening occurs with victim-
Id. at 108. The point here is that there are inherent, predictable agency costs in the intelli-
gence bureaus, which make staff increases for gathering more information, or analyzing
intercepted communications, relatively inefficient, from a cost-benefit standpoint.
298 See generally jack M. Balkin et al., The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan
Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489,521-29 (2006).
299 See HEYMANN, supra note 66, at 80-81 (discussing the relative costs of gathering suf-
ficient intelligence to prevent attacks versus the costs of incapacitating the terrorists
through other means).
500 See id. at 97.
831 See Campbell, supra note 79, at 229 (observing that most defendants prosecuted
under conspiracy statutes are addicts).
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less crimes, alluring participants who are prone to make mistakes,' 02
betray themselves unwittingly, or fail in some objective—a fortunate
effect for law enforcement. When criminal perpetrators blunder of-
ten, detection is easier (which lowers the costs of law enforcement
generally), and the crime less likely to succeed (which lowers the
stakes by decreasing the probability of harm) 3°3
Terrorists may seem fanatical to the point of irrationality, but fa-
naticism does not cause clumsiness. 5" Admittedly, a well-orchestrated
bombing or other sensational stunt is a complex, challenging undertak-
ing, especially compared to a simple drug transaction or downloading
of child porn. Even so, we cannot count on terrorists (or their material
supporters) 303 to make the same types of mistakes as the perpetrators of
the other crimes that normally give rise to the entrapment defense." 6
The legal rules should reflect this reality.
Turning to the specific charges that usually furnish antiterrorism
prosecutions, "material support" often includes the provision of sub-
stantial funds or necessary resources, special expertise, training, or
other assistance. Providers of such assets are likely to be more sophis-
ticated or wealthy than stereotypical traffickers, purveyors, and pan-
derers.
The self-screening effect for the victimless crimes makes the costs
of sting operations arguably less necessary because there is a reasonable
chance of the perpetrators betraying themselves, perhaps with minimal
surveillance or monitoring, or failing in their endeavors even without
government interference. Sting operations are therefore less necessary
with these crimes, and the regulation of stings through the entrapment
defense can be more burdensome relative to terrorism crimes. Provi-
sion of material support for terrorists (or terrorist organizations) is self-
screening in the other direction, for almost the opposite type of perpe-
312 See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 178, at 1317 ("MI hen they voiced clearly wrong answers,
the naive subjects would conform over one-third of the time to these obviously incorrect
answers (compared to a one percent error rate when confederates voiced correct an-
swers).").
3°3 For an example of incompetent conspirators, see generally United States v. Marti-
nez, 16 F.3d 202 (7th Cir. 1994).
2114 See Leger, supra note 65, at 490 (discussing the relative rationality of different cate-
gories of terrorist organizations).
. "15 See HEYMANN, supra note 66, at 96; Serrano, supra note 291, at 204-05.
we See WOLF, supra note 81, at 28 (explaining that recruits for terrorist organizations
are technically competent in their areas of specialization): See generally HUDSON, supra note
86 (arguing that terrorists are sophisticated and highly skilled).
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trator,307 making sting operations more essential. Legal regulation of
such stings, therefore, deserves to be less burdensome, suggesting a
relaxed entrapment defense.
D. Those Who Are Predisposed to Be Predisposed
Victimless crimes attract people naturally—in fact, one (paternal-
istic) rationale for criminalizing the activities is that they appeal to too
many people, or appeal to people too strongly. The idea is that people
cannot resist the temptation even through they are aware of the haz-
ards, so the government must intervene to protect them from them-
selves. By contrast, it seems that terrorists must recruit, 308 even prose-
lytize, in order to attract participants, or at least to draw useful
participants. Traffickers and purveyors have a customer base, a ready
market for their contraband; terrorists have no customers.
The current intended beneficiaries of the entrapment defense
are average law-abiding people who might succumb if tempted by a
fantastic sum of money, or if frightened or badgered enough by an
undercover agent—at least in an isolated instance.309 There seem to
be three tacit assumptions behind the predisposition rule. First, it as-
sumes that most people are not disposed to commit crimes; 310 second,
that even those without this disposition are likely to commit crimes if
confronted with enough incentive; and third, that government agents
can provide a sufficient incentive to beguile a person whom real crimi-
nals could not. These three underlying assumptions apply to almost
all the crimes for which the entrapment defense is likely to arise, but
are less applicable to terrorism. 311
Far fewer people would agree to drive a truck bomb up to the
city's federal building, or hijack a plane, regardless of inducement,
"7 See Leger, supra note 65, at 490-91 (discussing the psychology of those who join dif-
ferent types of terrorist groups); see also Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First
Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 11,
26 n.45 (2006) (discussing prosecution of computer science student in Idaho for design-
ing and maintaining a website for an Islamic charity that posted edicts from radical clerics
and links to terrorist sites; student was acquitted but then deported).
30 See, e.g., Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13,19 (D.D.C. 2002)
(discussing the enormous funds spent on recruiting).
"9 See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,438-42 (1932).
3" See generally Smith, supra note 91, at 772-74 (providing a detailed critique of this as-
sumption and agreeing with the Milgram Hypothesis that average people actually are pre-
disposed to commit heinous crimes, but simply lack the opportunity). This author dis-
agrees in the context of terror crimes; I contend that the pool of potential recruits is finite.
311 See Leger, supra note 65, at 490-91.
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even the almost-infinite inducement for any sum of money or other
incentive. Perhaps only people with a certain psychological makeup," 2
or certain entrenched attitudes, could be potential recruits for a ter-
ror ce11. 515 Terrorists recruit; they do not have customers." 4 If the re-
cruits were susceptible to the undercover agent, they would also be
"recruit material" for real terrorists; it is fortunate for the rest of us
that the undercover agent recruited them first. 315 With this particular
crime, we should assume that a normal person would be immune to
inducements, that we can infer predisposition merely by the fact that
the person agreed to engage in such a horrible act, and that other
evidence of predisposition is unnecessary. 516 They must be predis-
posed to be predisposed, as it were.
This assumes that there are a finite number of potential recruits
for terrorism, and that these people pose a danger because of their sus-
ceptibility to recruitment. Both of these assumptions are admittedly
controversial. Judge Posner, for example, says, "[I] ncapacitation has
little effect because the supply of terrorists appears to be extremely
elastic, since terrorist enterprises can draw on a vast pool of disaffected
Muslim youth the world over." 317 Disaffected Muslim youth may abound,
512 See United States v. Ford, No. 05-cr-00537-REB, 2007 WL 628069, at *2 (D. Colo.
Feb. 26, 2007) ("Defendant claimed that because of his vulnerable psychological and emo-
tional makeup, he was, inter alia, particularly susceptible to the entreaties of [the agent],
who defendant saw as a father figure that defendant wanted to please and did not want to
disappoint."). See generally HUDSON, supra note 86 (surveying the entire corpus of psycho-
logical and sociological literature about the personality profiles of terrorist recruits).
3" See Leger, supra note 65, at 490-91 (discussing the profiles of individuals who join
the three types of terrorist groups).
514 See Hawkins, supra note 89, at 646.
"5 See Karen Pittel & Dirk T.G. Rubbelke, What Directs A Terrorist? (Chemnitz Univ. of
Tech. Econ. Working Paper No. WWDP 67/2005, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=752845 (discussing what motivates both terrorist cell members and leaders and
employing various mathematical models).
318 See Smith, supra note 91, at 775-79 (arguing that factfuiders are likely to infer dis-
position from the mere fact that the defendant committed the crime, and that this is a
product of a documented psychological-heuristic fallacy called *attribution"). If Smith is
correct, the courts have nonetheless not admitted that this occurs. Regardless of whether
"attribution" occurs subconsciously in garden variety entrapment cases, I contend that we
should be explicit about inferring predisposition in some cases based simply on the seri-
ousness of the offense. I cannot find a single entrapment case, however, where a court
inferred predisposition merely from the seriousness of the offense.
3" POSNER, supra note 3, at 245. As much as I appreciate Judge Posner's overall analy-
sis, his comment here seems to conflate the insurgents' guerrilla tactics in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan with the generally sophisticated, educated terrorist recruits and cell leaders in
the West. Disaffected Muslim youth in undeveloped countries, most of whom lack any way
to get a visa to the United States or to learn English, are not terribly relevant for antiterror-
ism stings and prosecutions here in this country. See Pittel & Rubbelke, supra nate 315, at
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but the vast majority of them never join a terrorist group. 318 Perhaps
this is due to lack of opportunities, but it may also be because terrorists
need certain types of people (not just drones or foot soldiers, like a
street gang or militia group), or because even disaffected Muslim youth
generally lack the requisite predisposition to join." If the supply of
terrorists were truly elastic, it seems that there would be more terrorist
strikes than we currently have. The number is relatively miniscule, at
least compared to the other crimes for which the entrapment defense
avails.329 Occupied countries and territories, like Iraq or the West Bank,
seem to have an endless supply of suicide bombers, which suggests that
opportunity and example (to strike at the perceived enemy) are crucial
factors.
In his seminal work on deterrence and punishment, 321 Johannes
Andenaes surveyed the common approaches to deterrence (specific, 322
genera1,323 educative,324 mora1,325 and others), and suggests that one of
the most effective ways to lower criminal activity is to remove "bad ex-
amples" from a section of society. 328 When transgressions become visibly
commonplace, other individuals feel emboldened to engage in the
same conduct; the "unthinkable is not unthinkable any longer when
one sees one's comrades doing it."327 Without a "bad example," others
would never have thought of committing the offense, or they would
have felt inhibited from doing so. 328 This makes it particularly impor-
tant to catch and remove the first-corners to an offense; Andenaes
makes a direct application to terrorist hijackings in the 1970s. 329 Sting
operations are particularly useful for incapacitating those who would be
potential recruiters for terrorist organizations, or even the recruits who
would serve as a sufficient catalyst to give the conspiracy momentum.
14 ("In contrast to previous analyses ... we find the basic question of whether an agent
could become a suicide bomber at all, to be independent of his level of income.").
313 See generally Pittel & Rubbelke, supra note 316 (discussing calculus for how success-
ful a terrorist leader will be in recruiting).
513 See HEywaiN , supra note 66, at 79.
32° See Pittel Rubbelke, supra note 315, at 1.
321 See generally ANDENAES, supra note 84.
322
	 id. at 3.
323 Id. at 34-79.
324 Id. at 110-20,
223 Id. at 129-30.
323 See ANDENAES, supra note 84, at 122-25.
3S7 Id. at 123.
328 See id.
328 See id.
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This is, of course, not the classic model for either deterrence or
incapacitation. The focus is not on removing (ex post) the perpetrators
of crimes, but rather the catalysts who join the conspiracy early and
help expand it. It is, in a sense, a mirror image of regular deterrence—
instead of giving disincentives to commit a crime, this approach re-
moves the social incentives for the crimes (i.e., certain individuals). 330
Turning now to the realities of prosecutions and arrests, the
crime is normally the provision of material support, and the question
is the predisposition for that act. 331 Although this is a step removed
from delivering the bomb oneself—an important psychological step
that broadens the pool of possible actors—not every disaffected youth
has any useful contribution to make to the cause. 332 Similarly, if hot-
headed vainglory or an overweening martyr complex motivates the
actual bombers or leaders of the conspiracies, then "material support
provider" might seem like a lackluster legacy; a more calculating, un-
assuming sympathizer is a better candidate. 333 The point is that if we
do have a finite set of potential offenders, regardless of the induce-
ments, then the rules for entrapment should change. 334
If the set of possible participants is reasonably finite, then it be-
comes a zero some games" between the real terrorists and the under-
cover agents to get the recruits. Sting operations can serve the useful
sw See id.; see also Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1535,1554 n.85 (2005).
531 See Serrano, supra note 291, at 204-05.
332 See Kreimer, supra note 307, at 91-93 (discussing the provision of 'material sup-
port" —from the prosecutor's standpoint—in the creation and maintenance of Internet
websites).
333 This is exactly the point that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dis-
cussed in the celebrated United States u Lakhani case in March 2007. See 480 F.3d at 186-87
("Lakhani also argues that the District Court's general deterrence justifications are inapt.
He states that 'no sentence would be long enough' to deter a true terrorist and that the
only thing his sentence may have accomplished is the deterrence of 'charlatans and con-
artists from suggesting they can provide weapons to terrorists.' That may be so, but accept-
ing Lakhani's argument would require criminal courts to abandon their sworn duty in the
face of an irrational enemy .... Moreover, even if potential terrorists are unlikely to be
undeterrable, their necessary aiders and abetters-such as Lakhani believed he was-may be.
Moreover, aside from general deterrence, the penological goal of specific deterrence pro-
vides ample reason for Lakhani's sentence: he will never again seek to provide material
support to terrorists. Despite the role the Government played in his crime, we have no
doubt that if Lakhani had actually stumbled into a willing provider of a real missile, he
would eagerly have arranged to smuggle it into the United States all the same?).
334 See HEYMANN, supra note 66, at BO ("[I]ncapacitation can significantly affect the
number able and willing to stay the course.").
333 See id. at 82 ("IRleducing what may be a very limited total pool of participants by
discouraging beginners, increasing defections, and incapacitating the firmly committed.").
2008]	 Entrapment & Terrorism	 191
purpose of diverting potential participants into decoy operations in-
stead of real (and dangerous) operations. 336 This not only incapacitates
the potential wrongdoers by trapping and arresting them, but leaves
the organizers or masterminds of the plots understaffed or undersup-
plied with material support, and forces them to waste more time and
resources' on finding new people as the pool shrinks. 337
 Resources
wasted on recruiting, because of diminishing recruits, are resources
that cannot go towards the terrorist attacks themselves.
The second assumption—that anyone susceptible to recruitment
by a terrorist organization already poses an abnormal danger—does
not mean we should arrest people based on profiling.338 Raising the
entrapment defense presumes that the person did assent to participate
in a criminal enterprise that turned out to be a sting. 339 Returning for a
moment to the three assumptions underlying the predisposition test, in
the case of terrorism, all three assumptions falter. Instead of the aver-
age law-abiding person not being predisposed to commit the crime,
with terrorism we can assume that nearly everyone would be resistant to
it. Second, whereas we assumed before that many or most people would
succumb if the inducement were great enough, with terrorism we as-
sume that adequate inducements are almost unimaginable for most
people, and feasible for only certain people. 3" Third, we cannot as-
sume that the government's inducements will exceed whatever the ter-
rorists use; their financial resources can be vast."'
As stated in the Introduction, the current predisposition test may
already be vague enough to confer sufficient discretion for judges to
333 See, e.g., Lakhani, 480 F.3d at 187 ("Despite the role the Government played in his
crime, we have no doubt that if Lakhani had actually stumbled into a willing provider of a
real missile, he would eagerly have arranged to smuggle it into the United States all the
same.").
337 For more discussion about preventing recruitment, see Seymour, supra note 92, at
553.
336 But see H EYMANN, supra note 66, at 92 (discussing identification of potential threats
in a manner that borders on this).
339 See Smith, supra note 91, at 775-79, (arguing that there is a tendency to infer pre-
disposition from mere commission of an offense, and that that tendency taints the current
entrapment defense). I am suggesting that with this particular crime, it matters a great
deal whether someone succumbed to the temptation in the first place, more than with
other, less injurious crimes.
540 See generally Pittel & Rubbelke, supra note 315, at 14 (discussing the predisposition
to become a suicide bomber).
341 As Judge Posner explains, terrorist groups are larger, more sophisticated, and bet-
ter financed than even very large gangs; their resources may exceed that of prosecutors.
PosNxit, supra note 3, at 241.
192	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 49:125
tailor it to this unique type of crime, without overtly changing the rule. 342
Congress could also create a statutory exclusion of the entrapment de-
fense for terror-related crimes. 343 Alternatively, a judicial rule that finds
predisposition "per se," or as a presumed inference, seems warranted
where the undercover agents made the terrorist connection clear to the
target of the sting.
E. The Lemons Effect as a Positive Externality of Sting Operations
As suggested above, diverting or wasting terrorists' resources is a
method of prevention. It is important, therefore, that the presence of
undercover infiltrators raises the transaction costs of terrorism across
the board. As leaders realize that some of their recruits are possible in-
formants or undercover agents, 344 or if potential recruits realize that
their recruiters (or leaders) could be government agents, 345 a chilling
effect besets the entire enterprise. 346 This is desirable. Transaction costs
increase as mistrust permeates the organization or network. 347 Each
member must divert some resources to screening and testing their co-
conspirators more than they would otherwise, and each must be more
guarded, less cooperative, and less forthcoming with useful informa-
tion. The added transaction costs pose a drain on time, energy, and
other resources, slowing the progress of the plot. Internal mistrust
helps prevent terrorism.348
341 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
ms Norman Abrams implies that Congress has already done this by creating a relatively
weak mens rea requirement for the "material support" crimes (especially compared to the
specific intent elements of traditional conspiracy charges or the "purpose" element of
traditional complicity charges), and compensated for this by hardening the actus reus
element with the adjective "material" and a statutory list of possible items. See Abrams,
supra note 172, at 10-11,18.
544 See generally Pittel & Rubbelke, supra note 315, at 3-4 (discussing terrorist leaders'
instruments for controlling recruits).
545 See id. at 7-13 (modeling in economic terms the sense of belonging that motivates
the terror cell member).
546 See id. at 5-7 (discussing the importance of raising the organization's utility level).
547 See Katyal, supra note 178, at 1325 (discussing how conspiracies depend on a
"framework of trust to reduce the transaction costs in forming new contracts with each
other"). For an example of where a court found that undercover infiltrators can have this
chilling effect (but used in an abusive way, to target legitimate, peaceful political dissent),
see Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044,1054 (N.D. III. 1985).
348 POSNER, supra note 3, at 245 (observing that organized Crime depends more heavily
on trust than legal transactions do, as breaches of illegal contracts are unenforceable, and
therefore tends to organize around crime "families," as well as lines of business that have
lower'turnover in their ranks, like brothels instead of streetwalkers).
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As undercover agents clutter the field, recruiting grows more diffi-
cult, not only because many potential recruits are off following decoy
plots (described in the previous subsection), but also because some of
the remaining recruits are undercover agents who pose a serious threat
to the organization. Attracting the necessary contributors to the con-
spiracy takes more time, requires more screening, and results in false
positives—turning away recruits suspected of being undercover agents,
who actually would have been an asset to the program instead. 349 For
the true believers in the cause, the radicals, 35° the presence of unknown
traitors is not only worrisome (they jeopardize everything), but also
terribly discouraging. 3" In an organization that thrives on excitement
and zeal for motivation352 instead of pecuniary gain, infiltrators un-
dermine the most valuable resource of the conspiracy. 353
This creates an analogous situation to the famous "lemons effect"
for used cars or other commodities: it devalues the original, makes
transactions more costly for everyone, and tends to escalate over tirne.354
The difference here is that instead of being a problem, this is a social
benefit, because it undermines an enterprise that injures society. This
merits more judicial deference for the mechanism that obtains this
benefit, the sting operations.
345 See Alliance to End Repression, 627 F. Supp. at 1050-51.
5" See Leger, supra note 65, at 490 (discussing "physiological terrorists").
331 See HEYMANN, supra note 66, at 82.
352 See Leger, supra note 65, at 490-91 (discussing the commitment and trust level re-
quired within these organizations).
353 This is consistent with the analysis of Pittel and Rubbelke. See generally Pittel & Rub-
belke, supra note 315.
354 See, e.g., Akerlof, supra note 96, at 488-90; Winand Emons & George Sheldon, The
Market for Used Carr A New Test of the Lemons Model (Univ. of Bern, Dep't of Econ. Discus-
sion Paper 02.02, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstmct=306939; see also Hay, supra
note 10, at 412-13 (applying the lemons" concept to undercover sting operations by po-
lice) Bruce Hay explains:
When deterrence is the objective, the government creates something akin to
the well-known market for lemons. The government introduces lemons—
phony criminal opportunities—that resemble the genuine article. To the
would-be offender, the risk of being caught in a trap makes it costlier to seize
apparent opportunities for crime. He may therefore turn away genuine op-
portunities that would otherwise attract him. Just as the presence of lemons
in the auto market discourages the sale of even good cars, the presence of
lemons in the market for crime discourages genuine criminal transactions. If
the sting totally succeeds, the market for real criminal opportunities "unrav-
els," driving criminals into other activities. For example, if there were enough
phony buyers of narcotics on the street, the price of drugs would rise so high
that genuine buyers would disappear.
Id.
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Admittedly, the benefit of the lemons effect is from the criminals'
perception more than the actual number of undercover infiltrators.
The government has an incentive, therefore, to publicize its use of
undercover agents, to foster a perception than they are ubiquitous
and effective. 355 There are many ways to do this, such as leaking the
identity of one or two former undercover agents, who face little dan-
ger of retaliation now that they are out of the field, to the press. If
convictions generate written opinions and reportable news more than
acquittals do, prosecutors have an incentive to make examples of
those caught in sting operations, rather than showing them leni-
ency.356 The point is that the use of sting operations against terrorists
affords some positive externalities in the efforts to prevent terrorism
generally, far-reaching positive effects beyond the immediate appre-
hension of potential attackers or supports. This consideration should
influence the regulation of sting operations, which occurs primarily
through the entrapment defense.
F. Terrorism, Information Asymmetries, and Prosecutorial Bargaining Power
Prosecutorial bargaining power during the plea negotiations be-
fore trial is especially important where prevention of future crimes is a
priority, as with terrorism. Prosecutors with more bargaining power may
elicit useful disclosures about the larger terror network and other
plots.357 If the affirmative defense most relevant to the charge were less
available, this would give prosecutors an additional edge in inducing
the suspect, as part of a plea agreement, to inform on others who are
still at large. 358
355 See Hay, supra note 10, at 412-13. Of course, even unsuccessful stings can serve this
end. The fact that the sting worked well enough to lead to an arrest, regardless of whether
the trial ends in an acquittal, can make others more wary in the future. Assume for sake of
argument that the police engage in a particularly atrocious sting operation, something
that would sicken even the most progovernment judge. From the standpoint of disseminat-
ing a frightening impression among would-be offenders, this could be useful: the sensa-
tional nature of the news makes it more likely to spread quickly, and to make a deeper
impression on those who hear. This is not to say that unsuccessful stings are as desirable as
successful ones, of course.
355 See ANDENAES, supra note 84, at 137 ("If a case has for some reason attracted great
publicity, a severe sentence could be expected to have great deterrent effect.").
357 See POSNER, supra note 4, at 112.
353 See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 66, at 27 (discussing the greater success of Scotland
Yard in gaining useful antiterrorist information than Britain's secret service, because ''most
informants have been found among those who have been arrested and threatened with
punishment for other crimes").
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At first glance, this may seem to verge on the idea, disavowed in an
earlier subsection, that the heightened stakes justify dispensing with
procedural rights of these defendants. Yet the idea here is to focus on
prevention, not punishment—to enhance the defendant's willingness
to cooperate with disclosure requests in quid pro quo bargaining be-
fore trial. Every other procedural safeguard at trial could remain intact,
except this particular affirmative defense.
In cases where entrapment might otherwise avail, however, the
crime in question would be the product of a sting operation." 9 This
means that many of the usual procedural safeguards are less relevant,
such as the exclusionary rules. With stings, the agents can plan the in-
cident and catch the defendant in the act, perhaps on videotape.'" En-
trapment becomes relevant when the constitutional protections are not
available in a case, as a defense of last resort, 361
 when the defendant's
involvement is unquestionable. 962
There is a significant difference between this point and the usual
"give less rights to terrorists" argument. 363
 Here, we are talking about
increased prosecutorial power to bargain for information before the
trial, as opposed to increased prosecutorial power regarding sentenc-
ing, admissibility of incriminating evidence, degree of the charges
brought, and so forth. All of those other features.of the criminal proc-
ess remain the same regardless of the entrapment defense. The goal is
to provide an incentive for defendants to give up valuable information
for the prevention of future attacks, not to get the defendant to accede
to a tougher sentence or more severe charges. The information disclo-
sure should put the defendant in no worse position than she already
was, but it puts society in a better position than it would be without the
disclosure; it seems Pareto Superior. 364
G. Diminishing Marginal Value of Ex Post/External Regulation of
Antiterrorism Stings
A final consideration for adapting the entrapment defense in the
antiterrorism context is the obvious dangerousness of infiltrating a
359 See Sorrel's, 287 U.S. at 438-42.
3e4 See id.
381 See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 34.
362 Most of the antiterrorism prosecutions, in fact, end with plea agreements. See
Abrams, supra note 172, at 21.
363 Sce HEYMANN, supra note 66, at 112 (discussing various methods for extracting use-
ful information out of defendants).
364 See id. at 121.
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terrorist conspiracy. 363 This already serves as a check or deterrent
against government overreaching, and screens out some "bad apple"
agents who might otherwise do undercover work in other contexts.
There is less need here for the judiciary to add additional checks.
Judicial intervention to regulate undercover operations has a di-
minishing marginal value where there are already significant natural
restrictions on the enterprise. Some of these operations are not only
dangerous,363 but involve costly international travel, training undercover
agents in foreign languages, 367 and inherent risks of failure.
. As mentioned above, the entrapment defense is our legal system's
primary device for regulating government sting operations. It is an
"ex post" regulatory device, in that it imposes sanctions (acquittal of the
target) after the operation is complete, although such setbacks can in-
fluence future agency planning, as can be seen in the FBI Guidelines
for Undercover Operations. 363 The entrapment defense is also an ex-
ternal regulatory device, in that the judiciary decides whether the sting
operation stayed within proper boundaries, rather than the agency or
actors responsible for obtaining the operation's intended product, ar-
rests and convictions.3"
The ex post and external nature of the entrapment defense as a
regulatory device suggests that it will have diminishing effectiveness, or
diminishing marginal value, as either ex ante or internal restrictions
365 See WOLF, supra note 81, at 93 ("Police undercover work, designed to obtain infor-
mation on terrorist groups, is extremely dangerous to the police officer, as there is a con-
stant risk that he will face torture and death if discovered. Police undercover operatives
nevertheless must often be used to supplement routine police counterterrorist operations.
The police undercover agent must be a person who blends in with the surrounding of the
target area, and, in so doing, leaves the public totally oblivious as to what he is doing.
Counterterrorist undercover operatives should be experienced police officers with a
proven track record of success in deep-cover operations, since they will not be controlled
by any onsite intelligence or undercover groups. Many of these onsite units are not so
'tight' as some police officers believe them to be, and, therefore, undercover operatives
are usually on their own, insofar as looking after themselves is concerned.... It is best that
all other police officers operating in an area where a deep•penetration undercover opera-
tion is being conducted should not be aware of the operation ....").
366 See id.
367 See POSNER, supra note 4, at 111 (discussing the difficulty the FBI has experienced
in recruiting agents with the necessary language skills for deciphering intercepted com-
munications).
511 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
569 See ASHCROFT, GUIDELINES supra note 106, at 16,
57° See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442.
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increase. 371 Sting operations in the antiterrorism context have both ele-
vated ex ante and elevated internal restrictions compared to operations
focused on other crimes. 372 The screening effect on agents that results
from the increased dangerousness and enhanced skills needed provide
natural disincentives and selectiveness for finding agents; these place
elevated ex ante limitations on the sting operations. The higher budg-
etary costs for the agency, 373 as well as the higher stakes, political con-
siderations, and absolute need for successful prevention of attacks,
place elevated internal restrictions on the agencies in planning and
executing the operations. 374 Compared to other crimes where the en-
trapment defense is useful, the antiterrorism context presents ex ante
and internal conditions that make judicial regulation less valuable and
less necessary.
In sum, there are enough restraints or screening effects inherent
in undercover antiterrorism work to obviate some of the need for ad-
ditional judicial intervention. Judicial hesitancy in finding a lack of
predisposition, therefore, is especially appropriate in this context.
1V. SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT, ENTRAPMENT BY ESTOPPEL, AND
DERIVATIVE ENTRAPMENT
This Section discusses the entrapment defense's lesser-known sib-
lings: sentencing entrapment, entrapment by estoppel, and derivative
entrapment (also called vicarious entrapment). Each of these defenses
has potential relevance in upcoming antiterrorism prosecutions. 375 The
previous Section discussed principles for the adaptation of the entrap-
ment defense that would be applicable to these defenses as well. In ad-
dition, each of these defenses has a unique trait or element that re-
quires special analysis as it applies to terrorism.
371 For an excellent discussion of ex ante and ex post regulatory devices, see generally
Robert Innes, Enforcement Costs, Optimal Sanctions, and the Choice Between Ex-Post Liability and
Ex-Ante Regulation, 24 NV!. REV. L. & ECON. 29 (2005).
372 See supra notes 366-367 and accompanying text.
573 See, e.g., State v. Mullens, 650 S.E.2d 169, 215 {W. Va. 2007) (Maynard, J., dissent-
ing) Mash-strapped and overworked law-enforcement agencies have no incentive to arbi-
trarily send wired informants into the homes of law-abiding citizens when there are real
crimes to investigate:").
374 See, e.g., HEYMANN, supra note 66, at 80 (discussing the heightened stakes of terror-
ism investigations).
375 See, e.g 	States v. Lakhani, 480 F.Sd 171, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2007) (challenging
sentence for failure to give a mitigation or downward departure in light of the government's
involvement in the sting operation); United States v. Meskini, 319 F.3d 88, 90-91 (2d Cir.
2003) {terrorist defendant unsuccessfully challenging sentence under terrorist provision of
section 3A1.4 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as violative of due process).
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A. Sentencing Entrapment and Antiterrorism Prosecutions
Modern criminal law has become increasingly algorithmic with the
widespread adoption of mechanical sentencing guidelines," grada-
tions for offenses, and aggravating factors. A byproduct of this punish-
ment calculus, "sentencing entrapment"377 is the name for the process
by which undercover agents intentionally "ratchet up" a crime." For
example, agents who plan a trafficking sting operation can decide be-
forehand the amount of drugs to buy or sell," or which drugs to in-
"6 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, of course, have been the subject of a spate of
recent Supreme Court cases, and it is not clear how the new limitations on the sentencing
guidelines will affect the phenomenon of sentencing manipulation or sentencing entrap-
ment. See, e.g., Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 860 (2007) (holding that Califor-
nia's determinate sentencing framework is unconstitutional, because it authorized judge,
not jury, to find facts exposing defendant to elevated upper term sentence, which violated
defendant's right to trial by jury); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005); Rita v.
United States, No. 06-5754, 2006 WL 1144508, at *1 (4th Cir. May 1, 2006); United States
v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479, 481-82 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding sentence unreasonable on ap-
peal), vacated as moot, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007). The requirement of jury findings for sentenc-
ing enhancement factors would tend to encourage law enforcement to rely even more on
preplanned events to guarantee that the evidence for the jury is sufficient. Similarly, a
decrease in judicial discretion in applying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (i.e., more
ex ante predictability) also makes it easier for law enforcement to plan sting operations
around the more predictable sentencing factors. At least one court has hinted that the
ongoing changes in the application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines could affect its
treatment of sentencing entrapment claims. See United States V. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229, 1237
(11th Cir. 2004).
377 See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 353-59. The law review articles and student notes on
this subject have become innumerable; for a recent one that provides excellent back-
ground, see generally Jess D. Mekeel, Note, Misnamed, Misapplied, and Misguided: Clarifying
the State of Sentencing .entrapment and Proposing a New Conception of the Doctrine, 14 Wrd. &
MARY BILL Rrs. J. 1583 (2006).
378 The phrase "ratchet up" seems to have first been used in 1991, by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v Richardson, a money laundering case. 925
F.2d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 1991).
3" See United States v. Lenfesty, 923 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that the
defendant argued that the undercover agent's only motive in repeatedly purchasing from
her was to increase her sentence); United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607, 613-14 (8th Cir.
1991) (recapping the defendant's contention that he was entrapped by the government's
act of fronting money to purchase a larger quantity of drugs than the defendant was pre-
disposed to sell); United States v. Barth, 788 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding
that "[t] he Court finds it not at all fortuitous that the agent arrested the defendant only
after he had arranged enough successive buys to reach the magic number [of fifty grams of
cocaine base, doubling the minimum mandatory sentence from five years to ten years)"),
vacated, 990 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1993); People v. Cousins, No, 239767, 2003 WL 22222056, at
*6, 7 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2003) (holding that the defendant was not a victim of sen-
tencing entrapment when he was asked to supply a larger quantity of cocaine for the third
transaction); State v. Burnett, No. C9-98-1201, 1999 WL 289221, at *3-4 (Minn. Ct. App.
May 11, 1999) (holding that it was not enough to establish sentencing entrapment when
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elude, as different drugs carry different punishments. 380 By so doing,
agents can catapult the defendant into a higher sentencing range,
sometimes making the difference of years on a sentence."' Similarly, an
agent can suggest that the target bring a gun to the transaction. The
presence of firearms can trigger a sentencing enhancement,32 espe-
cially for weapons like automatic rifles, which agents sometimes request
specifically."3 Similarly, agents posing as decoys for pedophiles in
the undercover agent had contacted her supervisor before making the last sale to deter-
mine if the addition of that amount would establish a first degree offense).
399 Often claims of sentencing entrapment arise under circumstances where an under-
cover agent requests the defendant to transform powder cocaine into cocaine base or to
provide the agent with cocaine base rather than powder cocaine. Cocaine base carries a
higher penalty under the Sentencing Guidelines, 120-135 months, whereas powder co-
caine carries a sixty month minimum mandatory sentence. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2006). Cocaine base is crack cocaine; powder cocaine can
be ''cooked" in a microwave to become crack. See United States v. Kimley, No. 01-4324,
2003 WL 1090706, at 441 (3d Cir. Mar. 12, 2003) (reiterating the defendant's claim that the
informant both induced him to sell crack rather than powdered cocaine and manipulated
his sentence by making repeat purchases from him); United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323,
1328-30 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that a request by a government agent for crack cocaine
upon a seller's delivery of powder cocaine, without more, does not establish a claim of
sentencing entrapment); United States v. Saulter, 60 F.3d 270, 279-80 (7th Cir. 1995) (re-
jecting the defendant's contention that downward departure from the Guidelines is war-
ranted due to the undercover agent's encouragement of having the defendant transform
the powder cocaine into crack); United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105, 110-12
(D.D.C. 1994) (holding that the undercover agent's insistence that the purchase of co-
caine was conditioned on the defendant transforming the cocaine powder into crack was
impermissible because this demand did not further the investigation).
981 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1. Professor Neal Katyal of-
fers the following explanation:
[Cl]ne kilo of crack yields a 188-235 month sentence and one kilo of heroin
yields 121-151 months. The four level enhancement increases a crack sen-
tence to 292-365 months—an average increase of about ten years. The en-
hancement increases a heroin sentence, however, to 188-235 months, a much
smaller increase of about six years.
Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrences Difficulty, 95 Micti. L. kEv. 2385, 2422 (1997).
582 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000) (establishing a minimum five year enhancement for
the use of a firearm in drug trafficking, ten years if the firearm is a short-barreled shotgun,
thirty years if the firearm is a machine gun or a gun equipped with a silencer).
3" See United States v. Ramirez-Rangel, 103 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that the trial court should have held a private hearing in chambers to decide whether the
confidential informant's testimony would be relevant to the defendants' claim that the
agents chose to exchange machine guns for their methamphetamines instead of hand-
-
guns, in an attempt to enlarge their sentences by a mandatory thirty years); United States
v. Jones, 102 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that sentencing entrapment was not
warranted despite the defendant's allegation that the agents knew that they would arrest
him already but only insisted upon him exchanging a machine gun for drugs in an at-
tempt to lengthen his sentence); United States v. Cannon, 886 F. Supp. 705, 708 (D.N.D.
1995) (holding that an undercover agent's encouragement of buying handguns and a
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Internet chat rooms ascribe an age to themselves that is just young
enough to implicate the most serious category of attempted sexual
predation, although not too young, lest the trap appeal to too few tar-
gets.384 From the law enforcement perspective, ex ante knowledge of
the sentencing enhancements can provide a way around the exclusion-
ary rules. Even where undercover agents have botched a case regarding
one charge, they can continue an operation if other potential charges
are still alive, ratcheting up the sentence enough to get the same result.
There is a diminishing marginal inducement needed for enhancement
factors, once the culprit has agreed to the base offense.
The idea of agents planning around the sentencing guidelines is
predictably controversial. 385 Some courts, therefore, entertain argu-
ments that the defendant's sentence should be mitigated to offset the
machine gun warranted a downward departure because the sole purpose of this action was
to increase the defendants' sentences by twenty-five years), mud on other grounds, 88 F.3d
1495 (8th Cir. 1996).
584 Federal Sentencing Guidelines contain an enhancement for attempts to engage in
prohibited sexual conduct with a minor or an undercover agent posing as a minor. U.S. SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3.2(b) application n.1; see United States v. McGraw, 351
F.3d 443, 444 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Robertson, 350 F.3d 1109, 1111 (10th Cir.
2003); United States v. Dotson, 324 F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2003). The Sentencing Guide-
lines explicitly state that for pedophiliac computer crimes, it does not matter whether
there was a real "victim" or merely an undercover agent posing as a victim. U.S. SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3.1 application n.l.
" See, e.g., Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Failure to Eliminate
Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 187, 201
(arguing that the Sentencing Guidelines create an increase in the severity of punishment
and double prison populations nationwide); Andrew G. Deiss, Comment, Making the Crime
Fit the Punishment: Pre-Arrest Sentence Manipulation by Investigators Under the Sentencing Guide-
lines, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 419, 419-20 (stating that the minority view is that the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines give the undercover agents too much discretion, the majority opinion is
that the Sentencing Guidelines give the prosecutors too much discretion); Joan Malmud,
Comment, Defending a Sentence: The Judicial Establishment of Sentencing Entrapment and Sen-
tencing Manipulation Defenses, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1359, 1362-76 (1997) (discussing the his-
tory of abuse in sentencing and the possible remedies); Mark Thomas, Comment, Sentenc-
ing Entrapment: How Far Should the Federal Courts Go?, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 147, 147-51 (1996)
(discussing the history of abuse in sentencing and arguing that sentencing entrapment
should not be used for "straight stings").
Most academic commentators frame the problem with sentencing entrapment as a
matter of excessive investigative/prosecutorial discretion resulting from the adoption of
mechanical sentencing guidelines, designed to limit judicial discretion. See, e.g., Berlin,
supra, at 196; Robert S. Johnson, Note, The Ills of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Search for a Cure: Using Sentence Entrapment to Combat Governmental Manipulation of Sentencing,
49 VAND. L. REV. 197, 205-06 (1996).
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increase that state agents manipulated. 386 The conviction stands, but
the court may reduce or mitigate the sentence. 387
There is currently a circuit split among the federal courts of appeal
about whether even to recognize "sentencing en trapmen t. "388 Those
586 See United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that, be-.
fore the advent of the Sentencing Guidelines, courts could prevent sentencing entrapment
by voicing their discretion in sentencing, however under the Sentencing Guidelines
"courts can ensure that the sentences imposed reflect the defendants' degree of culpability
only if they are able to reduce the sentences of defendants who are not predisposed to
engage in deals as large as those induced by the government"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(2000 & Supp. 2003) ("[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the
range, referred to in subsection (a) (4) unless the court finds that there exists an aggravat-
ing or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consid-
eration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in
a sentence different from that described.").
387 See United States v. Padilla, No. Civ.A. 03-CV-85, CRIM.A. 00.CR-12-1, 2003 WL
22016886, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2003) ("Sentencing manipulation by definition is not a
defense ... [and] has no bearing on the defendant's guilt or innocence. Succeeding tin-
der this theory will result in the court granting a downward offense level adjustment under
the guidelines."); see also United States v. Palo, No. 97-50167, 1999 WL 51507, at *1 (9th
Cir. Dec. 10, 1999) (stating that the Ninth Circuit has identified two available remedies for
valid sentencing entrapment claims: 1) "a sentencing court may decline to apply the statu-
tory penalty provision for the greater offense that the defendant was induced to commit,
and instead apply the penalty provision for the lesser offense that the defendant was pre-
disposed to commit"; or 2) "a sentencing court may exercise its discretion to depart down-
ward from the sentencing range for the greater offense that the defendant was induced to
commit" (quoting United States v. Parrilla, 114 F.3d 124, 127 (9th Cir. 1997))).
388 It appears, as of this writing, that the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Fifth, Sixth, Sev-
enth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have rejected it entirely. See United States v. San-
chez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1414 (11th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging sentencing entrapment de-
fense but rejecting it on the instant facts); Jones, 102 F.3d at 809 ("While other circuits have
recognized sentencing entrapment, this circuit has never acknowledged sentencing en-
trapment as a valid basis for a downward departure ...."); United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d
956, 962-66 (10th Cir. 1996) (analyzing defendant's sentencing entrapment argument
under an outrageous official conduct rubric, and finding no such outrageous official con-
duct); United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74, 76 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting sentence manipula-
tion as a matter of law); United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1328-29 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (not
expressly accepting or rejecting the sentencing entrapment doctrine, but definitively re.
jecting it for the instant facts); United States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1279 (5th Cir.
1995) (dismissing the defense as "trendy"). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit has not yet adopted a position. United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 2000).
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have recog-
nized the defense in theory, but not to the benefit of any defendants. See Mekeel, supra
note 378, at 1596-1602 (surveying unsuccessful attempts in these circuits). The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has adopted the defense and applied it to lower a defen-
dant's sentence. See Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1107; 'see also Padilla, 2003 WL 22016886, at *5, 7
(stating that the circuits are split on both the sentence entrapment doctrine and the sen-
tence manipulation doctrine).
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that do recognize it use a predisposition test, 389 that is, whether the de-
fendant would have refused to commit the crime on the scale that oc-
curred in the sting, "but for" the government inducement. 390 The de-*
fendant bears the burden of proving his reticence. 391 The claim is
usually unsuccessful; 392 one court has commented, "garden variety ma-
384 Circuits that recognize sentencing entrapment use similar tests that revolve around
predisposition. See United States v. Gutierrez-Herrera, 293 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2002)
(describing sentencing entrapment as occurring "when the government causes a defen-
dant initially predisposed to commit a lesser crime to commit a more serious offense."
(quoting United States v. Estrada, 256 F.3d 466, 473-74 (7th - Cir. 2001))); United States v.
Woods, 210 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir. 2000) (describing sentencing entrapment as occurring
"when 'a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is en-
trapped in committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment'" (quoting Staufer;
38 F.3d it 1106)); United States v. Citro, 842 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing
five factors used to determine sentencing entrapment: "(1) the character or reputation of
the defendant; (2) whether the government made the initial suggestion of criminal activ-
ity; (3) whether the defendant engaged in the activity for profit; (4) whether the defendant
showed any reluctance; and (5) the nature of the government's inducement"); Padilla, 2003
WL 22016886, at *6 (stating that the Eighth Circuit defines "sentencing entrapment as
'outrageous official conduct' that overcomes the volition of an individual who was predis-
posed to commit a less serious crime and unduly influences them to commit a more seri-
ous crime for the purpose of increasing the resulting sentence of the entrapped defen-
dant" (citing United States v. Rogers, 982 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1993) )).
39° See United States v. Si, 343 F.3d 1116, 1128 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Sentencing entrapment
occurs when a defendant is predisposed to commit a lesser crime, but is entrapped into
committing a more significant crime that is subject to more severe punishment because of
government conduct."); United States v. Stavig, 80 F.3d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating
that sentencing entrapment "may occur where outrageous government conduct overcomes
the will of a defendant predisposed to deal only in small quantities of drugs, for the pur-
pose of increasing the amount of drugs and resulting sentence imposed against that de-
fendant" (quoting United States v. Aikens, 64 F.3d 372, 376 (8th Cir. 1995))); Stuart, 923
F.2d at 614 ("'Sentencing entrapment' as defined by the defendant, posits the situation
where a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is en-
trapped in committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment.").
391 See United States v. Nieto-Cruz, No. 03-50420, 2004 WL 886346, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr.
6, 2004) (stating that the defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that "he had
neither the intent nor the ability to produce the amount of drugs involved"); United States
Medina, No. 99-10332, 2002 WL 1808705, at *1 (9th Cu-. Aug. 6, 2002) ("The defendant
bears that burden of showing sentencing entrapment by a preponderance of the evi-
dence."); United States V. Naranjo, 52 F.3d 245, 250 & n.13 (9th Cir. 1995) ("In making a
sentencing entrapment claim, the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate both the
lack of intent to produce and the lack of capability to produce the quantity of drugs at
issue.").
"2 See, e.g., United States V. Ross, No. 02-50226, 2004 WL 1375522, at *12 (9th Cir.
June 21, 2004) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the
defendant was predisposed to commit an offense involving 100 kilograms of cocaine);
United States v. Rice, No. 02-1383, 2004 WL 1240824, at *3 (10th Cir. June 7, 2004) (re-
jecting the defendant's sentencing factor Manipulation claim that he was improperly in-
duced into manufacturing and selling twenty machine guns because of the government's
fronting him with the money to purchase supplies); United States v. Vega, Nos. 02-50253,
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nipulation claims are largely a waste of time" as this Is a claim only for
the extreme or unusual case."393
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit appar-
ently coined the phrases" in the 1991 case United States v. Lenfe,sty. 395
The defendant's argument was novel at the time, and it met with
skepticism from the Court: "We are not prepared to say there is no
such animal as 'sentencing entrapment.'"" 6 The same week, however,
02-50499, 2004 WL 785311, at *3 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 2004) (holding that the defendant was
not entitled to reduction of his sentence because he was "predisposed to sell in amounts
up to whatever he could handle, including the 233 gram sale"); United States v.
Hightower, No. 03-1015, 2004 WL 729255, at *4 (10th Cir. Apr. 6, 2004) (holding that the
defendant was not a victim of sentencing entrapment when the agent specifically asked for
crack when he had knowledge that the defendant could also supply other drugs that car-
ried less penalty); Gutierrez-Herrera, 293 F.3d at 377 (holding that the defendant was pre-
disposed to distribute cocaine by his admittance of supplying two kilograms to individuals
and that he intended for them to resell it); Estrada, 256 F.3d at 476 (rejecting defendant's
claim that he was offered bargain basement prices for cocaine, given generous credit terms
to accept the larger amount even though he originally requested a much smaller amount,
and that he only had enough money on him to purchase 3.75 kilograms of the 5 kilogram
purchase); United States v. Case, 217 F. Supp. 2d 158, 161-62 (D. Me. 2002) (rejecting the
defendant's claim that his sentence should be reduced for the final sale, which occurred
after the agents could have arrested him for making a ten pound sale); United States V.
Lora, 129 F. Supp. 2d 77, 94 (D. Mass. 2001) (holding that the defendants were predis-
posed to buy cocaine and were not offered "artificially favorable credit terms" that induced
them to purchase more cocaine than they had resources for).
3" See United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995).
394 "Sentencing entrapment" is the most common moniker, but some courts call it
"sentencing manipulation,' and a few courts and commentators have tried to find two
separate defenses in these two terms—but this seems to be the minority view. The First
Circuit uses the terms sentencing entrapment and sentencing factor manipulation to de-
scribe the same conduct. Padilla, 2003 WL 22016886, at *5 (quoting Woods, 210 F.3d at 75).
The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits use the term sentencing entrapment and have
recognized the defense. Id. at *5, 6. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
recognized sentencing entrapment in 1994, in United States v. Shepherd. 857 F. Supp. at 110-
12. The First and Second Circuits recognize sentence manipulation. Padilla, 2003 WL
22016886, at *7. The Fifth Circuit recognizes sentence manipulation but has never applied
it. Id. (citing United States v. Cunningham, Nos: 3-97-CR-263-R, 3-01-CV-1160-11., 2002 WL
1896932, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2002)). In 1994, in United States v. Jones, the Fourth
Circuit recognized the separate existences of sentence entrapment and sentence manipu-
lation, however the viability of either defense was not addressed. 18 F.3d 1145, 1154-55
(4th Cir. 1994). For more discussion, see Malmud, supra note 385, at 1373-74 (distinguish-
ing between the doctrines of sentence entrapment and sentence manipulation and noting
that the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have recognized the existence of some form of the sen-
tence manipulation doctrine); Todd E. Witten, Comment, Sentence Entrapment and Manipu-
lation: Government Manipulation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AKRON L. REV. 697,
716-34 (1996) (discussing the evolution and history behind the different circuits' treat-
ment of sentencing entrapment and sentence manipulation).
393 923 F.2d at 1300.
396 Id.
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the Eighth Circuit addressed it in another ruling, United States v. Stu-
art, 397 this time less dismissively: "Perhaps there is such a thing as 'sen-
tencing entrapment,' but we are not persuaded that [the defendant]
has succeeded in establishing it."98 The first court to recognize sen-
tencing entrapment formally was a federal district court in Minnesota
in 1992, in United States v. Barth, where the court found that the Sen-
tencing Commission had "failed to adequately consider the terrifying
capacity for escalation of a defendant's sentence based on the investi-
gating officer's determination of when to make the arrest."399 Based
on the number of reported cases on Westlaw,40 sentencing entrap-
ment cases reached their peak in the period between 1996 and 1997,
at least in the federal courts (the state cases are too rare to speak of a
pattern), and the cases have dropped off steadily since then. 401
Of special interest to our discussion, federal courts use the same
verbiage, i.e., "predisposition," in deciding sentencing entrapment as
they do in the regular entrapment defense.402 This is also true in cases
involving terrorism charges where sentencing entrapment arises as a
defense. 4°3 Courts frame the question the same way, whether it is the
397 See generally 923 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1991).
598 Id. at 614.
999 788 F. Supp. at 1057.
400 is difficult, if not impossible, to determine exactly how many cases involved an
entrapment defense, because in trials where the defense was effective, resulting in an ac-
quittal, there would often be no written opinion, and this would be true in many unsuc-
cessful attempts to use the defense as well if the defendant did not appeal the conviction.
Nevertheless, the aggregate numbers of cases in which entrapment occurs in written opin-
ions must be roughly representative of its use overall, sufficiently so to serve as a proxy in
making approximations.
401 See Stevenson, supra note 10, at 45.
402 See, e.g., United States v. Knecht, 55 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1995) (expressing that the
validity of the defense has not been determined, and even if it was, the defendant was pre-
disposed to launder proceeds from illegal activity with the knowledge that it was probably
drug money); Washington, 44 F.3d at 1279-80 (choosing not to address the viability of the
theory due to the facts of the case); United States v. Wright, No. 93-4228, 1995 WL
101300, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 9, 1995) (declining to address the issue of accepting the sen-
tencing entrapment doctrine, because even in a court that accepts the doctrine, the facts
of the case would not support a claim); United States v. Cotts, 14 F.3d 300, 306 n.2 (7th Cir.
1994) (stating that even if sentencing entrapment is a viable theory, defendant failed to
present evidence that outrageous conduct occurred); Stuart, 923 F.2d at 613-14 (acknowl-
edging the existence of the defense and elaborating upon it, but holding that the facts of
the case do not warrant the defense).
4433 See, e.g., United States v. Hale, 448 F.3d 971, 989 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The argument
suggests 'sentencing entrapment,' which occurs when an individual predisposed to commit
a lesser crime commits a more serious offense as a result of 'unrelenting government per-
sistence.' The government overcomes an alleged entrapment defense by establishing that
the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense charged." (citation omitted)).
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predisposition to go from selling zero drugs to one gram (that is, to
commit the crime in the first place), or to go from selling nine grams
to ten. In either case, it means something like readiness, willingness,
or a lack of resistance to lawbreaking. 404
The length of sentences goes directly to the issue of incapacitation.
As discussed above, incapacitation of terrorists is necessary because
prevention of attacks is so important. As a policy matter, stings that
produce longer periods of incapacitation for terrorists have value, and
should receive a higher degree of judicial deference than usual. 4°5
The scienter requirement of the "material support" statutes 406
means that undercover agents must include extra steps in the sting op-
erations to demonstrate that the culprit meets this element.407 Re-
peated or escalated acts help prove scienter, rather than merely ratchet-
ing up a sentence, as they would for other crimes. Planning the
operation around the statutory scienter requirements may necessitate
repeated acts or escalating factors.
On the other hand, terrorism prosecutions have special sentenc-
ing considerations under the Sentencing Guidelines and the "material
support" statutes.'m Following a hypothetical offered by Brian Comer-
ford,'" under the regular Sentencing Guidelines, the base offense level
for Section 2339B violations would be twenty-six, which does not in-
clude specific offense enhancements for "dangerous weapons, explo-
404 see" e.g.,
 Biggs v. United States, No. 99-5238, 2001 WL. 128413, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Feb.
6, 2001) r[T] he record reveals that Biggs was predisposed to deal in distribution-sized
quantities of methamphetamine. Biggs was charged following the execution of a reverse-
sting operation in which the government sold four pounds of methamphetamine to Biggs
and his co-defendant. Biggs sought to purchase the drugs so that he could resell them in
Memphis, Tennessee. Biggs met an informant at a nightclub and gave the informant
$2,000 for the purchase. Later, during a telephone conversation that was recorded, the
informant stated that he felt a pressing need to be rid of the four pounds of metham-
phetamine he was about to possess and that Biggs could have all four pounds for $5,000.
Biggs accepted the bargain, delivered $2,500 to make the purchase, and was arrested after
he and his co-defendant took possession of all four pounds of methamphetamine. At sen-
tencing, Biggs stated that it was never his 'intention to buy four pounds of crystal meth.'
He stated that, 'If they had not been practically give [sic] to me, I wouldn't be in the trou-
ble I am now.'").
40 In United States v. Lakhani, the defendant argued, after his primary entrapment de-
fense failed, that he should receive a mitigated sentence because of the hint of entrap-
ment. 480 F.3d at 186-87. The court was dismissive; his sentence remained at forty-seven
years. Id.
"8 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(a) (West 2006): 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV
2004).
ton See Abrams, supra note 172, at 21-35.
405 See Comerford, .supra note 173, at 752-56.
409 Id. at 753.
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sixes, or the provision of support with the intent to commit or assist in
the commission of a violent act."'" If a defendant has no criminal re-
cord, and was not subject to any enhancements, the guideline range
would therefore equal sixty-three to seventy-eight months; 4 " except
that there is an additional provision of the Sentencing Guidelines
ratcheting up the sentence for "federal crimes of terrorism."'" This
terrorism enhancement increases the sentencing by twelve levels, which
means that the defendant who otherwise would receive a sentence of
five or six years would receive a sentence of thirty years or more.'" Yet
no defendant could receive this sentence for a "material support"
charge, because the applicable criminal statute caps the punishment at
fifteen years.414 This cap serves as an ex ante limit, in theory, to the
amount of "sentencing manipulation" or "sentencing entrapment" that
stings could achieve in the terrorism context.
B. Entrapment by Estoppel
Entrapment by estoppel involves no stings and no undercover
agents,415 unlike traditional entrapment.'" Rather, this refers to situa-
410 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2M5.3 (2004).
4" Id. § 5A.
410 Id. § 3A1.4.
4" See Comerford, supra note 173, at 753-54.
414 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (1) (2000).
415 A few of the cases involve former government informants who had temporary au-
thority to go along with illegal activities as part of a sting operation (or so it was claimed),
but this authorization expired while the defendant continued. See, e.g., United States V.
Hilton, 257 F.3d 50, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2001) (arguing that the defendant's previous collabo-
ration with the government misled him to believe that collecting child pornography was
legal as long as he turned over the material to a government agent).
416 See MARCUS, supra note 1, at 47. Marcus notes that "much of the rationale for the
claim implicates due process concerns under the fifth and fourteenth amendments." Id.
There is only one academic article devoted to the subject from the last ten years. See Sean
Connelly, Bad Advice: The Entrapment by Estoppel Doctrine in Criminal Law, 48 U. MIAMI L.
Rev. 627, 647 (1994) (arguing that the defense should only apply to crimes not requiring
proof of culpable intent, and that the applicability of the defense in a given case should be
decided by the court, not the jury). And, in the same time period, only two bar journal
articles have been devoted to the topic. See Mark S. Cohen, Entrapment by Estoppel, COLO.
LAW., Feb. 2002, at 45; Michael S. Pasano et al., Using the Defense of Entrapment by Estoppe4
CHAMPION, May 2002, at 20. Both articles are descriptive law summaries designed to aid
practitioners, without advocating for a significant change in policy. See generally Cohen,
supra Pasano et al., supra.
Two older articles provided some of the conceptual framework for courts addressing
this issue before it took on its present name. See generally Note, Applying Estoppel Principles in
Criminal Cases, 78 YALE L.J. 1046 (1969); Recent Cases, State Estopped to Prosecute Criminal
Conduct Suggested by Police, 81 HARV. L. REV. 895 (1968) (discussing People v. Donovan, 279
N.Y.S. 2d 404 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1967)).
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tions where 1) there was an official assurance of the legality of a certain
action,417 2) by an appropriately authorized state actor, 418 3) followed by
a reasonable reliance on the assurance by the defendant, 419 and 4)
criminal charges against the defendant for carrying out the action. 42° It
417 See, e.g., United States v. Aquino-Chacon, 109 F.3d 936, 939 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
defendant required to show "active misleading" by government); United States v. Trevino-
Martinez, 86 F.3d 65, 69-70 (5th Cir. 1996); State v. Krzeszowski, 24 P.M 485, 489-90
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001) ("active representation" by government agent required); see also
MARCUS, supra note 1, at 47-49.
4113 see, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 89 F. App'x 632, 634 (9th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Bunnell, 280 F.3d 46, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2002) (firearm violation); United States v.
Ormsby, 252 F.3d 844, 851 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that state government official's assur-
ances cannot be basis of reasonable reliance for federal law firearm regulations); United
States v. Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 466 (5th Cir. 1996); People v. Charon, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 211,
218-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Woods, 616 N.W.2d 211, 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000);
see also MARCUS, WPM note 1, at 49.
419 The question of whether the defendant's reliance was reasonable tends to be the
most common point of dispute in the cases. For a good discussion of the doctrine gener-
ally and of this point in particular, see United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 107-08 (2d Cir..
2002); see also United States V. Parker, 267 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir, 2001) (involving child
pornography case, where defendant claimed he was supplying the government with leads
on other violators); United States v. Rector, 111 F.3d 503, 506-07 (7th Cir. 1997); State v.
Kremlacek, No. A-98-1195, 1999 WL 759970, at *3-4 (Neb. Ct. App. 1999); MARCUS, supra
note 1, at 47-49.
420 A succinct explanation of this defense, distinguishing it from similar strategies a de-
fendant could use, was explained as follows:
Several defenses may apply when a defendant claims he performed the acts
for which he was charged in response to a request from an agency of the gov-
ernment... First, the defendant may allege 'that he lacked criminal intent
because he honestly believed he was performing the otherwiSe-criminal acts
in cooperation with the government. "Innocent intent" is not a defense per se,
but a defense strategy aimed at negating the melts rea for the crime, an essen-
tial element of the prosecution's case.... A second possible defense is "public
authority." With this affirmative defense, the defendant seeks exoneration
based on the fact that he reasonably relied on the authority of a government
official to engage him in a covert activity. The validity of this defense depends
upon whether the government agent in fact had the authority to empower
the defendant to perform the acts in question. If the agent had no such
power, then the defendant may not rest on the "public authority" [de-
fense].... A third possible defense ... is "entrapment by estoppel." This de-
fense applies when a government official tells a defendant that certain con-
duct is legal and the defendant commits what would otherwise be a crime in
reasonable reliance on the official's representation.
See United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1368 n.18 (11th Cir. 1994) (citation
omitted); see also United States v. Burrows, 36 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting the
above passage as its own rule). A strange illustration of the foregoing distinctions can be
seen operating in the background of United States v. George, where the prosecution re-
quested that the defendant be acquitted, if at all, under the theory of entrapment by es-
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is similar to promissory estoppel in contracts. 421 The Supreme Court
addressed the doctrine in three cases, albeit without using the moniker
"entrapment by estoppel. "422 The Court cites articles referring to the
"estoppel" defense, but its own verbiage emphasizes the due process
violation inherent in officials misleading defendants with false assur-
ances about the legality of their proposed actions. 425
Despite its association by name with the entrapment defense, there
is little association with the rest of entrapment law; 424 inadvertent ac-
tions by state actors are usually the issue instead of planned operations,
and the agent's position with the government is obvious. One similarity
to the entrapment defense, however, is how rarely this defense works. 425
toppel, rather than a lack of the requisite mental state, to avoid creating unfavorable
precedent. 266 F.3d 52, 59 n.7 (2d Cir. 2001), vacated in part, 386 F.3d 383 (2d Cir. 2004).
421 See e.g., EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 129 {Robert C.
Clark et al. eds., 6th ed. 2003) ("The doctrine of equitable estoppel is founded on con-
cepts of equity and fair dealing. It provides that a person may not deny the existence of a
state of facts if he intentionally led another to believe a particular circumstance to be true
and to rely upon such a belief to his detriment. The elements of the doctrine are that {1)
the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct
shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to be-
lieve it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and
(4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.").
422 United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674-75 (1973); Cox v. Lou-
isiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426 {1959).
423 See Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. at 674.
424 See Connelly, supra note 416, at 628 ("Entrapment by estoppel differs markedly
from the traditional entrapment defense because a defendant need not show that a gov-
ernment official 'induced' his conduct but only that the official offered an honest, albeit
mistaken, opinion that the conduct was lawful. Similarly, the defense differs from the 'out-
rageous government misconduct' defense that some courts have recognized as a matter of
substantive due process in cases where, even though the defendant was criminally predis-
posed, the government induced the crime or participated in it through means that 'shock
the conscience.'").
425 In the last few years, the defense was only successful in one reported federal case.
United States v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir. 2004), Batterjee was convicted for
violating a federal statute prohibiting nonimmigrant aliens from possessing firearms or
ammunition; Batterjee was residing in the United States on a student visa. Id. at 1212. He
ordered a pistol and filled out Federal Form 4473 to obtain a permit for the weapon, indi-
cating truthfully that he was not a citizen on the forms. Id. at 1212-14. He provided addi-
tional materials requested by the gun store owner, a firearms licensee, and was given assur-
ances from the store owner that he was completing the license application properly. Id. at
1214. The statute prohibiting certain aliens from possessing firearms, however, was
amended before the defendant's gun purchase, making it illegal for him to consummate
the purchase, although the instructions on the application forms were not updated to
reflect this change. Id. at 1215. When prosecuted, Batterjee claimed that the form and the
store owner (a federal licensee) had misled him. Id. The district court rejected this de-
fense, but his conviction was reversed on appeal; he reasonably relied on the licensee's
representations as to his eligibility to possess a firearm. Id. at 1219.
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The defense arises in a variety of cases (different types of crimes) , 428 but
most pertain to regulatory offenses, especially firearms violations. 427 It
is usually a federal crime for convicted felons to purchase guns, but a
surprising number decide that prohibition does not apply in their case,
based on misunderstood instructions from official sources. 428 Typically,
the purported assurances usually come in the form of the confusing
written instructions on the permit application form, or perhaps verbal
In state courts, entrapment by estoppel seems to have succeeded only twice in the last
few years, and in one of these cases the acquittal was reversed on an appeal by the state.
State v. Hagan-Sherwin, 158 S.W.3d 156, 158 (Ark. 2004) (successful estoppel defense
where defendant was charged with appropriating insurance premiums for own use, where
state regulators had tacitly condoned the practice); Chacon, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 212 (suc-
cessful defense at trial reversed on appeal).
Entrapment by estoppel usually arises in cases where the defendant cannot meet the
test-where there was either no assurance or not reasonable reliance. See MARCUS, supra
note 1, at 49 ("Defendants have had a difficult time demonstrating that these elements are
all present.").
426 Recent entrapment by estoppel cases include tax fraud, see United States v. Young,
350 F.3d 1302, 1309 n.7 (11th Cir. 2003), food and dairy regulations, see United Stites v.
Lagrou Distrib. Sys., Inc., No. 03 CR 605, 2004 WL 524438, at *1 (N.D. 111. Feb. 2, 2004),
trafficking in endangered animals/animal products, see United States v. Kapp, No. 02-CR
418-1, 2003 WL 23162408, at *5 (N.D. III. Nov. 6, 2003), defrauding the Department of
[lousing and Urban Development, see United States v. Westover, No. 02-40012-01-SAC,
2003 WL 1904046, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 6, 2003), securities fraud, see United States v. Grey-
ling, No. 00CR.631(RCC), 2002 WL 424655, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2002), violation of
insurance regulations, see Hagan-Sherwin, 158 S.W.3d at 158, operation of pyramid scheme,
see People v. Micheau, No. 241076, 2003 WL 22358874, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 16,
2003), election code violations, see Commonwealth v. Cosentino, 850 A.2d 58, 61 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2004), violation of alimony orders, see White v. White, 564 S.E.2d 700, 702 (Va.
Ct. App. 2002), welfare fraud, see United States v. Whitecloud, 59 F. App'x 918, 919 (9th
Cir. 2003), operation of nudist club, see Poppell v. City of San Diego, 149 F.3d 951, 959 (9th
Cir. 1998), child pornography, see Hilton, 257 F.3d .at 50, drug possession, see United States
v. Guevara, 99 F. App'x 300, 303 (2d Cir. 2004), importation and sale of drug parapherna-
lia, see United States v. Marshall, 332 F.3d 254, 262 (4th Cir. 2003), and immigration viola-
tions. See Mendoza, 89 F. App'x at 634; United States v. Miranda-Ramirez, 309 F.3d 1255,
1261 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Alba, 38 F. App'x 707, 708-09 (3d Cir. 2002); George,
266 F.3d at 60 n.7. The most common crime charged is firearm violations.
427 See, e.g., Battedee, 361 F.3d at 1212; United States v. Haire, 89 F. App'x 551, 553 (6th
Cir. 2004); United States v Emerson, 86 F. App`x 696, 698 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Kubowski, 85 F. App'x 686, 688(10th Cir. 2003); Hood v. United States, 342 F.3d 861, 863
(8th Cir. 2003); Bunnel4 280 F.3d at 49; United States v. Scott, 41 F. App'x 372, 375 (10th
Cir. 2002); Ormsby, 252 F.3d at 847; Fehr v. Coplan, No. Cir. 03-59-M, 2003 WL 22489735,
at *3 (D.N.H. No 4, 2003); Swartz v. Iowa, No. C00-2065, 2002 WL 32173383, at *1 (N.D.
Iowa Aug. 30, 2002); People v. Babich, No. A098521, 2003 WL 21958615, at *1 (Cal. Ct.
App. Aug. 18, 2003); People v. Sparazynski, No. 243381, 2004 WI. 345371, at *1 (Mich. Ct.
App. Feb. 24, 2004); State v. Morley, No. 21357-9-M, 2004 WL 171587, at *4 (Wash. Ct.
App. Jan. 29, 2004); State v. Leavitt, 27 P.3d 622, 625-28 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); Krzeszowski,
24 P.3d at 489-90. These are all recent cases; surveys going back further reveal a similar
predominance of firearms violations as the underlying substantive offense.
428 See, e.g., Batterjee, 361 F.3d at 1212.
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assurances from gun shop owners, 429 who in rare cases are held to be
agents of the state, due to their special role in administering the federal
applications. 43° Some cases allege misleading assurances from judges,
police, or probation officers. 43 ' Besides cases relating to eligibility to
purchase firearms, there are some eligibility cases pertaining to immi-
gration or illegal reentry. 432
These regulatory offenses, in turn, can constitute a probation vio-
lation, so the consequences for some defendants are quite severe. 433 If
one thinks of "entrapment by estoppel" primarily in terms of fudging
on gun license applications and the like, the limited usefulness of the
defense becomes apparent.
Entrapment by estoppel poses two special considerations in the
context of antiterrorism prosecutions. 4M First, given the astute plan-
4" See, e.g., Scott, 41 F. App'x at 375.
4'° See, e.g., Batteuee, 361 F.3d at 1217; Scott, 41 F. App'x at 375; Sparazynski, 2004 WI.
345371, at *2 (involving overdue permit; defendant alleged clerk at county Gun Board
told defendant he had a grace period); Fehr, 2003 WI. 22489735, at *3-4.
431 See, e.g., Haire, 89 F. App'x at 553 (holding that although defendant was told by state
police he could own firearms this was not valid defense on federal charges); Kubowski, 85 F.
App'x at 688 (assurances from judge); Hood, 342 F.3d at 865; Ormsby, 252 F.3d at 847 (im-
plicit permission of sheriff's department); Swartz v. Mathes, 291 F. Supp. 2d 861, 869 (N.D.
Iowa 2003); Swartz, 2003 WL 32173383, at *1; State v. Johnson, 83 P.3d 772, 772 (Haw. Ct.
App. 2004) (unpublished table decision) (assurances of probation officer); Babich, 2003
WL 21958615, at '0 1 (sheriff returned guns to defendant's possession after confiscation);
Miller v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 482, 491 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (defense successful
where probation officer authorized gun possession).
4" See, e.g., Mendoza, 89 F. App'x at 634; Alba, 38 F. App'x at 708-09; Miranda-Ramirez,
309 F.3d at 1258; George, 266 F.3d at 59 n.7; United States v. Santana Cruz, 216 F.3d 1074
(2d Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision); United States v. Ramirez-Valencia, 202 F.3d
1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Gutierrez-Gonzalez, 184 F.3d 1160, 1162 (10th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Ortegon-Uvalde, 179 F.3d 956, 957 (5th Cir. 1999); Aquino-
Chacon, 109 F.3d at 937; United States v. Thomas, 70 F.3d 575, 575 (11th Cir. 1995).
4" See, e.g., Spires, 79 F.3d at 465; People v. Dingman, 55 Cal. Rptr, 2d 211, 213, 217
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Howell, No. 97CA824, 1998 WL 807800, at *8-13 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 17, 1998); see also Whitecloud, 2003 WL 1459508, at *1 (welfare fraud violates
probation); Poppet!, 149 F.3d at 959 (operation of nudist club); Johnson, 83 P.3d at 772 (plea
agreement in homicide case violated probation in another jurisdiction).
434 For an interesting discussion and alternative (practitioner's) view of the defense as
it might relate to terrorism-related crimes and tort litigation, see John W. Stamper, Looking
at the Events of September 11: Some Effects and Implications, 69 DEF. COUNS, J. 152, 166-68
(2002). Stamper concludes:
Thus, a defendant could utilize this defense—if the above requirements are
met—to defend itself in a criminal or civil action brought by the government.
There is some possibility that the defense could succeed if formally asserted in a
civil suit, and it could still have value even if it did not succeed. In the case of a
private tort suit brought in relation to the September 11 events, a defendant's
reliance on an official statement or interpretation of law from the FAA could be
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ning and preparation that goes into a terror-related crime, it is foresee-
able that this defense could be set up in advance by soliciting official
approval, with half-truths or a manipulative presentation, of various
auxiliary activities (like the provision of support to an NGO operating
as a front organization). A court should look askance at such official
assurances relied on by sophisticated conspirators, as opposed to the
more typical felon-purchaser of handguns.
Second, most antiterrorism prosecutions in the next several years
will involve "material support to terror-related organizations," rather
than ,actual bombings or hijackings. 435 As has already occurred, defen-
dants are likely to claim reliance on the fact that the organization in
question was not on some official government list of recognized terror
groups, or even that some administrative agency gave assurances that
the organization was in good standing. There is a problem here with
private information; the donor often has better information about the
true nature of a charity or NGO than do the regulatory agencies (e.g.,
the Internal Revenue Service) that issue certificates of tax exemption,
licenses, and permits. It is foreseeable that the primary antiterrorism
statutes will lend themselves to entrapment by estoppel claims, and it
would be prudent to tighten the rule in anticipation of this scenario. 4"
C. Derivative or Vicarious Entrapment
"Derivative entrapment" (also called "vicarious entrapment") is a
developing area of laW. 437 Sometimes the original targets of the sting
relevant to whether that entity had exercised due care. This would be particu-
larly true if the applicable standard of care was drawn from the very regulations
that the FAA was interpreting and enforcing. Thus, while such reliance would
provide good arguments that the airport or airline wasn't negligent in perform-
ing its security functions, it probably wouldn't trigger a true "government au-
thorization" or "entrapment by estoppel" defense. The true form of this defense
is best utilized in an action brought by the government.
Id. at 168.
4" See AtittAms, supra note 257, at 30 (`°the government views these offenses as espe-
cially important tools in the effort to prevent terrorism.").
436
	
the topic of internationalization of entrapment law, there are two relatively re-
cent cases from the Supreme Court of Canada applying a defense that appears to be iden-
tical to what Americans call 'entrapment by estoppel." See Levis (Ville) c. Têtreault, [2006]
1 S.C.R. 420,1 25 (Can.); R. v. Jorgensen, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 55,11 22-23 (Can.).
437 See United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1204 (7th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Valencia, 669 F.2d 37, 39-41 (2d Cir. 1981); Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d
944, 947 (9th Cir. 1968) (-thus we have the paradoxical situation in which the principal
participant goes free because he was entrapped, while his lesser confederate must remain
in prison and serve his sentence unless the 'umbrella' of [the principal's] entrapment is
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operation act on their own to recruit additional members of the con-
spiracy,438 but usually derivative entrapment refers to situations where
the undercover agent uses an unsuspecting intermediary as a means of
passing on an inducement to a distant target.439 Some federal appellate
courts have held that if the original party had a valid entrapment de-
fense, then the friend or relative whom the culprit subsequently re-
cruited could also use the defense,44° In some circumstances, an en-
stretched to cover [the lesser] as well."); United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191, 196 (3d
Cir. 1957); Hassel v. Matthues, 22 F.2d 979, 979-80 (E.D. Pa. 1927). For more academic
commentary and discussion, see LAFAVE, supra note 130, § 5.2(a); Nilsson, supra note 124,
at 746 (1996); Note, Entrapment Through Unsuspecting Middlemen, 95 HARV, L. REV, 1122,
1129 (1982) ("[E]ven when the government has no reason to suspect that a target of an
investigation will induce a nonessential collaborator to join in criminal activity, the third
party should still be able to plead entrapment if it is found that the initial target was him-
self entrapped."). For an excellent recent judicial discussion of the defense, including
detailed analysis of appropriate jury instructions, see United States v. Turner, No, GRIM.
99-10098-RGS, 2005 WL 516007, at *3-5 (D. Mass. Mar. 4, 2005).
4M1 See, e.g., United States v. Pilarinos, 864 F.2d 253, 254-55 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining
how the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") inspector posed as a corrupt IRS employee
who took bribes from taxpayers to avoid taxes; agent met two coconspirators, a priest-
businessman and an accountant, who acted as middlemen and who shared in the bribe
revenues; priest told the inspector that he had a client, the defendant, who was willing to
pay $4000 to stop a federal audit on a gas station).
'" See, e.g., United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 127 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that de-
fendant is entitled to a derivative entrapment defense when the government's inducement
was directly communicated to the person seeking the entrapment charge by an unwitting
middleman); People v. Wiegelos, 568 N.E.2d 861, 862-64 (Ill. 1991).
440 see e.g., United States v. Emmert, 829 F.2d 805, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
defendant's derivative entrapment claim, reasoning that defendant's college roommate
was not an agent of the government); Klosterman, 248 F.2d at 196 (friend); State v. Hunter,
586 So. 2d 319, 322 (Fla. 1991) ("When a middleman, not a state agent, induces another
person to engage in a crime, entrapment is not an available defense."). The success rate of
the defense seems to vary somewhat depending on the familial relationship at issue, but
there are not necessarily enough cases to extrapolate a definite pattern or rule. For exam-
ple, in United States u Mers, a court held that a son could not claim vicarious entrapment
through his father. 701 F.2d 1321, 1340 (11th Cir. 1983). In that case, the son never dealt
with or even met the government's informant, any inducements to the son to traffic in
drugs came from his father (a private citizen), and thus the vicarious entrapment defense
was held to be unavailable. Id. Defenses where a sibling was the intermediary have been
more successful. See, e.g., Matthues, 22 F.2d at 979-80 (holding that bribery conviction was
tainted by entrapment of brother); People v. McIntire, 591 P.2d 527, 530-31 (Cal. 1979)
(reversing sister's conviction of possession of marijuana for sale where her younger
brother had been entrapped). Asserting entrapment via one's spouse yields mixed results.
See United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1151, 1168-69 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that hus-
band's vicarious entrapment defense via his wife was potentially meritorious although the
wife herself was held unable to defend on the ground of entrapment; but ultimately hold-
ing that the defense faltered because the husband could not show sufficient communica-
tion between himself and his wife); Norman v. State, 588 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979) (wife unsuccessfully argued vicarious entrapment partly via her husband). At least
one grandparent derivative entrapment claim seems to have succeeded. See, e.g., United
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trapment defense has succeeded for the distant target"' but usually
the defense is unsuccessful. 442
Although the relative newness and lack of widespread accep-
tance445 makes this defense less significant for purposes of this discus-
States v. Pardue, 765 F. Supp. 513, 525-31 (W.D. Ark. 1991) (holding that grandfather's
tacit derivative or vicarious entrapment argument based on entrapment of his grandson
was meritorious). In a case involving an uncle and nephew the defense failed. United
States v. Fernandez, No. 87 CR 75-3, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5027, at *15 (N.D. Ili. May 27,
1988).
441 See United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 993-96 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (recognizing
derivative entrapment as a legally cognizable defense but stating facts of the case do not
support it); United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269-70 (7th Cir. 1986) (recognizing
possibility of derivative entrapment instruction, but holding that facts of the case did not
support such an instruction); Valencia, 645 F.2d at 1168-69 (recognizing derivative en-
trapment defense and remanding for determination of whether there was sufficient com-
munication from wife to defendant to support the defense). Contra United States v. Eu-
ishas, 791 F.2d 1310, 1313-14 (7th Cir. 1986).
443 See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 364 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e have ex-
pressly refused to recognize derivative entrapment as a basis for an entrapment defense.");
United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 573-74 (4th Cir. 2000) ("[I]n the Fourth Circuit,
a defendant cannot claim an entrapment defense based upon the purported inducement
of a third party who is not a government agent if the third party is not aware that he is
dealing with a government agent."); United States v. Hodges, 936 F.2d 371, 371 (8th Cir.
1991); United States v. Marren, 890 F.2d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 1989); Pilarinos, 864 F.2d at 256;
United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Noll, 600 F.2d
1123, 1125 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Gonzales, 461 F.2d 1000, 1000 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Turner, No. CR.A. 99-10098-RGS, 2003 WL 22056405, at *2 (D. Mass. Sept.
4, 2003) (derivative entrapment defense held unavailable where intermediary was not
found to have been entrapped); Acosta v. State, 477 So. 2d 9, 9-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Wiegelos, 568 N.E.2d at 862-63.
443 For example, it is difficult to find cases where it has succeeded in a state court as
opposed to federal court. See, e.g., People v. Van Alstyne, 46 Cal. App. 3d 900, 906-08 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1975); Hunter, 586 So. 2d at 322; Acosta, 477 So. 2d at 9-10; State v. Perez, 438 So.
2d 436, 437-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Agrabunte, 830 P.2d 492, 501 (Haw.
1992); Wiegelos, 568 N.E.2d at 862-64; Rettman v. State, 292 A.2d 107, 110 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1972); Commonwealth s Silva, 488 N.E.2d 34, 41 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986); 'State v.
McGee, 299 S.E.2d 796, 800 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); Commonwealth v. Lindenmuth, 554
A.2d 62, 65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Ramirez v. State, 822 S.W.2d 240, 248 (Tex. App. 1991);
Norman, 588 S.W.2d at 345-46. But see McIntire, 591 P.2d at 530-31 (reversing sister's con-
viction of possession of marijuana for sale where her younger brother had been en-
trapped); People v. Weatherford, 341 N.W.2d 119, 120 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (suggesting
that vicarious entrapment defense was successful, albeit not explicitly distinguishing it
from a standard entrapment charge).
About one-third of the federal circuits have explicitly refused to recognize the defense
as a matter of law. See Hsu, 364 F.3d at 202; Washington, 106 F.3d at 993-94 (adopting the
proposition •of United States v. Layeni, 90 F.3d 514, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1996), that "the entrap-
ment defense can be raised by a defendant who was induced by an unknowing intermedi-
ary at the instruction or direction of a government official or third party acting on behalf
of the government (e.g., an informant)" but not if "the unknowing intermediary on his own
induces the defendant to engage in criminal activity"); Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1207; Farah
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sion, the increased use of undercover agents and elaborate sting op-
erations in the War on Terror will probably result in more instances of
second-hand recruitment, that is, someone recruited by the under-
cover agent in turn recruits other people. In the antiterrorism con-
text, this seems to be a desirable result. If the earlier point is correct
that there is a finite set of potential recruits for terrorism, at least
within our country's prosecutorial jurisdiction, 445 then the broadest
net for catching them is the most efficient net. The priority of preven-
tion makes secondhand stings particularly useful, even necessary.`
CONCLUSION
In American criminal law, the entrapment defense is distinct from
other defenses and procedural safeguards in two important ways. First,
it is unique in the extent to which its parameters can influence the pol-
icy and planning of enforcement agencies; second, it is distinct in its
inherent relations to a single method of policing. Its connection to this
solitary method (sting operations) historically connected the defense
v. United States, Nos. 2:06-CV-39-FtM-29DNF, 2:96-cr-27-FTM-29DNF, 2006 WL 2691520, at
*2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2006) (noting that the defense is not available in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit).
444 See Carleo-Evangelist, supra note 9.
44' On the issues of internationalization of the entrapment defense, there is a relatively
recent case from the Supreme Court of Canada that appears to reject the notion of vicari-
ous or derivative entrapment in Canada's legal system. See R. v. Carosella, [19971 1 S.C.R.
80,1 137 (Can.).
It is difficult to see how the conduct of a third party could undermine the moral in-
tegrity of a prosecution if it does not affect the fairness of the trial. The law recognizes that
serious improprieties on the part of the police or prosecuting autlunities—ulterior motives for
a prosecution and entrapment, to name but two examples—could be so inconsistent with
the community's sense of decency that a remedy for abuse of process is warranted even if
the impugned conduct did not affect the fairness of the trial. Seel). M. Paciocco, The Stay of
Proceedings as a Remedy in Criminal Cases: Abusing the Abuse of Process Concept, 15 CR1M. L.J.
315, 318-19 (1991); Andrew L.-T. Choo, Halting Criminal Prosecutions: The Abuse of Process
Doctrine Revisited, 1995 Cum. L. Ray. 864, 866.-71. However, the conduct of a potential
witness or other third party cannot be assimilated to an abuse by the state of its investiga-
tory powers and prosecutorial prerogative.
446 In other areas of criminal defenses, particularly those involving constitutional
rights, it is not clear that a defendant can assert Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations for
searches conducted on another person or another's property that led to incriminating
evidence against the defendant as a third party. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
105 (1980) (defendant had no standing to contest admissibility of drugs seized from
friend's purse). This point is noted by other commentators. Roger Park mentions the pos-
sibility of greater payoffs but not referring to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine;
rather, he emphasizes what I would consider "side benefits" of harassing defendants with
pretextual arrests. See Park, supra note 15, at 232.
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to a finite set of crimes that lent themselves to this method, and this
historical context shaped the development of its rules or elements.
The policing method in question, however, has special significance
for antiterrorism efforts, and this new context necessitates a reconsid-
eration of the traditional rules for the defense. Unlike "victimless"
crimes, terrorism requires an emphasis on prevention more than pun-
ishment. This orientation toward prevention changes the scale of some
policing methods, such as surveillance. Surveillance designed to detect
crimes already committed, or committed repeatedly by the same crimi-
nals, allow for targeted, specific surveillance with relatively modest in-
fringements on the civil liberties of third parties (innocent civilians). By
contrast, preventing terrorism requires much more extensive and in-
trusive surveillance. This panoptic monitoring of large segments of the
population poses much more significant infringements on everyone's
privacy and civil liberties, is inconceivably costly, and relatively ineffec-
tive. Sting operations are discreet, narrowly targeted, and pragmatic,
avoiding the extensive privacy invasions that surveillance brings.
Law enforcement resources are finite, and present agency direc-
tors with a zero sum game, forcing a choice between alternative meth-
ods. Spending resources on one police method diverts resources away
from other alternatives; making one method "cheaper' ) in terms of le-
gal obstacles will predictably shift agencies toward that method, and
away from others. Sting operations are a rival method, in terms of allo-
cating resources, to dragnet surveillance. To the extent that ubiquitous,
invasive surveillance is undesirable, encouraging the use of stings for
combating terrorism will decrease the use of widespread surveillance.
The entrapment defense is the primary means by which we regu-
late sting operations in this country. Encouraging law enforcement to
use stings instead of dragnet surveillance, therefore, is achievable
mostly through an adaptation of the entrapment defense. Courts or
legislatures could confine such an adaptation to antiterrorism prose-
cutions, leaving the defense in its traditional state for the traditional
crimes related to it. The present growth of antiterrorism prosecutions
makes the need for a tailored entrapment defense especially urgent.
